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ABSTRACT 
 
Most peace operations (60%), deployed from 1978 to 2009 by international organizations 
(IOs), were deployed in conflicts in which other international organizations’ peace operations 
were active at the same time. Multiple simultaneous peace operations increased from around 
10% of all peace operations in 1992 to almost 60% of all peace operations in 2007.  I define two 
or more peace operations deployed by international organizations at the same time, in the same 
conflicts as multiple simultaneous peace operations (MSPOs).  
This continuous increase in multiple simultaneous peace operations has not been 
paralleled by an increase in scholarly analysis of this phenomenon. We have little understanding 
of why we observe international organizations (IOs) deployed at the same time, in the same 
conflicts, and increasingly cooperating with each other to address these conflicts. This study asks 
the question: What factors determine cooperation between international organizations in 
peace operations?  
I test several rational and social constructivist explanations introducing an innovative 
collective principals-multiple agents framework. There are three rational-interest explanations 
for inter-organizational cooperation tested: resources, complementarity, and conflict complexity. 
I also tested three social-constructivist arguments for inter-organizational cooperation provided 
by the scholarly literature: social learning, security cultures similarity, and personnel nationality 
similarity. This study provides the first systematic analysis of EU’s peace operations and 
cooperation between the EU and other international organizations. The research design is a 
multi-method approach, using statistical analysis from my new dataset on multiple simultaneous 
peace operations, data from interviews with EU officials, and case studies. There are two stages 
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for the initiation of inter-organizational cooperation: the member-states’ acquiescence and the 
international organizations’ cooperation. At the first stage of cooperation, the member-states’ 
acquiescence is required, and the evidence provided by this study shows that member-states are 
acquiescent to inter-organizational cooperation. At the second stage, the findings show that 
international organizations cooperate with each other, when deploying peace operations, because 
they want to share the financial and human resources costs, and second, because they want to 
complement each other’s work.  
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
“Partnerships have now become the predominant architecture for peacekeeping 
operations.” (Derblom, Frisell, and Schmidt 2008, 39)  
 
In 2008, 65% (41 out of 63) of the global peace operations were conducted in some form 
of inter-organizational partnership. A number of intergovernmental organizations, besides the 
United Nations (UN), such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 
the European Union (EU), the African Union (AU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), have their own peace 
operations departments and deploy their own civilian and military peacekeepers in various 
conflicts around the world. The EU is the most active regional organization in the field of peace 
and security with 23 peace operations from 2003-2008, deploying more peace operations than 
the UN in the same time period.  
Until the 1990s, most peace operations were usually conducted by only a single 
organization, the United Nations. In the aftermath of the Balkan wars, there has been an increase 
in multiple simultaneous peace operations (MSPOs) with several organizations having their own 
operations deployed in the same conflict at the same time. For example, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
there were four international organizations that deployed peace operations during overlapping 
time periods -UN’s UNPROFOR1 and UNMIBH2; NATO’s SFOR3 and IFOR4, OSCE and EU’s 
                                                           
1United Nations Protection Force 
2 United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
3 Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
4 Implementation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
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EUPM5, and EUFOR-Althea6. The presence of peacekeepers on the ground wearing different 
uniforms and hats, with different mandates, responsibilities, chains of command, logistics and 
directives from their headquarters, required some form of cooperation between the international 
organizations that deploy peace operations on the ground so that they do not, unintentionally, 
undermine each other’s efforts.  
This increase in peace operations’ inter-organizational cooperation since the mid-1990s 
has not been paralleled by an increase in the scholarly analysis of this phenomenon. We have 
little understanding of why we observe international organizations (IOs) deployed in the same 
conflicts, at the same time, and increasingly cooperating with each other to address these 
conflicts. Many of the policy-makers, at the UN or the EU, who work on issues of inter-
organizational cooperation started thinking about this question only when asked about it for the 
purposes of this research.  
Peace operations do not operate in a vacuum. They operate in an environment where, 
most of the time, the peace operations of other international organizations are present, too. This 
study analyzes the ties that bind together the numerous peace operations of different international 
organizations by asking the question: What factors determine cooperation between 
international organizations in the context of peace operations? Once two or more IOs deploy 
peace operations to a conflict hotspot, what determines them to work together or not? This is the 
parallel deployment scenario. A different scenario, the sequential deployments scenario, is when 
one IO decides to withdraw from an unresolved conflict. What determines whether another IO 
takes over from the out-going IO and if this new IO will cooperate with the out-going IO?  
                                                           
5 European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
6 European Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina-Althea  
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The two scenarios mentioned above, the parallel and the sequential deployments 
scenarios, offer the possibility for inter-organizational cooperation. In the parallel deployments 
scenario, two or more IOs deploy peace operations in a conflict. The peace operations of 
ECOWAS (ECOMOG) and UN (UNOMIL) in Liberia from 1993 to 1997 are an example of 
parallel deployments. No IO has the “ownership” of peace operations in that conflict. Once they 
deployed in the field, the peacekeepers of international organizations can decide if they want to 
tackle the task of peace and stability alone, independent of other IOs’ peacekeepers, or work 
together with other IOs’ peacekeepers in addressing the conflict. The decision to cooperate 
usually occurs once the peace operations are deployed in the field. This decision, to initiate 
cooperation with another peace operation, is not informed by the decision to deploy a peace 
operation. In most cases, IOs become aware of the possibility to cooperate with other IOs’ 
peacekeepers only once they are in the field. The complexity of internal bureaucratic politics and 
the novelty of having more IOs deploying peace operations in the same conflicts, at the same 
time, are the main reasons why cooperation does not occur from the early planning stages of 
peace operations deployment. 
In the sequential deployments scenario, the process is essentially the same. The incoming 
IO (the IO that takes over the peace operation responsibilities from another IO) can either choose 
to cooperate with the outgoing IO and establish a smooth transition, or it can choose to distance 
itself from the previous IO and go its own way. The sequential deployments scenario is 
illustrated by such operations as the ones in the Balkans in which the EU took over from NATO 
(EU’s Operation Concordia, Macedonia which took over from NATO’s Operation Allied 
Harmony) or from the UN (EU Police Mission Bosnia which took over UN’s International Police 
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Task Force). In both scenarios, there is one IO promoting (or not) cooperation and the other 
one(s) reciprocating (or not).   
 This study analyzes the initiation of cooperation and what determines IOs to work 
together when they deploy their own independent peace operations in the same conflicts, at the 
same time. I am not concerned with the depth of cooperation, but rather with the initiation of 
inter-organizational cooperation. Inter-organizational cooperation could range from relatively 
limited interaction between the peace operations’ officials (e.g.: OAU-UNAMIR I in Rwanda) to 
having a hybrid peace operation that integrates components of the two organizations (e.g.: 
African Union/United Nations Mission in Darfur). As I am interested in the initiation of inter-
organizational cooperation regardless of its depth, I consider both cases mentioned above, 
limited interaction and hybrid peace operation, as instances of inter-organizational cooperation. 
The following paragraphs will present a conceptualization of inter-organizational cooperation.  
 
Inter-Organizational Cooperation  
By inter-organizational cooperation between inter-governmental organizations (IO-to-IO 
cooperation) in peace operations, I understand those actions through which, in varying degrees, 
IOs exchange information, plan, decide, and function together in peace operations in the same 
conflict. There has to be a shared sense of interdependence between the two or more peace 
operations, as well as an exchange of information, joint planning and meetings exercises, joint 
patrols and exercises, and some established formal structures for working together. For the 
purposes of this research, inter-organizational cooperation could exist only in the case of 
multiple simultaneous peace operations (MSPOs), when two or more international organizations 
deploy their peace operations in the same time and in the same conflict (Balas 2011). For 
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example, NATO’s ISAF, UN’s UNAMA, and EU’s EUPOL7 are three peace operations 
deployed in the same time, in Afghanistan, from 2007 onwards.  
I do acknowledge that some sort of cooperation exists even without the need to have 
MSPOs (as in one IO providing financial or intelligence services support to another IO without 
the need to create another peace operation for this). This type of cooperation, however, exists 
among most international organizations, most of the time, anyway (e.g.: EU paid the bill for 
AU’s AMIS mission to Sudan and thus the EU did not have to send its own peacekeepers to 
Sudan). Second, the need for cooperation is much higher when troops from two or more IOs are 
on the ground, rather than when only one has troops deployed and the other one is merely writing 
checks from a location removed from the conflict. I believe that it would be more fruitful, from a 
theoretical and policy perspective to understand the mechanisms of cooperation when there are 
peacekeepers from multiple organizations deployed on the ground. For this study, logistical 
support activities are the ones that require the smallest number of peacekeepers deployment. 
Anything that requires less involvement than these logistical support activities will not be 
analyzed in this research. 
Inter-organizational cooperation seems to be the wave of the future for international 
organizations as they attempt to address global challenges. As one EU official interviewed for 
this study acknowledged “it is trendy to talk about inter-organizational cooperation nowadays, 
and politically incorrect not to make reference to it” (interview conducted in Brussels, July 
2009). Since the mid-1990s, the need for cooperation to address global challenges was evident 
and all the major international organizations acknowledged that multilateralism became a 
requirement. For the European Union’s foreign policy philosophy, the concepts of 
                                                           
7 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), EU 
Police Mission to Afghanistan (EUPOL). 
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comprehensive and effective multilateralism form a central element (Solana 2005). The United 
Nations has enshrined multilateralism in its Charter by requesting closer cooperation with other 
regional organizations. In December 1994, the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration 
on the Enhancement of Cooperation between the United Nations and Regional Arrangements or 
Agencies in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security through which the UN 
advocated strengthened cooperation with other international organizations when tackling global 
peace and security challenges. OSCE’s Platform for Co-operative Security (1999), African 
Union’s Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African 
Union (2001) and the Organization of American States’ Declaration on Security in the Americas 
(2003) are milestone documents of several regional organizations active in peace operations, 
through which these IOs acknowledge a significant need for increased inter-organizational 
cooperation.  
For all the talk about multilateralism and inter-organizational cooperation to address 
global challenges, how do we explain the puzzle that, for example, the EU and NATO, two 
international organizations which should experience very high levels of cooperation, cooperate 
so little? As of 2011, the European Union and NATO have 21 members in common (out of 27 
and 28 members, respectively) with 3 more current NATO members on the accession path to EU 
membership (Iceland, Croatia and Turkey, respectively). In 1990, NATO’s Secretary General at 
the time, Manfred Worner, developed the concept of interlocking institutions, which was meant 
to bring cooperation between NATO and the European Community. The two organizations have 
their headquarters in Brussels only 3.5 miles away from each other. They have a common vision 
for European peace and security and as a result one of the most complex mechanisms of 
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cooperation in the form of the “Berlin Plus” Agreement8. Yet there were only 2 instances in 
which EU and NATO worked together under the “Berlin Plus” Agreement: Operation Concordia 
in Macedonia and Operation EUFOR-Althea in Bosnia. As the EU diplomats interviewed 
acknowledged, official cooperation between the two organizations has been impeded since 2004 
by the “Cyprus problem” with Turkey blocking cooperation in NATO, and Cyprus doing the 
same in the European Union. Lord Robertson, former NATO Secretary General, acknowledged 
that “NATO and [the] EC resided only a few blocks apart in Brussels, but lived 'in separate 
universes' “(Press Conference 2003). Still, informal, unofficial, staff-to-staff cooperation 
between the EU and NATO takes place on a daily basis as all the EU and NATO officials 
interviewed acknowledged. This “below the radar” EU-NATO cooperation questions the 
assumption that the staff of international organizations only does what their member states tell 
them to do. Questions such as this are not only theoretically important but have repercussions on 
peace and security in the world. The EU-NATO cooperation (or lack of formal cooperation) 
puzzle is one such question that will be tackled in this study, within the larger context of 
understanding which factors bring international organizations to work together when they deploy 
peace operations.  
 
Theoretical Contributions 
This study offers several theoretical, empirical, and policy contributions. The theoretical 
contributions are twofold: first to the literature on international organizations and second to the 
peacekeeping literature. Regarding the international organizations literature, the study makes the 
following contributions : a) it attempts to shift the focus from international cooperation toward 
                                                           
8 The Berlin Plus Agreement is a comprehensive package of agreements which allows the EU to draw on NATO’s 
resources for EU’s peace operations.  
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global cooperation of which inter-organizational (IO-to-IO) cooperation is a sub-type; b) it 
explains how IO-IO cooperation, especially in the context of peace operations, is a key 
characteristic of global governance; c) it shows that the activity of inter-organizational 
cooperation is one of the activities which allow for the highest forms of autonomy and 
independence for international organizations, and d) it introduces a new, innovative multiple 
principals-multiple agents model. Regarding the peacekeeping literature, this study makes the 
following contributions: a) it introduces the concept of multiple simultaneous peace operations 
(MSPOs); b) it introduces a typology of IO-to-IO cooperation in peace operations; c) it argues 
that the effectiveness of peace operations is linked to the level of peace operations cooperation; 
and d) it maps the mechanisms of cooperation between two or more peace operations.  
 
Contributions to international organizations literature 
The first contribution this study makes to the international organizations literature is to 
introduce inter-organizational cooperation as a sub-type of global cooperation and as a key 
characteristic of global governance. The concept of global cooperation does not have a 
commonly agreed definition in the literature, even though there are several scholars who make 
use of it (John Brown Childs 1993; Veugelers 1993; Buse and Gwin 1998; Georghiou 1998; 
Krishna-Hensel 2006). Global cooperation usually refers to transnational actors working together 
to address problems that affect the world as a whole (e.g., health pandemics, environmental 
disasters, climate change, outer-space exploration). This research argues that there are other 
forms of cooperation in the world besides that of international cooperation. International 
cooperation is generally considered to be cooperation between governments of sovereign states. 
Global cooperation is larger than international cooperation and it encompasses it. 
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Global cooperation is not limited to cooperation between states, even though states can 
work together to address global challenges. Some examples of global cooperation are 
represented by cooperation between cities, universities, multinational companies, non-
governmental organizations, and international organizations. Cities around the world have “sister 
cities” and work together in various fora (World Cities Summit, World Winter Cities Association 
for Mayors) to address issues of pollution, sewage systems, garbage disposal, water treatment 
plants, urban planning, and other issues of urban concern. Universities on all continents have 
cooperation agreements set up with each other. These agreements allow students, administrative 
staff, researchers, and faculty members to work together and produce better research and provide 
better education. Multinational companies in different corners of the world establish guidelines 
for behavior for their industry and agreements of cooperation based on which they conduct 
business. International non-governmental organizations (INGOs) such as Amnesty International 
and Human Rights Watch establish worldwide federations, networks, associations such as the 
International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights. Through this cooperation, these INGOs 
work together to address specific global challenges: human rights, climate change, humanitarian 
crises etc. International organizations such as the United Nations, the European Union, the World 
Bank, the IMF also cooperate on a wide range of issues, from how to consolidate peace in war-
torn regions by deploying peace operations, to ensuring the passengers’ safety through 
international aviation rules and regulations.   
The cooperation of non-state actors such as international organizations, NGOs, 
universities, religious organizations, companies, local governments is not captured by the 
concept of international cooperation. Working together to address global challenges occurs both 
below and above the state level. All these types of cooperation (international cooperation, city-
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to-city, university-to-university, multinational-to-multinational and inter-organizational 
cooperation also referred to as IO-to-IO cooperation) are different sub-types of global 
cooperation.  
Inter-organizational cooperation on issues dealing with peace and security is one way 
through which global governance is asserted. The literature has not tackled how inter-
organizational cooperation creates global governance, specifically in the context of peace and 
conflict resolution, even though Paris (2000) recommended this approach to generate a macro-
theory of peacekeeping. This study links the two concepts of peace operations and global 
governance and shows how the former creates the latter. Rosenau (1999) brought the concept of 
‘global governance’ into scholarly work. He did this by showing that the locus of governance is 
not only national governments anymore, but also other actors in the global society- international 
governmental and non-governmental organizations, grassroots movements, and individuals. 
Weiss and Thakur (2010, 7) referred to global governance as “an attempt to combine the 
traditional two UNs [UN’s General Assembly and the UN Secretariat] and to harness nonstate 
actors-both civil society and market institutions, or what UNIHP has identified as the Third UN”. 
More specifically, Weiss and Thakur (2010, 6) defined global governance as "the sum of laws, 
norms, policies and institutions that define, constitute, and mediate relations among citizens, 
society, markets, and the state in the international arena-the wielders and objects of international 
public power." From these definitions we learn that global governance represents the actions of 
various entities-international organizations, states, NGOs, businesses, through which global 
challenges are addressed in the absence of a global government. Obviously, inter-organizational 
cooperation on peace operations is not the only way through which global governance is created. 
I readily acknowledge other global areas which have generated global governance: climate 
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change, health issues, globalized economy, global communication, sharing of information and 
education.  
In this study, I make a contribution to the literature by analyzing how inter-organizational 
cooperation is an activity that allows for larger autonomy and independence for the international 
organizations. Barnett and Finnemore (2004, 164) argued that IOs are usually successful in 
enlarging their autonomy on areas that are of no essential significance to the member-states: “IOs 
use their authority to expand in ways that both help constitute how the world is organized and 
give IOs more control over a transformed world.” They achieve more autonomy by creating 
more tasks for themselves that were not envisioned initially by the member-states. One such task 
is inter-organizational cooperation. The current study builds upon the work of Biermann and 
Hofmann (2008), which shows that IOs in inter-organizational cooperation end up with more 
autonomy than their member-states wanted to give them initially. Biermann and Hofmann (2008, 
11) argue that "the less salient and the more technical issues are for member states, the more they 
are willing to transfer competencies to IO bureaucracies.[...] NATO, UN, and, increasingly, 
ESDP belong to this group. Operational organizations rely strongly on expert knowledge. […] 
once the UN Security Council or the North Atlantic Council have mandated a peace operation, 
many follow-up decisions are left to the bureaucracies and the commanders 'in the field'." Quite 
often commanders in the field, or strategic planners at headquarters, are put in the position to 
take decisions beyond their mandates and to improvise without any supervision from the 
member-states, thus enlarging the autonomy of the IOs.  
This study enlarges the current IOs literature and makes a case for inter-organizational 
cooperation as the external activity with a large autonomy for IOs. External activities refer to 
those activities performed by IOs that have an output outside the confines of the international 
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organization, such as peace operations, disarmament, monitoring elections, humanitarian 
operations. Internal activities relate to activities that ensure the proper functioning of an 
organization such as job recruitment and logistics, where the IOs usually have autonomy.  
The first evidence in favor of the autonomy argument is that inter-organizational 
cooperation asserts the identity of an organization within the discourse of international politics. 
Thus, the international community talks about the EU-UN cooperation, not the cooperation of 
the EU’s 27 members with UN’s 192 member-states. Second, the agreements for inter-
organizational cooperation are coined in such a vague parlance that it falls upon the technically-
skilled international staff to put words into action. Member-states tend to be involved only at the 
inter-organizational cooperation agreement negotiation stage, leaving it up to the IOs to 
implement them. Member-states do not have the resources or the staff required to follow up on 
every single decision taken by a bureaucrat in the framework of a cooperation agreement with 
another IO, and thus the international staff has leeway. Of course, member-states can question at 
any moment the activities that take place under the cooperation agreement, as Germany did when 
EU’s High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana, was negotiating with the UN, a deployment 
of EU troops in D.R. Congo in 2006. Nevertheless, member-states’ questioning of the IOs 
decisions happens rarely.  
Third, the problems addressed by inter-organizational cooperation are global. Unlike 
other principal-agent models, states rarely have the option to go it alone or rely on a coalition of 
states, given that the challenges they are faced with are rarely addressed by one single nation or a 
small group of nations. Thus, member-states realize that they need to give more autonomy for 
inter-organizational cooperation, than in other areas of IO activity, if they want the global 
challenges to be addressed effectively. Finally, compared to the day-to-day IO activities, which 
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produce numerous reports for the member-states’ consumption and control, inter-organizational 
cooperation, does not produce even remotely the same amounts of reports, and it rarely goes 
beyond general information. The actual, ‘on the ground’ cooperation, or what gets decided and 
goes on in the desk-to-desk, staff-to-staff, below the radar meetings, rarely sees the printed form 
for member-states consumption. The fact that member states perceive inter-organizational 
cooperation as nothing more than “talk” could be beneficial for the increased autonomy of IOs. 
The member-states will believe there is not much happening in terms of inter-organizational 
cooperation and will not oversee very closely the IOs’ activities.  
The fourth and final contribution this study makes to the international organizations 
literature is that it introduces a new, innovative, collective principals-multiple agents model. The 
literature on the principal-agent model (Hawkins, Lake, and Nielson 2006) has shown that 
member-states can be the collective principals that delegate activities to an agent, the 
international organization. This study argues that in the case of peace operations, the collective 
principals (member states) often delegate to multiple agents (IOs). The same member-states can 
delegate multiple simultaneous peace operations (MSPOs) through two, three, or even four 
agents. For this study, I conceptualize multiple agents as international organizations to whom the 
principals (member states) delegate similar peace operations functions to be accomplished 
simultaneously in the same conflict environment. These collective principals could have chosen 
just one of the agents to perform most of the peacekeeping functions delegated. Most of the IOs 
have the basic abilities to implement all the peacekeeping tasks required. These IOs have all the 
necessary peacekeeping tools, but they are specialized on using some of these tools more than 
others. One of the key puzzles addressed by this research is: Why do collective principals decide 
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to ask several agents to perform either the same tasks (which often leads to mandate confusion in 
peace operations deployments) or give them complementary functions?  
 To summarize, this study’s contribution to the international organizations literature is 
fourfold. First, it strengthens the concept of global cooperation by showing that inter-
organizational cooperation is a form of global cooperation. Second, it demonstrates how inter-
organizational cooperation is a key characteristic of global governance. Third, it argues that 
international organizations have a large degree of independence and autonomy when they 
cooperate with other IOs. Fourth, it introduces a new, innovative collective principals-multiple 
agents model.  
 
Contributions to peace operations literature 
For the literature on peace operations, this study contributes the following: a) introduces 
the concept of multiple simultaneous peace operations; b) presents a typology of multiple 
simultaneous peace operations; c) argues that the effectiveness of peace operations is linked to 
the level of peace operations cooperation, and d) enlarges the mapping of peace operations by 
including the mechanisms of cooperation with other peace operations.  
In this study I introduce the concept of multiple, simultaneous peace operations 
(MSPOs). Multiple, simultaneous peace operations (MSPOs) are the peace operations of two or 
more IOs that have overlapping time periods of their deployments in the same conflicts. 
Sequential operations (bridging or handover operations), which transfer the responsibility for 
peacekeeping from one IO to another, are included under the label of multiple simultaneous 
peace operations, because there is some, small temporal overlap. Currently, more than 50% of all 
peace operations worldwide do not take place in a vacuum, but in a conflict environment in 
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which other peace operations are present. Thus, most peace operations are actually multiple 
simultaneous peace operations. The literature has largely ignored this aspect of peace operations. 
Most studies that acknowledge the presence of two or more peace operations at the same time, in 
the same conflict, are case studies. This study provides a systematic analysis of all multiple 
simultaneous peace operations from 1978, the year of the first multiple simultaneous peace 
operation, to 2008. There is a need to analyze how these multiple simultaneous peace operations 
function differently than individual peace operations, given the different environment in which 
they operate.  
Second, a typology of multiple simultaneous peace operations is presented in this study. 
These types of multiple simultaneous peace operations form the embryo for different paths to 
inter-organizational cooperation. There are many ways to divide the relationships between two or 
more peace operations (Jones and Cherif 2004; Tardy 2005; Derblom, Frisell, and Schmidt 
2008). I propose a simple and straight-forward typology, based on the overlapping time period of 
the peace operations, and their activities. There are three types of multiple simultaneous peace 
operations: 1) sequential peace operations (either bridging or handovers); 2) parallel 
deployments; 3) hybrid peace operations. Each of these different types of MSPOs will be 
analyzed more in- depth in later chapters to explore if these different types of MSPOs impact the 
conditions for inter-organizational cooperation.  
By analyzing the causes of inter-organizational cooperation, this study will also shed 
some light on this link between cooperation and effectiveness. It is important to point out though, 
that this study does not have as its main goal to study the relationship between inter-
organizational cooperation and peace operations’ effectiveness. The literature on 3rd party 
interventions links the number of interveners with the effectiveness of the overall 3rd party 
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intervention. Thus, we could infer that the presence or absence of inter-organizational 
cooperation between the multiple interveners impacts the effectiveness of peace operations. 
Crocker, Hampson, and Aall (2001, 125) question the liabilities and benefits of multiparty 
interventions: “Too many parties can cause confusion and dilute responsibility among the 
various peacemakers […] In some instances, the multi-party aspect of the [3rd party intervention] 
effort may be a real liability to the parties to the conflict.” Susan Allen Nan (2004) argues that 
complementarity and coordination between the activities of all the involved 3rd parties is 
necessary in order to ensure the effectiveness of the over-all 3rd party intervention. 
I would expect that the lack of cooperation between the international organizations will 
make peace operations’ failure more likely in highly complex conflicts that require the 
deployment of two or more peace operations. If there is no cooperation between the various 
peace operations deployed, we could expect the peace operations to conduct any of the 
following: undercut each other’s policies, pursue incompatible goals, convey competing 
expectations or even overload the attention span of the conflict parties (Kriesberg, 1998; Nan, 
1999). A lack of cooperation could lead to disastrous consequences for the peace process in those 
conflicts. On the other hand, cooperation allows international organizations to avoid all the 
above mentioned problems and either pave the way, or reinforce the actions of each other.  
Inter-organizational cooperation allows all the interveners involved to act in unison for 
the achievement of the same, commonly agreed upon goals of peace and stabilization. More 
inter-organizational cooperation does not mean an increased effectiveness of peace operations. 
The right balance between the independence of an IO’s peace operations and the way it 
cooperates with other peace operations needs to be found. Overloading peacekeepers with 
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cooperative duties will take away from their main peacekeeping goals and could have negative 
consequences for the effectiveness of the peace operation.  
Finally, this study adds to the peacekeeping literature by mapping a significant part of 
peace operations that has been neglected by the current literature: inter-organizational 
cooperation. Peace operations devote a significant amount of time, resources, and staff to 
cooperate with other peace operations deployed in the same conflict. The mechanisms of 
cooperation differ from case to case, from IO to IO. This study will analyze the different paths to 
inter-organizational cooperation and show the mechanisms involved. Given that more than 50% 
of all peace operations take place in the presence of other peace operations, an understanding of 
their cooperation is imperative. 
 
Empirical Contributions  
This study makes an empirical contribution, as well, by introducing the first inter-
organizational cooperation dataset. I assembled three IO-to-IO cooperation datasets. The first 
one is monadic and includes all the multiple simultaneous peace operations with information 
regarding the conflicts to which they are deployed, conflict type, duration of deployment, peace 
operation size and mandate.  
The second dataset is a dyadic dataset in which I pair the peace operations of each IO 
with another peace operation deployed in the same conflict over an overlapping temporal period 
(for sequential cooperation, I consider that there is a limited overlap when the transfer of power 
is implemented). The dyadic dataset contains information about the sending authority, duration 
of deployment, presence or absence of inter-organizational cooperation, type of inter-
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organizational cooperation, financial and human resources costs, type of activities, type and 
intensity of conflict, security cultures, and the nationality of the international staff.  
I chose a dyadic approach, rather than the network analysis Biermann (2008). I do not 
believe that, for example, the inter-organizational cooperation between the peace operation of 
IO#1 and the peace operation of IO#2, is influenced by IO#1’s cooperation with the peace 
operation of IO#3 in specific conflicts, as a network approach would suggest. Most of the time 
there are only two peace operations at the same time, in the same conflicts and thus a network 
analysis approach would not be useful. Even when there are more than two peace operations, 
EU’s EUPOL cooperation with the United Nations’ UNAMA in Afghanistan does not influence 
the lack of cooperation between EU’s EUPOL and NATO’s ISAF in the same conflict. Thus, I 
do not see the need for a network analysis approach. The decisions to initiate cooperation seem 
to be taken at a dyadic level. 
The third dataset I put together is a dyadic-year dataset that was used to test some of the 
hypotheses for which the values of the independent variables change yearly. This dataset 
contains information similar to the dyadic dataset, but using the yearly values rather than the 
averages for some of the independent variables.  
Finally, I updated the list of all peace operations from 1948 until 2009, using Stimson’s 
dataset on peace operations (which ends in 2006) as the backbone of this new, comprehensive 
dataset on peace operations. I enlarged the Stimson dataset by adding the civilian peacebuilding 
operations of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. I also added some 
smaller peace operations deployed by regional organizations (e.g.: the League of Arab States’ 
peace operation in Kuwait from 1961 to 1963) that were missing from the Stimson dataset. 
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Finally, all the peace operations initiated between 2006 and 2009 were included in this new 
comprehensive dataset.  
 
Policy Contributions 
The policy implications of this study are crucial for improving the effectiveness of inter-
organizational cooperation between multiple simultaneous peace operations. Most of the policy 
recommendations are at the operational level on how to improve inter-organizational cooperation 
in the field. The lessons learned from the case study illustrations will help international 
organizations to improve inter-organizational cooperation and find a good balance of cooperation 
with each other in the future. These will most likely increase peace operations’ effectiveness, and 
if applied, lead to a more integrative approach of the myriad of 3rd parties active in a peace 
operations environment. 
Specifically, I shall recommend that a flexible institutionalization of this cooperation is 
required in order to avoid the problems caused by ad-hoc cooperation and personnel turnover. 
Currently, cooperation occurs on an ad-hoc basis and it is often implemented only in the field 
between the various peace operations commanders. A good headquarters-to-headquarters 
cooperation is required to ensure the sustainability of these projects.  
Second, cooperation is currently institutionalized as a bilateral relationship between IOs. 
There are UN-EU or EU-AU meetings at which peace operations are brought up into discussion. 
However, given that there are just approximately ten IOs who have (or had) peace operations 
responsibilities, it would be beneficial to institutionalize yearly summits on the status of peace 
operations. At these summits, officials, from all the IOs deploying peacekeepers, could gather 
and discuss the global problems they face and the common global solutions they should 
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implement. Similar summits exist for international financial and trade issues, but there is no such 
forum for issues of peace and security.   
Several other operational contributions are related to developing inter-organizational 
cooperation at the planning stages of peace operations. Finally, I make the argument that too 
much cooperation is also a problem because it takes away time, resources, and staff from the 
actual peacekeeping activities of the IOs. A good balance has to be found regarding the best level 
of cooperation.  
The findings of this research could be applied to other areas of inter-organizational 
cooperation, beyond the context of peace operations. Inter-organizational cooperation occurs also 
between inter-governmental trade, financial, and economic organizations. The World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund cooperate extensively with each other (in the Heavily Indebted 
Poor Countries Initiative as well as the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative). The two Bretton 
Woods institutions also work together with the World Trade Organization and with international 
regional banks-European Central Bank, Central American Bank in specific programs but also in 
sharing statistics, research, standard-setting, technical assistance, and training.   
International courts of justice and human rights also cooperate extensively with each 
other. The European Court of Justice inspired and helped the Andean Justice Tribunal with 
funds, expertise, and trainings (Alter 2007). The Special Court for Sierra Leone received 
financial and technical help from the International Criminal Court, to move the trial of former 
Liberian president, Charles Taylor, to the latter’s headquarters in the Hague. These international 
courts and tribunals exchange expertise, training, and technical assistance. Understanding the 
motives and mechanisms of inter-organizational cooperation in peace operations could be 
beneficial for understanding how courts of justice and human rights work together, too. 
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There is also cooperation between United Nations and regional organizations (EU, AU, 
OAS, ASEAN) as well as between the regional organizations themselves (EU and Andean 
Community; EU and ASEAN) on implementing developmental and environmental programs, but 
also between their respective humanitarian agencies on such issues as refugees. On 
environmental issues, the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) and the European 
Union signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 2004. Some of the objectives of their 
reinforced cooperation were to foster policy exchange and integration at all levels between the 
EU and UNEP as well as to enhance exchange and cooperation on analysis and strategic 
assessments. Similar memoranda on environmental issues exist between other international 
organizations, too. The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the African 
Commission on Human and People’s Rights and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees 
(2003) is an example of how the AU and the UN acknowledged the need to work together in 
order to tackle the problems of refugees worldwide.  There is also inter-organizational 
cooperation on other peace and security-related issues such as nuclear disarmament (the 
International Atomic Energy Agency and the European Union dealing jointly with Iran’s nuclear 
program). Thus, the findings of my research regarding what determines inter-organizational 
cooperation could be applied beyond the field of peace operations.  
The chapters of this study are structured as follows. Chapter 2 will review the current 
state of the art research on inter-organizational cooperation and place this study within the 
broader literature on international relations. The literatures on global governance, inter-
organizational cooperation, and peace operations will be reviewed and I shall identify the gaps 
my study helps to cover. In Chapter 3, I will present the theoretical model of this research and 
my expectations and hypotheses. The small amount of literature on inter-organizational 
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cooperation that exists is mainly descriptive and lacks a firm theoretical grounding. My research 
will provide a theoretical grounding of this new line of research.  
Chapter 4 will introduce the research methods used. This chapter is twofold, as I use two 
methods for data collection: quantitative data from a new dataset and interviews with IO 
officials. The data gathering processes and coding decisions will be explained in detail. I shall 
also talk about case studies of specific inter-organizational cooperation that will help illustrate 
the findings of this research. The case studies I shall use for illustrative purposes are: the EU-
NATO relationship in Afghanistan (EUPOL-ISAF), the AU-UN relationship in Darfur, Sudan 
(AMIS-UNMIS cooperation and later the UNAMID peace operation), and the EU-UN 
relationship in Kosovo (EULEX-UNMIK). Chapter 5 presents the findings from the statistical 
analyses. In Chapter 6, I present the findings from the interviews conducted in Brussels with 
officials from international organizations.  The case studies in Chapter 7 are used to illustrate the 
findings from the previous chapters. Chapter 8 will provide the conclusions of this research, the 
policy recommendations for how to improve inter-organizational cooperation, and what we 
learned from an analysis of inter-organizational cooperation.   
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The literature on inter-organizational cooperation involving international organizations is 
in its nascent stages. Most of the research, specifically related to cooperation between 
international organizations in peace operations, comes in the form of conference proceedings, 
think-tank reports, and working papers, which are largely descriptive rather than theoretical. The 
few studies of cooperation between international organizations in peace operations that exist 
borrow from the rational choice and the social constructivist theoretical perspectives. One 
theoretical approach that indirectly informs this study is the inter-organizational cooperation 
theory literature from organizational management studies.  
This chapter discusses how the various literatures mentioned above inform the present 
study. I start with a discussion of the inter-organizational cooperation theory and its application 
to organizational management. Three different inter-organizational cooperation theories are 
emphasized: exchange theory, attraction theory, and socialization, respectively. Second, I 
continue with an analysis of the applications of the rational choice and social constructivism to 
the study of inter-organizational cooperation between international organizations. Finally, I 
review the case studies that analyze inter-organizational cooperation in peace operations and 
present the ways in which they inform this study. The case studies are divided into three clusters: 
inter-organizational cooperation in peace operations between a) African international 
organizations; b) the European Union and the United Nations, and lastly c) European 
international organizations. 
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Inter-Organizational Cooperation Theory 
The literature on inter-organizational cooperation theory has its academic roots in several 
fields of research: inter-organizational relations (Hall et al. 1977; Mulford and Rogers 1982; 
Mulford 1984), policy planning, public administration and implementation (Alexander 1993; 
Linder and Peters 1987; Lorange 1982; Hambleton 1983; O’Toole 1986), and organizational 
behavior, organization theory, and strategic management (Smith, Carroll, and Ashford 1995). 
These literatures have been heavily influenced by how to create cooperation between business 
organizations, especially when they are complex multinational companies with many types of 
organizations subsumed under one umbrella. In the following paragraphs, I shall emphasize three 
theoretical explanations (exchange theory, attraction theory, and socialization theory).  
 
Exchange Theory 
The exchange theory emerged as the strongest explanation for inter-organizational 
cooperation in the literature in the late 1970s (Benson 1975, 1982; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; 
Mulford and Rogers 1982; Mulford 1984). Exchange theory is based on the idea of resource 
dependency. Organizations are dependent on each other for the resources that they need to 
maintain their activities and operations. Trading resources allows for lower costs compared to 
having the organizations produce those resources themselves. Thus, each organization focuses on 
its comparative advantage in producing a specific resource and they exchange these resources so 
that they can become more efficient. Inter-organizational cooperation also allows organizations 
to lower the uncertainty regarding the source of the resources they need in addition to lowering 
the costs of production. Raelin (1980, 1982) suggested three bases for resource dependency: 
voluntary exchanges, power relations, and the result of legal-political mandates. Most of the time 
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organizations exchange information and resources voluntarily if there is an agreement on the 
scope of inter-organizational cooperation (Hall et al. 1977). Some situations require 
organizations that have smaller amounts of resources to cooperate with other organizations, in 
order to supplement their limited resources. In these cases, power asymmetries play a major role 
in determining inter-organizational cooperation. The third reason for cooperation suggested by 
Raelin is that the mandates of the organizations require them to work together. In this case inter-
organizational cooperation occurs because the member-states giving the mandate to international 
organizations believe that they stand to gain from the international organizations’ cooperation.  
In IO-to-IO cooperation, we could observe all three explanations for resource dependency 
(increased efficiency, power asymmetries, and mandate requirements), depending on the IOs 
analyzed. There are several expectations derived from the exchange theory that could be tested 
for inter-organizational cooperation: a) international organizations cooperate in order to increase 
their efficiency and use the resources and services produced cheaper and better by another IO; b) 
international organizations with limited resources try to supplement them through inter-
organizational cooperation, and c) the mandates of the international organizations determine the 
development of inter-organizational cooperation.   
The link between resource dependency and inter-organizational cooperation is also 
supported by empirical findings. Resource dependency is shown to increase the probability of 
cooperation and of joint ventures between organizations (Barringer and Harrison 2000; Park and 
Mezias 2005; Oliver 1990). The increasing costs of peace operations, the often delayed 
deployment of peacekeepers, and the specialized skills for different types of peace operations 
may require inter-organizational cooperation, as one solution to the dilemma of how to make 
resources stretch to meet increasing needs in international organizations. These are similar 
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concerns to those of business organizations, as mentioned earlier. This study extends the use of 
the resource dependency explanation for inter-organizational cooperation (primarily used for 
studying organizational management in businesses) and tests it in the different environment of 
IO-to-IO cooperation. 
Along the same lines of thought, Litwak and Rothman (1970) argue that richer 
organizations should cooperate more often with others because they have the resources to do so. 
Their idea suggests that there are costs associated with inter-organizational cooperation such as 
loss of decision-making autonomy, loss of organizational image and identity, and expenditures 
for transportation and cooperation activities. Inter-organizational cooperation is not only a 
positive process, a win-win situation. There are also significant negative aspects associated with 
this type of cooperation. Whenever organizations have to work together, their decision-making 
autonomy diminishes, as they have to pay attention to the other organizations’ demands. Second, 
cooperation means that there is a higher probability of losing their separate identity within the 
community. If they often cooperate, the organizations will be lumped together and an identity 
shift may occur for the employees, who may start to identify with the joint organizations. Finally, 
cooperation is expensive, in terms of time spent trying to work together and human resources, as 
well. Instead of conducting peacekeeping activities, international organizations may end up 
spending a disproportionate amount of time trying to cooperate together through tedious and 
extended joint meetings and cooperative activities.  
Third, I would argue that the least applicable strand of the exchange theory to inter-
organizational cooperation between international organizations in peace operations is the role 
played by mandates. The mandates of the international organizations could allow for some form 
of inter-organizational cooperation, as Articles 53 and 54 of the UN Charter do. Nevertheless, 
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actual inter-organizational cooperation arises out of a need of the international organizations, and 
not out of an altruistic desire to cooperate. As an example, cooperation between the UN and 
other international organizations in peace operations developed only after more than three 
decades since cooperation between the UN and regional IOs was first written in the UN Charter, 
and inter-organizational cooperation only became active when the conditions of the conflict 
asked for it.  
  
Attraction Theory 
Besides resource dependency, another theory that explains inter-organizational 
cooperation is attraction theory (Smith 1995). Attraction theory states that organizations with 
similar values and goals, status similarities, and complementary needs will be more likely to 
prefer to cooperate with each other. If the organizations have similar values, it means that they 
“speak the same institutional language,” use the same concepts and want to achieve similar 
goals. These circumstances suggest a higher probability for inter-organizational cooperation. 
Organizations that have similar status in the international community should be more willing to 
work together, because of their similar position in the international network. For example, the 
EU and the AU peacekeepers should be more willing to work together as in both situations they 
are peacekeepers from regional organizations.  
If some organizations are better at specific tasks than other organizations, but they fare 
worse at other tasks, than they may be attracted to each other because of their complementary 
skills. There are several expectations derived from the attraction theory that could be tested for 
inter-organizational cooperation in peace operations: a) international organizations that have 
complementary activities in peace operations are more likely to experience inter-organizational 
  
28 
cooperation, and b) international organizations with similar security cultures or with similar 
background for the personnel of peace operations are more likely to experience inter-
organizational cooperation. 
Nevertheless, “inter-organizational cooperation appears more likely in situations where 
organizational domains are not sensitive issues […] and where mutual performance objectives 
are perceived […]" (Schermerhorn 1975, 851). Thus, regardless of mutual attraction, 
organizations might not be willing to sacrifice their autonomy on specific issues. For example, 
both the OSCE and the European Union deploy civilian peacebuilding missions. They should 
have been attracted to each other given that they are both civilian organizations and share similar 
goals regarding democratization and the peaceful resolution of conflicts in Europe. In the early 
days of the EU peace operations (2003-2005) however, the OSCE was reluctant to work together 
with the EU because it considered the EU activities as an encroachment on OSCE’s turf 
(interview with EU officials, Brussels, 2009).  
An integral part of attraction theories is that of trust (Smith et al., 1995). Trust between 
organizations refers to the confidence in the good will of the other organizations that they will 
work together consistent with the goals of all the international organizations in the group (Ring 
and Van de Ven, 1994). Cases of cooperation between two or more organizations that do not 
trust each other are rare. Trust is central for inter-organizational cooperation, especially on such 
sensitive issues as peace operations. Research on IO-to-IO cooperation has neglected the major 
role played by trust. Lack of trust between IOs (e.g.: NATO-EU until they enshrined their inter-
organizational cooperation principles in the Berlin Plus agreement) has often been mentioned as 
an obstacle for IO-to-IO cooperation. The present study will also, indirectly, analyze how the 
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depth of trust between international organizations, as well as between the member-states of the 
international organizations, impacts their inter-organizational cooperation in peace operations.  
 Attraction between organizations also depends on the permeability of the institutional 
boundaries between them. International organizations are more attracted to each other if there are 
individuals or special units within each international organization managing lines of 
communication between the organizations. Baker and O’Brien (1971) suggest that the presence 
of boundary-spanning roles and the ability to scan and understand the environment in which an 
organization functions, facilitate cooperation. For example, university-industry liaison offices are 
meant to spur cooperation between the research of academics and the needs of the entrepreneurs. 
Second, overlapping membership and similarity of the IOs’ functions and goals are also 
facilitating factors for cooperation. This notion of boundary permeability also applies to the 
relationships between the EU and NATO, for whom more than 75% of their membership is the 
same and the functions of these two international organizations are increasingly overlapping. 
Thus, we should expect organizations such as the EU and NATO to cooperate more often with 
each other and with other international organizations, because they have the boundary-spanning 
units that would be able to identify opportunities for cooperation.  
 
Socialization 
The social environment in which the organizations co-exist could also be a factor 
positively influencing inter-organizational cooperation if the prevailing societal norms encourage 
such interactions. Evan (1965) and Guetzkow (1966) suggest that creating the feeling that 
cooperation is a 'good thing to be doing', may tend to pull organizations in the direction of inter-
organizational cooperative activity. This explanation is especially relevant given the European 
  
30 
Union’s agenda to promote inter-organizational cooperation as a “good thing to be doing” within 
the international community (interview with EU official, Brussels, 2009). Some international 
organizations might cooperate, not because they truly believe in cooperation, but because they 
feel pressured to do so by their peers (other IOs). Inter-organizational cooperation may be simply 
a by-product of peer or public-pressure. If everyone cooperates in the international community, 
standing out as an unfriendly, non-cooperative organization, may not be a productive approach. 
The norms of the international system currently promote cooperation over non-cooperation 
(interview with EU officials, Brussels, 2009). Lack of cooperation would send the wrong signals 
to the international community. Thus, one expectation suggested by the socialization theory is 
that inter-organizational cooperation is more likely to increase if the norms of the international 
community also promote it.  
The inter-organizational cooperation theory literature also identified several stages of 
cooperation. Murray and Mahon (1993, 109) argued that there are five stages of inter-
organizational cooperation. These stages are: 1) courtship, 2) negotiation (motives for 
cooperation), 3) start-up and 4) maintenance (initial lessons learned and feedback), and 5) 
continuation or dissolution (overall lessons learned and feedback which could lead to the 
continuation or the disruption of cooperation). A good understanding of inter-organizational 
cooperation requires an analysis of the stages of cooperation. The present study will focus only 
on the second and third stages of cooperation (the motives and the start-up) to analyze the 
dynamics of the initiation of inter-organizational cooperation.   
The inter-organizational literature presented above was used for management studies that 
did not involve cooperation between international organizations. The relation between the fields 
of organizational theory and international organizations has been one of mutual neglect: 'The gap 
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between the study of international organizations and the sociology of organizations, is deep and 
persistent' (Ness and Brechin 1988, 245). These words are still accurate more than twenty years 
later, even though some attempts to bridge the gap were conducted (Barnett and Finnemore 
2004). International organizations are still perceived as different actors than the domestic 
organizations that are usually the focus of organizational theory research. Nevertheless, there are 
lessons to learn from the domestic organizational theory literature that could inform inter-
organizational cooperation at the international level. The following section will outline these 
lessons.  
 
Inter-Organizational Theory in International Organizations  
As international organizations proliferated in the 1980s and they established liaison 
officers with each other in the 1990s, some scholars (Jonsson 1986; 1993) started adopting inter-
organizational cooperation theory to analyze relations between international organizations. 
Jonsson (1986; 1993) introduced the concepts of ‘linking-pin’ IOs and boundary-role personnel 
as they apply to international organizations. Linking-pin IOs are those organizations central to a 
network of IOs and which connect the members together. An example would be the IMF and the 
World Bank, which are central to the network of international financial institutions. Boundary-
role personnel are individuals who represent their organizations to the environment (e.g., liaison 
officers) but who are also agents of change within their organizations because they represent the 
environment to their organizations. Having boundary-role personnel such as liaison officers or 
designated inter-organizational cooperation units allows for a greater border permeability, which 
could prove to be important for IO-to-IO cooperation.  
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Jonsson (1986; 1993) applies network analysis to the web of connections between 
international organizations. The key explanations for inter-organizational cooperation stem from 
the location of actors within a network, the patterns of resource distribution, and the number and 
strength of links between organizations. My study will present the network of IOs cooperating in 
peace operations, but will focus on the dyadic relationships between IOs, and specifically locate 
the motives for inter-organizational cooperation within the attributes of IOs rather than analyzing 
their place in the system. We need to analyze the different explanations for cooperation that exist 
in pairs of international organizations before placing them in a network configuration and 
analyzing patterns of cooperation at a network level. Cooperation between, for example, the EU 
and NATO, does not depend on cooperation between the EU and the UN, or NATO and the UN. 
Thus, EU’s EUPOL cooperation with the United Nations’ UNAMA in Afghanistan does not 
influence cooperation between EU’s EUPOL and NATO’s ISAF in the same conflict The nodes 
of the network do not inform the initiation of inter-organizational cooperation. That is why I 
believe the dyadic approach is more appropriate at this stage of the research.  
Inter-organizational cooperation has been applied to the study of IO-to-IO cooperation in 
the context of peace operations by Biermann (2008). Similar to Jonsson (1986; 1993), Biermann 
(2008) argues for using network analysis rather than a dyadic approach to understand inter-
organizational cooperation. The focus is on the European cluster of international organizations 
(EU-NATO-OSCE-UN-Council of Europe) and he analyzes how they cooperate in peace 
operations. He questions how much burden-shifting, rather than burden-sharing, is a motivating 
factor for IO-to-IO cooperation, but does not provide any systematic empirical evidence to 
support this affirmation. Biermann (2008) also identifies several impediments for inter-
organizational cooperation, including the loss of autonomy (as mentioned earlier by the 
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exchange theory) and inter-organizational rivalry over turf and resources. He seems to observe 
more inter-organizational rivalry in the international community, rather than inter-organizational 
cooperation, especially within the cluster of European international organizations. I consider 
Biermann’s work as important for transferring the general inter-organizational literature to the 
specifics of IO-to-IO cooperation in the context of peace operations. My study will add different 
insights from the inter-organizational literature and empirically test some of Biermann’s 
assertions, such as the role of burden-sharing as an explanation for inter-organizational 
cooperation.  
In another application of the inter-organizational cooperation theory to international 
organizations, Koops (2007) uses three approaches to explain the motivation for IO-to-IO 
cooperation: the economics-management, the institutionalist-sociological and the international 
relations approaches, respectively. The first approach, economics-management, borrows from 
Smith’s (1995) attraction theory, arguing that the focus of inter-organizational cooperation is on 
“trust and on what attracts groups or individuals to each other, such as status similarities, 
complementary needs, aspects of personality, goal congruence and interpersonal fit” (Koops 
2007, 22).  
The second approach, the institutionalist-sociological one, argues that international 
organizations cooperate with each other because they want to learn from each other. Inter-
organizational networks are bound by shared norms and the exchange of information. Because of 
these ties, they learn from each other’s mistakes and successes and apply these to their own 
organizations. This is called institutional isomorphism, and over time it leads to similarities 
between international organizations regarding their functioning and design. Cooperation can 
bring about “institutional isomorphism.”  
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In the third approach, Koops argues for the role of individuals for successful inter-
organizational cooperation. The boundary-role individuals are assigned a major role in bringing 
about cooperation between international organizations. Even though I do agree that, especially in 
the nascent stages of inter-organizational cooperation, individuals play a significant role in 
cooperation, I disagree with the label of “international relations approach” that Koops gives this 
idea. The role of individuals is minimal in the field of international organizations, when 
compared to the role of states or international organizations. Thus, it does not make much sense 
to label this approach as the “IR approach.” Second, the role of the individuals seems to be 
important only in the nascent stages of inter-organizational cooperation; later, when the 
relationships have been institutionalized, the role of individuals decreases. Subsequently, when 
cooperation is at its peak, individuals can be easily replaced, as the relationships are 
institutionalized and will continue developing, even if a specific individual is removed from an 
organization. This study will test hypotheses derived from the first two approaches mentioned by 
Koops, the economics-management and the institutionalist-sociological approaches. The 
economics-management approach informs the hypotheses on the role of complementarity, 
security cultures similarities, and personnel similarities for the initiation of inter-organizational 
cooperation. The institutionalist-sociological approach informs the hypothesis on the role of 
learning processes for inter-organizational cooperation initiation.  
 Haugevik’s (2007) study is the only one that posed a similar research question to this 
study: “What underlying motives for inter-organizational security cooperation can be 
identified?” He argues that the motives for cooperation can be both materialistic and idealistic 
depending on the actors. Thus, he asserts that cooperation could occur because of materialistic 
reasons such as organizational survival, neutralizing competition, and resource dependence, and 
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second, cooperation could occur because of idealistic reasons such as legitimization, shared 
values, and organizational learning. Haugevik’s explanations are useful and they borrow 
significantly from the inter-organizational cooperation theory literature. Yet, his study lacks 
empirical evidence beyond a limited number of case studies involving four international 
organizations. I agree with Haugevik that different dyads have different explanations for inter-
organizational cooperation, depending on the identity of the international organizations and on 
the characteristics of the conflict. Nevertheless, there are similarities between dyads and these 
need to be explored. Given that there are more explanations tested than the number of cases 
studied, a question mark could be placed on his research design. NATO-AU cooperation occurs 
because of different motives than UN-NATO cooperation. Still, listing all possible explanations 
for the six dyads of international organizations he mentions does not clarify which explanation is 
more appropriate for which dyad. My study will empirically test possible explanations and 
differentiate between the motives for cooperation in specific dyads.  
 Biermann (2008), Koops (2007), and Haugevik (2007) borrowed different aspects from 
the inter-organizational cooperation theory developed in the field of organizational management. 
My study uses the suggestions derived from the organizational management field, their 
applications to inter-organizational cooperation, and the limited, mainly descriptive, case studies 
on inter-organizational cooperation in the context of peace operations to develop a theory of 
inter-organizational cooperation. Much of the literature on peace operations comes in the form of 
case studies. Thus, it is not surprising that most of the research on inter-organizational 
cooperation comes also in the form of case studies. The following sections will present the 
current state of research on inter-organizational cooperation involving specific pairs of 
international organizations. The case studies can be divided into three clusters: inter-
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organizational cooperation in African peace operations, inter-organizational cooperation between 
the United Nations and the European Union, and inter-organizational cooperation in European 
peace operations.  
 
Case Studies  on Inter-Organizational Cooperation in African Peace Operations 
Inter-organizational cooperation in the African cluster is usually criticized for its 
problems. Two major obstacles for the development of inter-organizational cooperation in Africa 
are the lack of trust between international organizations, as in the case of the UN-ECOWAS co-
deployment in Liberia, and second, the presence of inter-organizational rivalries, as in the case of 
AU-ECOWAS relations.  
The United Nations did not trust ECOWAS’ peacekeepers in Liberia and thus sent its 
own peace operation to monitor the activities of ECOWAS. The African Union and ECOWAS 
developed through different historical paths as Franke (2007) points out, and this lead to a rivalry 
between the two African organizations. The rivalry between Ghana, the major initiator of the 
Organization of African Unity (the precursor to the African Union), and Nigeria, the major 
initiator of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), led to two different 
organizations, with a long history of inter-organizational rivalry. Structural imbalances in the 
relationships between African and non-African organizations, especially in terms of resources 
and expertise, are also more noticeable than in other cases, and seem to keep the AU and 
ECOWAS in a perpetual resource dependency to wealthier organizations, such as the United 
Nations, the European Union, and NATO. 
 In spite of the challenges for inter-organizational cooperation within the African cluster 
of international organizations, cases of cooperation still occur. There is a certain increase in the 
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use of co-deployments between the African Union and other international organizations, as 
argued by Aboagye (2007). The United Nations works together with both the African Union and 
ECOWAS. In recent years, the European Union and even NATO have extended a helping hand 
(mainly in terms of financial resources and airlift capability) to African Union’s peacekeepers. 
The following paragraphs will explore some of the literature on these case studies.  
Bagoyoko and Gilbert (2007) argue that there is competition within the European 
Union’s directorates on the issue of African peace operations. This competition should lower 
cooperation between the EU and the AU, because some of the EU directorates only want 
cooperation with the AU through them, and not through other EU directorates. On the same lines 
of thought Franke (2007) presents a theoretical model for why there is so little cooperation 
between ECOWAS and AU. He argues that the institutional rivalry between ECOWAS and AU, 
which dates back to their establishment years, makes it difficult for the two organizations to 
work together, even on issues of peace operations.  
Francis et al. (2005) criticized the way cooperation was organized between ECOWAS 
and UN in Liberia and Sierra Leone. He argued that UN sought ECOWAS’ cooperation in order 
to lighten its financial burden, while ECOWAS sought UN’s cooperation in order to enjoy 
greater credibility and legitimacy for its peace operations. He criticized UN-ECOWAS 
cooperation, especially for their second co-deployment in Sierra Leone, for failing to learn from 
the lessons of Liberia. The working relationships between UN and ECOWAS continued to be 
fractured, and there were significant problems with communication, logistics, and command and 
control. These problems plagued the UN-ECOWAS relationship in Liberia, as well. The studies 
suggest that the motives for cooperation are not always necessarily symmetrical; international 
organization “X” may want to cooperate with organization “Y” for different motives than why 
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“Y” wants to cooperate with “X”. This is an important lesson that inter-organizational 
cooperation in the African cluster of international organizations teaches us. This study further 
develops the different motivations of inter-organizational cooperation of the international 
organizations.  
Holt (2005) and Haugevik (2007) point to the close relationship between the African 
Union and the United Nations. The United Nations is African Union’s closest friend in the field 
of peace operations. The UN supported the AU in its reform process and in developing an 
African Standby Force. African Union’s peace operations are modeled on those of the United 
Nations. Murithi (2008) argues that the UN-AU relationship is an asymmetrical one, given that 
advice and resources are flowing in one direction, only from New York City to Addis-Ababa, 
and never the other way. On the same line of thought, Derblom et al. (2008, 68) note the 
structural imbalances between wealthy organizations, such as the United Nations/the European 
Union/NATO on one side, and the African Union on the other: "There are structural imbalances 
in, and impediments to, coordination among the UN, EU and AU, primarily rooted in the fact 
that the three organizations are unequal entities. The UN and the EU have more experience of 
peacekeeping, and, therefore, have developed processes and structures for coordination." These 
case studies suggest that the African Union’s lack of expertise and resources on peace operations 
is a major motive for its cooperation with the UN/EU/NATO. For these latter organizations, 
inter-organizational cooperation with the African Union may be an issue of burden-sharing 
(UN), expanding its activities to different regions (NATO), or a learning process (EU).  
Derblom, Frisell, and Schmidt (2008) favor ad-hoc inter-organizational cooperation 
instead of institutionalized cooperation mechanisms. They argue that ad-hoc arrangements allow 
for the peace operations to respond to field level needs without the involvement of the slow 
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bureaucracies of the headquarters. Yet, institutionalized cooperation, with enough flexibility for 
field commanders, is a much better approach in the long run. Without the institutionalization of 
inter-organizational cooperation, the presence or absence of cooperation between international 
organizations is left to be determined by specific individuals. Second, ad hoc arrangements could 
easily be affected by the rapid turn-around of personnel within international organizations. 
Derblom, Frisell, and Schmidt (2008, 68) also observed a pattern of cooperation arrangements 
emerging in Africa: "quick intervention (by the AU), co-deployment to reinforce (by the EU) at 
certain points, and transition to the UN when the situation so permits." Such patterns of 
deployment will be analyzed using the multiple simultaneous peace operations dataset 
introduced in this study.  
 The models of inter-organizational cooperation in the African cluster of international 
organizations suggest several expectations that will be tested in this study. First, resources are a 
major motive for cooperation for African-based regional organizations. Second, international 
organizations from outside the continent are interested in working together with the African 
Union or with ECOWAS in order to share the burden of peace operations, expand their activities 
to different regions (NATO), or learn from African Union’s experience with peace operations. A 
last point to be taken away from this discussion is the policy debate around ad hoc versus 
institutionalized models of cooperation.  
 
Case Studies on Inter-Organizational Cooperation between the EU-UN  
The relationship between the European Union and the United Nations is the linking-pin 
relationship of the network of international organizations. The European Union and the United 
Nations are co-deployed on three continents: Europe, Africa, and Asia. Given the significant 
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degree of cooperation on various global issues, the EU-UN relationship is considered by many as 
the most developed form of inter-organizational cooperation (Haugevik 2007). The European 
Union Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighborhood Policy, Benita Ferrero-
Waldner, and the EU Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid, Louis Michel 
stated that "Our commitment to the United Nations is based on shared values and strongly 
convergent objectives in many areas and translates into an active partnership with the UN in 
operational, normative, and policy work, backed up by strong financial support" (United Nations 
Office in Brussels, 2006). 
The EU-UN relationship has been described in a number of case studies on both sides of 
the Atlantic (Gowan 2007; Tardy 2005, 2009; Wouters 2007; Wouters, Hoffmeister, and Ruys 
2006; Sucharipa 2003; Ortega 2005; Laatikainen 2006; Gourlay 2009; Ekengard 2009; Morsut 
2009). Nevertheless, these studies do not go much beyond arguing that we should see more 
cooperation. They are highly normative, arguing in favor of cooperation, but without providing 
an explanation for such cooperation. They are useful for learning about specific cases of EU-UN 
cooperation in peace operations, but with a few exceptions, they are not making significant 
theoretical contributions.  
Several models of EU-UN cooperation have been suggested, depending on the timing of 
the interventions and the command and control mechanisms for the peace operations. Tardy 
(2005, 52) argues that the EU does not like to put troops under UN’s authority: "the general 
reticence of the European states to place troops under UN command, in addition to their 
skepticism about the reliability of the UN structure in general, are concerns that are echoed 
within the EU itself and its politico-military structure, and that both negatively impact the EU-
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UN relationship." Based on this assessment, we should expect limited cooperation between the 
two international organizations.  
In light of this EU reticence, the dominant models of inter-organizational cooperation 
suggested were: a) the subcontracting model, b) the bridging model, c) the standby model, and d) 
the EU as an autonomous component of a UN peace operation model. In the subcontracting 
model, IO#1 allows IO#2 to run a peace operation, fully or partially, independent of IO#1. For 
example, the UN subcontracts peace operations to the European Union (Aceh, Indonesia) or to 
the African Union (Darfur, Sudan) in places where it cannot deploy because of political reasons 
or in places in which it does not want to deploy.  
The bridging model is used when an international organization sends in a peace operation 
for a limited amount of time, until another international organization can muster the resources to 
deploy there. For example, EU’s deployment in Tchad/Central African Republic (EUFOR-
Tchad/CAR) was meant to be temporary until the UN could deploy enough troops there. The 
standby model refers to the parallel deployment of peace operations from different international 
organizations. The last model mentioned in the literature is the possibility of having one IO 
deployed as an autonomous part of another IO’s peace operation. This was a model under 
consideration for the EU: to deploy an independent unit under the UN umbrella in Lebanon, in 
2006. Wouters, Hoffmeister, and Ruys (2006) argue that the bridging model is the most used in 
the EU-UN relations, but their argument lacks empirical evidence. This study will present a 
typology of deployments, as well as empirical evidence for the most common models of inter-
organizational cooperation between international organizations.  
Scholars also identified several motivating factors for inter-organizational cooperation 
between the European Union and the United Nations. Wouters (2007) identified burden-sharing 
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as the reason why the UN seeks EU’s cooperation, while the EU seeks UN’s cooperation to place 
itself on the international stage in security issues. In other words, the United Nations wants to 
cooperate with the European Union because the latter has financial and human resources, 
especially highly trained Western European peacekeepers that the UN lacks. Gourlay (2009) 
emphasizes the importance of European Union funds for the United Nations’ peacebuilding 
activities. The EU can also help the UN in terms of rapid reaction capacity, intelligence, medical 
units, and logistics. On the other hand, the European Union is in its early years of deploying 
peace operations and it wants to work together with an organization that has six decades of 
experience in deploying peace operations. 
Charbonneau (2009) makes an argument for the leading role of some states within the 
European Union in promoting inter-organizational cooperation with the United Nations. He 
correctly points out that “EU–UN military cooperation in Africa depends on France’s military 
apparatus.”(Charbonneau 2009, 552). France seeks to use the European Union to cooperate with 
the United Nations in order to defuse criticisms of neo-colonialism through the legitimacy 
umbrella that the United Nations provides the European Union’s peacekeepers. This is a point 
further explored in Chapter 3, as an explanation of why member-states seek inter-organizational 
cooperation between international organizations. Nevertheless, Charbonneau’s point does not 
explain why the international institutions themselves seek to cooperate with each other.   
Gowan’s (2007) study focuses on how EU’s identity as a multilateral actor, shaped by a 
slow functionalist integration, promotes the same type of multilateralism in its foreign policy. 
This is a constructivist logic, different from the rational choice burden-sharing arguments. As 
Jorgensen (2009, 10) said regarding the EU-UN cooperation, "[t]hen the argument goes: we 
support the UN because we have multilateral genetic codes or important experiences with 
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multilateral processes. Others, and particularly the one significant other [UN], have no such 
codes and no such experiences." There are two problems with Gowan’s study: the lack of 
empirical evidence and, the impossibility of testing the proposition that EU’s inter-organizational 
cooperation is determined by its cooperative DNA. The often meetings between the 27 EU 
member-states that make the EU run are an example of EU’s cooperative DNA. This is hardly a 
falsifiable and testable argument. Last, this argument does not explain the motives for 
cooperation between other international organizations that do not share this “cooperation gene” 
among their member-states. 
On the same line of thought as Gowan, Morsut (2009, 261) argues that the European 
Union wants to cooperate with the United Nations because this inter-organizational cooperation 
helps the EU to become a global player in international security: “In this respect, cooperation 
with the UN is considered an important instrument to achieve this goal: ‘Strengthening the 
United Nations, equipping it to fulfill its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European 
priority’.” Indeed, in its conclusions in December 2003, the Council of the EU declared that the 
EU ‘would contribute to an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more 
united world. . . . Initial work would include effective multilateralism with the UN at its core’." 
(European Union 2003, 11) Thus, the European Union has a vested interest in diffusing inter-
organizational cooperation throughout the international society. As with the argument about 
multilateral genetic codes, the argument about global actor aspirations promoting inter-
organizational cooperation is an argument hard to falsify and test. Second, it is also an EU-
specific explanation for inter-organizational cooperation, and it does not explain inter-
organizational cooperation involving other international organizations that do not have such 
global ambitions as the European Union.  
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The models and motives of inter-organizational cooperation between the European Union 
and the United Nations point to two major hypotheses that will be tested in this study. 
International organizations cooperate because they want to share resources, and second, they 
cooperate because they want to learn from each other.  
 
Case Studies on Inter-Organizational Cooperation in European Peace Operations 
The final part of the literature review is devoted to studies of the European cluster of 
peace operations in which the relations between the EU, NATO, the UN, and the OSCE are 
analyzed (Ham 2006; Hauser 2006; Hofmann 2009; Schia and Ulriksen 2007; Karaosmanoglu 
and Udum 2007; Oertel 2008; Yost 2009; Harsch and Varwick 2009; Jakobsen and Lightburn 
2005). This is by far the most developed literature, primarily because of the relationship between 
EU and NATO. The EU and NATO have the most developed mechanisms for inter-
organizational cooperation in the form of the Berlin Plus Agreement,9 but have not cooperated in 
peace operations since 2004. This literature generated a significant number of studies. Some of 
the arguments that emerge from it concern the lack of inter-organizational cooperation in the 
European cluster, the debate over institutionalized vs. ad-hoc cooperation, the role of member-
states in blocking or encouraging IO-to-IO cooperation, and the motivations for cooperation. 
These arguments will be discussed in-depth in the following paragraphs.  
There is a strong belief among scholars that the international organizations active in the 
European cluster of peace operations are inhibiting each other’s activities rather than 
cooperating. The relationship between the EU and NATO seems to be the most problematic one 
(Hoffman 2009; Ham 2006). Yost (2007, 81) argues that “the difficulties [between the EU and 
                                                           
9 The Berlin Plus Agreement is a comprehensive package of agreements which allows the EU to draw on NATO’s 
resources for EU’s peace operations. 
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UN] include institutional and national rivalries, the participation problem, and disagreements 
about the proper scope and purpose of NATO-EU cooperation." Thus, without the blockage 
generated by the Turkish-Cyprus conflict, there should be a significant amount of inter-
organizational cooperation between the two international organizations.   
NATO and the European Union have the most complex institutionalized mechanism of 
inter-organizational cooperation in the world, in the form of the Berlin Plus agreement. Yet, the 
Turkish-Cyprus conflict has managed to prevent official cooperation at the political level 
between the two Brussels neighbors. Given the propensity for consensus-based decisions in both 
organizations, whenever there are discussions about EU-NATO cooperation, Cyprus vetoes these 
discussions in the EU, while Turkey does the same in NATO. A significant amount of inter-
organizational cooperation between the two organizations occurs at an informal, ‘below the 
radar’ level, and especially in the field, where the immediate needs of the peace operations are 
remote from the politics and rivalries of the headquarters. This is why some scholars argue 
against the high institutionalization of inter-organizational cooperation for the European cluster 
of international organizations (Yost 2007; Karaosmanoglu and Udum 2007) and instead suggest 
a flexible, case-by-case approach, in order to circumvent the political obstacles.  
Several political obstacles come from the member-states of the organizations, who favor 
one IO over another one, even if in some cases they are members of both organizations. The 
most often cited example is that of France which wants to strengthen the EU and does not like 
EU-NATO cooperation that could create a permanent EU dependency on NATO’s assets (Yost 
2007; Ham 2006; Schia 2007). Hofmann and Biermann (2008) argue that inter-organizational 
cooperation between international organizations is not favored by the member-states because 
they believe the IOs are getting out of member-states’ control and becoming too independent. 
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Their research raises an interesting question about the willingness of member-states to approve 
inter-organizational cooperation. My study will introduce an innovative collective principals-
multiple agents model that will demonstrate the reasons why member-states stand to gain from 
inter-organizational cooperation. What Hofmann and Biermann (2008) describe is a situation 
only found in the EU-NATO relationship. Even in this relationship, as Yost (2007) argues, the 
preferences of the member-states can be circumvented by the international staff, through 
cooperation at an informal level, and in the field.  
Scholars also identified several reasons for cooperation between international 
organizations in the European cluster. The dominant perception is that "NATO has a clear 
comparative advantage in conducting military operations, the EU in economic and diplomatic 
resources, whereas the OSCE mainly deals with conflict prevention and post-conflict 
reconciliation." (Ham 2006, 24) NATO is needed because of its military expertise, skills, 
resources, capacity, and experience deploying peacekeepers. The EU and OSCE bring in the 
civilian crisis management skills, while the UN is needed for its experience in running peace 
operations over six decades, as well as for its legitimizing power (Yost 2007; Jakobsen and 
Lightburn 2005; Haugevik 2007).  
 
The State of the Art in Inter-Organizational Cooperation Research 
To summarize, the explanations for inter-organizational cooperation between 
international organizations in peace operations can be divided into three major categories: 
rational-choice, social constructivist, and domestic politics. On the rational-choice side, several 
explanations such as resource dependency, institutional survival, neutralizing competition 
(Haugevik 2007; Wouters 2007) inform this study. On the social constructivist side, this study 
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will test explanations such as the attraction theory with its arguments about complementarity, 
shared values and goals, trust, institutional learning, legitimacy, and the role of individuals 
(Koops 2007; Haugevik 2007).  
On the domestic politics side, Schermerhorn (1975) argues that the social environment 
could promote inter-organizational cooperation through peer pressure. Jorgensen (2006) and 
Gowan (2007) adopt this explanation for the motives of the European Union cooperation with 
other international organizations: it is in the European Union’s genetic code to have all the 
relevant actors involved and to cooperate with other organizations, because the EU was built and 
works on cooperation. Morsut (2009) argues that the internal EU interests to become a global 
actor on issues of peace and security motivate its desire to cooperate with the United Nations.  
This study expands and tests a number of rational choice and social constructivist 
explanations for inter-organizational cooperation. Domestic politics explanations will be shown 
to play a facilitating, but not determining, role for cooperation. My study will also anchor the 
peace operations within the international relations literature and apply inter-organizational 
cooperation theory to analyze inter-organizational cooperation.  
The following chapter outlines the theory and the hypotheses of this study. I will 
introduce the mechanisms of IO-to-IO cooperation and have the explanations tested. This 
analysis will be framed using an innovative collective principal-multiple agents rational choice 
model.  
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CHAPTER 3. THEORY 
 
International organizations cooperate with each other because it is in their interest to do 
so. Cooperation in peace operations occurs because of the international organizations’ interests 
to share the financial and human resources costs with others, complement each other’s activities, 
and minimize audience costs. It is these rational interests that determine cooperation between 
international organizations’ peace operations.  
Inter-organizational cooperation in peace operations depends on the rational motivations 
of actors at two stages: 1) member-states’ acquiescence and 2) international organizations’ 
cooperation. In explaining the motivations of member-states in the first stage, I use a collective 
principal-multiple agents theoretical model. In this innovative application of the principal-agent 
model, the member-states of an IO are the collective principal, and the multiple agents are the 
various international organizations of which they are members. These international organizations 
deploy peace operations and the principals (states) have their own reasons for allowing 
cooperation between their multiple agents (international organizations). Without the states’ 
cooperation (or at least acquiescence) with inter-organizational cooperation, there would be no 
formal cooperation between the IOs. For example, the assent from the Cypriot and Turkish 
governments for European Union-NATO cooperation in peace operations blocks formal ties 
between these two organizations.  
In the second stage, there are three paths to inter-organizational cooperation. International 
organizations cooperate with each other in peace operations because of resources, 
complementarity, and audience costs. There is no single path that explains all instances of inter-
organizational cooperation in peace operations. Neither are they mutually exclusive. These paths 
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depend on the characteristics of the international organizations and those of the conflict. The 
rational calculation of costs and benefits conducted by each IO before engaging in inter-
organizational cooperation are the common denominator for these three paths to cooperation.  
Before proceeding to analyze what happens at the two stages of inter-organizational 
cooperation, a clear distinction between two decisions is necessary: the decision to deploy a 
peace operation and the decision to initiate inter-organizational cooperation between peace 
operations. These two decisions are not necessarily interdependent, and perhaps surprisingly they 
do not inform each other. The decision to deploy a peace operation is taken by the international 
organizations with the support of member-states that contribute peacekeeping troops. The United 
Nations Security Council or the Council of the European Union are the final decision-makers 
regarding the deployment of peace operations. The member-states of these institutions have to 
come to some agreement about the deployment.  
A decision to deploy a peace operation does not usually take into account the possibility 
of cooperation with another peace operation already deployed on the ground. Peace operations’ 
mandates only pay lip service to the need to work with other international actors in a specific 
conflict. In the planning phases of a new peace operation, however, there is a lack of joint 
planning and involvement of liaison officers from other peace operations that have been 
previously deployed on the ground. Whenever NATO officials plan a new peace operation, there 
is little talk about coordinating with other organizations’ (United Nations or European Union) 
peace operations already deployed on the ground in a specific conflict. For example, in the case 
of the counter-piracy peace operations off the coast of Somalia, even though NATO and the 
European Union were planning their separate operations at the same time in Brussels, there was 
no joint planning. Only after their separate and independent operations were deployed off the 
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coast of Somalia was cooperation between EU and NATO initiated (interview with NATO 
official, Brussels, 2009). EU and NATO cooperate only once deployed, in the field, off the cost 
of Somalia, because of the political problems (Cyprus-Turkey blockage) between the two IOs in 
Brussels that make impossible formal cooperation at the headquarters.  
Inter-organizational cooperation can only occur in the case of multiple simultaneous 
peace operations. I acknowledge that the existence of different kinds of cooperation do not 
require the presence of peacekeepers from two or more IOs simultaneously, on the ground. Some 
of these other kinds of inter-organizational cooperation include: financial support for an IO 
deploying a peace operation and operational/technical support that does not involve the 
deployment of personnel. Those types of cooperation might be the subject of future research. For 
the purposes of this dissertation I focus on cooperation that occurs only when there are multiple 
simultaneous peace operations deployed on the ground.  
 
STAGE 1: MEMBER-STATES’ ACQUIESCENCE 
 At stage one of cooperation, the member-states’ acquiescence is required. I consider the 
member-states to be the collective principals delegating responsibilities to their agents 
(international organizations). This is the standard approach in the principal-agent model literature 
to the relations between member-states and international organizations (Hawkins et al. 2006). I 
use the principal-agent model as a framework for understanding the reasons for member-states to 
be acquiescent to cooperation between their agents. I do not formally model the principal-agent 
relations for the purposes of this research.  
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Collective Principal-Multiple Agents Model  
The literature on the principal-agent model (Hawkins et al. 2006) has shown that 
member-states can be the collective principals that delegate activities to an agent, the 
international organization. This study argues that in the case of peace operations, the collective 
principals (member states) often delegate to multiple agents (IOs). The same member-states can 
delegate multiple simultaneous peace operations (MSPOs) through two, three, or even four 
agents. In some cases discussed later in ths chapter, member-states delegate only to one agent.  
The 15 members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
delegated MSPOs through both ECOWAS and the United Nations. They contributed troops and 
funds, and were represented in the decision-making process in both ECOWAS and the U.N. 
Security Council. Similarly, the 53 member-states of the African Union delegate peace 
operations through both the AU and the UN. Figure 3.1 portrays through which agents the 
collective principals in Africa can conduct their peace operations. In Europe, some states 
delegate through three or even four agents as shown by Figure 3.2. The 21 Western European 
states that are both members of NATO and the European Union, delegate peace operations in 
certain cases, through four agents (NATO, EU, OSCE, and the United Nations). For example, in 
Kosovo, all four agents had separate peace operations on the ground, and the 21 Western 
European states delegate different (but sometimes similar) functions to the agents. Other Western 
European states delegate peace operations only through three agents: NATO, OSCE, and the UN 
(e.g.: Norway) or EU, OSCE, and the UN (e.g.: Ireland). Some European and Central Asian 
states, which are neither members of NATO, nor of the EU, delegate peace operations only 
through the OSCE and the United Nations.  
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For this study, I conceptualize multiple agents as international organizations to whom the 
principals (member states) delegate similar peace operations functions to be accomplished 
simultaneously in the same conflict environment. These collective principals could have chosen 
just one of the agents to perform most of the peacekeeping functions delegated. Most of the IOs 
have the basic abilities to implement all the peacekeeping tasks required. These IOs have all the 
necessary peacekeeping tools, but their capabilities and expertise favor some of these tools more 
than others. One of the key puzzles addressed by this research is: Why do collective principals 
decide to ask several agents to perform either the same tasks (which often leads to mandate 
confusion in peace operations deployments) or give them complementary functions?  
The collective principal-multiple agents model model introduced by this study is 
innovative because it applies a new approach to the field of international relations. The concept 
of multiple agents has been used in the management literature before (Child and Rodrigues 2003; 
Arthur et al. 2008; Allcock and Filatotchev 2009) but with a different meaning than the one 
employed here. The management literature conceptualized multiple agents as layers of an 
agency. The shareholders are the principals for a company, the top management is one agent, and 
middle management is the second agent. Another conceptualization from the same literature 
considers the departments within the same company as different agents under the guidance of the 
shareholders. This usage of the multiple agents model is different than the one I use in this 
research. There is no study in international relations using multiple agents in the PA model.10  
 
 
 
                                                           
10 I would like to thank Darren Hawkins, Dan Nielson and Michael Tierney for their thoughts and comments on this 
issue. 
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Collective Principals-Multiple Agents: Delegation and Control 
There are several rational choice explanations for collective principals delegating peace 
operations to multiple agents. Collective principals calculate that delegation to multiple agents 
can help reduce information costs and increase technical expertise, legitimacy, and control over 
the agents. Collective principals can thus achieve their end-goal of stabilizing a post-conflict 
environment, with reduced costs, and possibly better results. These explanations show that 
member-states have strong incentives to approve of inter-organizational cooperation. Member-
states approval is required for allowing the decision to initiate cooperation to move to the second 
stage of inter-organizational cooperation: the IOs stage. The focus of this study is on the second 
stage of inter-organizational cooperation. An in-depth analysis of the explanations for 
cooperation at stage one will form the basis of a follow-up study. In the following paragraphs, I 
outline the collective principals’ logic for delegating to multiple agents.  
Member-states can reduce the costs of information, by employing different international 
organizations to achieve the same goals. Different IOs have varied information about the 
situation on the ground in a complex conflict. Information is power in such situations. 
International organizations have an interest in withholding essential information from their 
principals in order to increase their leverage against them (Vaubel 2006). Delegating to several 
IOs could allow the principals to gain more information, which could decrease the leverage of 
some of the agents. If the United Nations has some information about the conflicts in the 
Balkans, but it is withholding it from the principals to gain some leverage and autonomy from 
them, then the principals might secure some of that information from another source (the OSCE, 
EU, or NATO) which has either less autonomy from its principals or is willing to share more 
information. The United Nations may want to hide information from its member-states because it 
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may want to have more autonomy from its principals, and second, because it may want to avoid 
costs if the information puts the UN in a bad light (the member-states could cut financial support 
for the organizations, stop sending troops, or terminate UN’s mandate for that conflict). This 
argument suggests that in complex conflicts in which collective principals delegate to multiple 
agents, the latter will have limited leverage over the principals. For example ECOWAS withheld 
information from its 15 principals about the massive scale of sexual abuses perpetrated by 
Nigerian peacekeepers in Liberia. Those 15 principals uncovered the activities of Nigeria’s 
peacekeepers from a different agent operating in Liberia, the United Nations.  
Second, IOs have different technical expertise. Some IOs are better at conflict prevention 
operations (OSCE), others at peace enforcement with a greater role for the military (NATO). 
Some are better at civilian peacebuilding (the European Union), and others are superior at 
traditional peacekeeping (the United Nations). Their expertise addresses different aspects of the 
peace process. The principals stand to gain by delegating peace operations to several agents, 
because they get the best technical expertise for specific aspects of the peace process from all the 
relevant IOs. These arguments suggest that we should observe more agents deployed in complex 
conflicts.  
Some collective principals, such as regional organizations, have a smaller membership 
(ECOWAS, OSCE, NATO), and therefore those member-states can legitimize their regional IOs’ 
peace operations by pushing for the deployment of similar peace operations in the same conflict 
at the same time through the United Nations. The work of NATO in Afghanistan gained an 
increased international legitimacy once the United Nations deployed its peace operation 
(UNAMA) as well. NATO’s forces were no longer seen as United States’ thin attempt to 
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legitimize the war in Afghanistan. They were not any more the forces of the Western countries 
imposing its will on a Muslim country but a respected international peacekeeping force.  
Collective principals composed mainly of states that were colonial rulers in the past 
(NATO, EU) also use the UN to legitimize their regional IOs’ peace operations to Africa. By 
supporting another U.N.-led peace operation in the same conflict and at the same time, its peace 
operations receive a seal of universal acceptance and thus could decrease local resistance and 
animosity against their peacekeepers. NATO and EU’s peace operations are more likely to be 
accepted if they are portrayed as representing the interests of the entire international community, 
rather than promoting the interests of the former colonial masters against which African 
countries fought for independence. “The prominence of the United Nations in the pattern of 
international organization and its status as an institution approximating universality give it 
obvious advantages for playing the role of custodian of the seals of international approval and 
disapproval”(Claude 1966, 371-372). This suggests that we should observe more UN peace 
operations deployed simultaneously with small regional IOs and with regional IOs composed 
mainly of former colonial masters.   
Collective principals can also cut agency slack by delegating peace operations to multiple 
agents. The management literature (Holmstrom and Milgrom; Hal Varian 1990) argues that 
multiple agents can be employed to control each other. International organizations compete over 
turf and expertise and thus they are very careful to protect their functional boundaries. For 
example, the European Union and NATO competed over which IO will provide operational 
support to the African Union peacekeepers in Darfur, in 2004-2005 (Shimkus 2007). By 
protecting their boundaries against other IOs, they also monitor the activities of other IOs. 
Monitoring turf encroachments allows international organizations to observe other agencies’ 
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slack. Thus international organizations are in a good position to signal cases of agency slack to 
the respective principals of an IO. They are merely protecting their turf.  
IOs try to enlarge their autonomy at the expense of other IOs’ turf and expertise, as a 
protective mechanism. IOs want to maintain supremacy on a specific area of expertise or in a 
specific geographical region. In these situations, principals can gain information about one of 
their agent’s activities from the other agents deployed in the same conflict. In their desire to 
protect their own institutional turf and expertise, agents end up monitoring each other for the 
benefit of their principals. This explanation could be the cause of NATO’s initial reluctance to 
cooperate with European Union’s decision to develop its own independent ability to deploy 
peacekeeping operations. There were numerous voices within NATO’s Headquarters that 
perceived the EU as a competitor to NATO’s peace operations and lobbied against EU’s 
increased role in peace operations (interviews with EU Military Staff and NATO officials, 
Brussels, 2009). EU’s development of its common military was starting to take away from 
NATO’s functional role as protector of Western Europe. This assertion requires an in-depth 
access, to the private decision-making processes of both international organizations and member-
states. Nevertheless, I’d argue that this assertion is on strong ground. No organization wants to 
lose its functional turf to another organization, without lobbying for its own relevance and for the 
encroachments of the other IO, to the member-states.  
In some cases, the mandate of the peace operation specifically gives it the powers to 
monitor other peace operations in the same conflict. For example, the UN peace operation in 
Liberia, UNOMIL11, had a monitoring role, in addition to the legitimizing role mentioned earlier, 
over the activities of the ECOWAS peacekeepers in that conflict. UN’s monitoring role in 
Liberia, legitimized, in a way, ECOWAS’ functions, as well, by ensuring that ECOWAS was 
                                                           
11 United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia 
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providing an adequate peacekeeping performance. The principals of the two organizations were 
better able to control the two peace operations. When the UN disclosed allegations of sexual 
abuse and organized crime schemes run by Nigerian peacekeepers, other West African states 
attempted to reign in the activities of the ECOWAS peacekeepers.  
In other cases, just by their mere presence in a conflict, the EU and UN peacekeepers 
compel other IOs to behave. Arguably, the European and Canadian peacekeepers, deployed with 
EU, NATO, or the UN, have higher standards of professionalism and thus can monitor the 
activities of peacekeepers from the national militaries of other organizations (ECOWAS, AU) 
that have lower standards. The assumption is that the national militaries of the EU and NATO 
member-states have higher standards of professionalism than the national units of other 
international organizations. The EU and UN peacekeepers in former Soviet Union republics 
(Georgia, Moldova, Tajikistan) keep an eye on the activities of CIS missions in the former Soviet 
Republics, ensuring that these missions respect human rights and do not advance the imperialist 
ambitions of Russia’s foreign policy.  
There is a certain amount of checking and monitoring that exist between international 
organizations in multiple simultaneous peace operations in the initial phases of inter-
organizational cooperation. The collective principals place significant financial and human 
resources into the hands of the international organizations for peace operations.12 They want to 
make sure the IOs make the best use of these resources. As the Spanish Defense Minister Carme 
Chacon, whose country held the rotating presidency of the EU in the first half of 2010 said “the 
two organizations [EU and NATO] pledged not to duplicate efforts, especially at a time when 
budget constraints are severe." (Deutsche Presse Agentur 2010). The member-states are very 
careful with the resources that they give to their international organizations.  
                                                           
12 The cost of all peace operations in 2008 exceeded $9 billion USD.  
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Multiple agents can, to a certain extent, keep an eye on each other’s activities. There are 
costs for monitoring the activities of other IOs. That is why this study argues that IOs become 
aware of other IOs’ activities only when they encroach on their turf or area of expertise. It is 
more likely that IOs will monitor each other when they become competitors.  
This system of checking and monitoring of each other is similar to the one used in US 
politics. In US politics, individual citizens (principals) delegate authority to the executive and 
legislative branches of the government (their multiple agents). In the global society, member-
states delegate authority to international organizations (their agents). The system of checking and 
monitoring used by individual citizens in US politics is similar to the one used by member-states 
in international relations to make sure the agents do not go beyond their assigned areas of 
authority. The division of labor in Kosovo between the UN, the EU, the OSCE, and NATO, is an 
example in which principals employed multiple agents. The OSCE and EU were in charge of 
Pillar III (democratization and institution building) and Pillar IV (reconstruction and economic 
development phases), respectively. Their activities were checked by the UN. On the other hand, 
UN could not do its job of checking EU and OSCE, as well as overseeing the implementation of 
Pillars I (Police and Justice), and Pillar II (Civil Administration), without the security provided 
by NATO. The four organizations were both checking and monitoring each other’s actions.  
The other option for multiple agents is to work together as a syndicate and enlarge their 
overall autonomy against their collective principals. Inter-organizational cooperation that 
enlarges the agents’ autonomy does happen, but it requires a history of cooperation and high 
levels of trust between the IOs’ staffs. I argue that in this early phase of inter-organizational 
cooperation, it is more likely that IOs monitor each other rather than act as a syndicate. In the 
early phase of inter-organizational cooperation, the previous history of cooperation is very 
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limited and the trust between the IOs’ staff is not yet well established. International organizations 
still perceive themselves as competitors over the member-states funds and favors, and thus are 
less willing to cooperate with each other to increase their overall autonomy. As in domestic 
politics, once the agents (legislators) build trust and develop cooperative relationships that 
achieve effective outcomes without major problems in the inter-organizational cooperation, they 
realize that working together with other agents can increase their autonomy from the principals 
(individual citizens) for their own, personal or party benefits.  
IOs tend to keep information away from both their collective principals and other agents. 
It is well-established in the PA literature that agents want to keep information away from the 
principals in order to increase their leverage and autonomy (Vaubel 2006). They tend to do the 
same when interacting with other, competing agencies, in the same conflicts. International 
organizations protect their most valuable assets, information and technical expertise, from other 
IOs, just as they do with member-states. Given all these reasons for not cooperating, the puzzle 
of this research becomes even more interesting. Why do IOs cooperate at all when the incentives 
for not doing so are so great?  
 Besides controlling their agents with the help of other agents, collective principals control 
their agents (international organizations) in peace operations through regular votes on the 
deployment of peace operations, senior management appointments, budgets, and troops’ 
contributions. Principals control their agents on peace operation deployments every single time 
there is a new operation authorized and after that at regular intervals (6 months to 1 year 
depending on the IO). Most of the time, the missions are easily re-authorized. Nevertheless, the 
request for a report from the field and the power of member-states to terminate the peace 
operation at any time, are evidence of their ability to keep their agents under control. Peace 
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operations are also controlled by principals through the political pressures of one country or 
another who wants to see some specific developments in a peace operation. Linking peace 
operations to other issues (humanitarian emergencies, foreign aid) also gets them more in-depth 
scrutiny. This is a higher rate of control than on most other issues delegated to IOs. For most 
other international issues there is a contract when a new agent is created between the principals 
and the agent in the form of the peacekeeping mandate, and only sporadic monitoring afterward. 
For example the projects of UNAIDS, UNESCO, or of regional banks for development and 
reconstruction, do not need constant re-authorizations from the member-states whenever they are 
implemented in different countries.  
For all the IOs that deploy peace operations, states (principals) decide regarding the 
deployment of a peace operation (the Council of the European Union, UN Security Council). In 
most cases, there has to be consensus between the collective principals in order to have an 
operation deployed (EU, NATO). In other cases the veto-holding members have to be at least 
acquiescent to a new operation (UN). After the initial decision to deploy, principals keep 
monitoring their agents’ performance by requiring regular reports on the peace operation and 
authorizing the mandate of the operation at regular intervals, as required by the conditions on the 
ground.  
 Principals can decide who runs peace operations in an agency, the budget, and the level 
of troops contributions for peace operations. Principals have the power to approve, or not, the 
suggestions of the IOs’ executive management for the head positions in the departments of peace 
operations. Principals control their IOs on peace operations issues also through budgets and the 
commitment of troops. If IOs do not implement the principals’ wishes they can, in theory, 
experience budget cuts for peace operations and no troops from some principals. These actions 
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could bring the peace operations of an agent to a halt. In fact, principals can terminate the peace 
operations programs of some IOs. For example, in the aftermath of their botched peace operation 
in Lebanon (1978-1982), the League of Arab States decided to terminate its peace operations. 
The difficulties of the UN’s peace operation in the D.R.Congo (1960-1964) also placed on hold 
the initiation of new major UN peace operations for almost a decade, until 1973. UN’s failed 
peace operation in Somalia, in the early 1990s, left principals unwilling to send troops to prevent 
the Rwandan genocide a few years later. Even the European Union was worried that if its first 
peace operations did not go well, the member-states may terminate the program before it got off 
the ground. 
 To this point, I have argued that the model we are dealing with is a PA model of the 
collective principal-multiple agents kind. I have laid out the reasons for which principals use 
multiple agents and presented the principals’ strategy to control their agents. Next, I shall explain 
the principals’ motivations for being acquiescent to cooperation between their multiple agents.  
 
Principals’ Motivations for Inter-Organizational Cooperation 
The states’ approval of inter-organizational cooperation in peace operations depends on 
their strategic interests in the international and regional systems, but they are rarely opposed to 
such cooperation. Collective principals (member-states) are favorable to inter-organizational 
cooperation because they stand to gain: they increase their control over the agents, balance the 
risks of failure between different agents, promote their preferred IOs, promote a national interest 
such as multilateralism, and sometimes block unwanted competition.  In this study I merely spell 
out the logic showing that states are rarely opposed to inter-organizational cooperation, because 
of the significant gains this cooperation brings about. As explained above, the focus of the study 
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is on stage two of the principal-agent model presented, and not on this first stage of the member-
states.  
I shall first tackle the principals’ motivations for inter-organizational cooperation when 
they employ multiple agents. Principals are happy with inter-agency cooperation because they 
can control better the activities of their agents, by using other agents to control each other, as 
explained in the previous section. Principals are also happy with inter-organizational cooperation 
because they can promote different functions better suited for each of the IOs through different 
channels. States prefer to give their resources to those IOs that will make best use of them. That 
is why Western European states prefer to provide military troops to NATO operations, and 
civilians for OSCE’s operations. Second, delegating to multiple agents allows states to balance 
the risks for peace operations. Peace operations could turn into politically costly endeavors for 
member-states in cases of mission failure. Having more agents deploying peace operations with 
overlapping functions, at the same time and in the same conflicts, could increase the probability 
of positive results from at least one of them and diffuses the possible costs of failure. Thus, for 
the principals, the political gains from NATO’s successful operation would balance the audience 
costs from UN’s failed intervention.  
Other states that stand to gain from the cooperation are those that could promote their 
smaller, preferred IOs. This way they can have a more important role on the whole peace 
processes within a country. For example, France placed the European Union on the peacekeeping 
map when it promoted Operation Artemis in D.R. Congo, the first EU-led peace operation 
outside Europe and only EU’s second operation in history. Wanting to escape the tortuous 
bureaucracy and problems of the UN peace operations, France decided to promote its preferred 
IO, the EU, and at the same time increase its status on security issues within it. Other countries, 
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especially Scandinavian states have as a national interest to promote multilateralism and thus 
they are in favor of, and sometimes strongly advocate, inter-organizational cooperation between 
the United Nations, EU, NATO, and OSCE in peace operations.  
Some other states using multiple agents prefer inter-organizational cooperation, because 
they can block competition from other IOs and better control the latter’s actions. Russia is 
willing to have CIS cooperate with the OSCE in Moldova, because Russia can ensure it is not 
left out of the peace processes envisioned by other IOs for Moldova. Russia, through the CIS, 
can gain access to information, the other IOs’ peacekeeping plans, and can even influence the 
decisions of the other IOs’ peace operations, of which they are not members of (e.g. the activities 
of the European Union in Moldova).  
Principals with single agents are in favor of inter-organizational cooperation, because 
sometimes their troops get jointly deployed with troops better equipped and trained. Uruguayans 
in D.R. Congo have only one agent in that peace process, the United Nations. Being deployed 
next to European Union troops in Kinshasa, and previously, in the eastern Congo, allowed them 
to observe the latest developments in military training and learn from some of the best trained 
armies in the world. Sometimes peacekeepers from less developed militaries can benefit from the 
equipment left behind by peacekeepers from highly developed militaries. Ghanaian peacekeepers 
were famous for this type of quasi-pilfering in the UNIFIL mission during the 1980s (Heiberg 
1990).  
On the other hand, some collective principals with single agents, such as member-states 
that contribute peacekeepers only to the United Nations (India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal, and 
Fiji) are not happy about inter-organizational cooperation because it reduces their share of the 
peace operations market. These five states are major troops contributors to UN peacekeeping, 
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and the UN would have a hard time finding troops for its deployments without support from 
these states. These states usually send peacekeepers only through the United Nations, and given 
their past history with peacekeeping, they have an important role in the global peace operations 
market. Their voice gets muddled in the process of inter-organizational cooperation and they 
stand to lose a significant share of the market (which translates into loses of hundreds of 
thousands of dollars for their national armies as they won’t get paid as much by the UN 
anymore) if other IOs start chipping away at UN’s share of the peacekeeping market. The UN 
may be happy to have fewer peacekeepers of its own deployed and thus lower costs, but Pakistan 
or Fiji will not be financially pleased with this outcome, as their national militaries stand to lose 
the payments UN makes for their peacekeepers. Peacekeeping translates into influence in the 
international community as well as a very good income for some of these countries’ military 
personnel. Increased inter-organizational cooperation could lessen the influence and the number 
of soldiers sent by countries like Pakistan, Fiji, or Bangladesh.  
The acquiescence of the member-states is a necessary condition for inter-organizational 
cooperation at stage one of the theoretical model. Above, I presented several motivations of the 
member-states in favor of inter-organizational cooperation. Thus, Hypothesis 1 states that:   
H1: Member-states approve of inter-organizational cooperation in peace operation. 
To test this hypothesis, I shall analyze all cases of multiple simultaneous peace operations 
where there is no cooperation between the IOs and observe if the blockage came from the 
member-states level or from the agents’ level. In some organizations, such as the European 
Union or NATO, all member-states have a veto power on cooperation between IOs. In others, the 
United Nations, only some members have a veto power on cooperation.  
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STAGE 2: INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL COOPERATION 
Provided that the member-states did not oppose inter-organizational cooperation in peace 
operations, the decision to cooperate (or not) with another international organization moves to 
the second stage of the theoretical model - the international organizations themselves. The IOs 
are the ones to whom the principals delegated the responsibilities for implementing peace 
operations. International organizations have the final say about whether there will be cooperation 
between them and other IOs on peace operations. Their bureaucracies are the ones that will be 
cooperating. Even if member-states require inter-organizational cooperation, this may range from 
steering committee meetings twice a year to integrated daily briefings between the officials on 
the ground. What happens on the ground is far removed from the eyes of the member-states, and 
thus the decisions to cooperate are left to the IO officials in charge of the peace operations.  
I argue that there are three paths to inter-organizational cooperation: those of resources, 
complementarity, and conflict complexity, respectively. Cooperation can occur on any of these 
paths, depending on the characteristics of the international organizations and of the conflict. In 
some cases, the resources path will perform better in explaining cooperation than the audience 
costs path. In other cases it could be the opposite. In some instances, it may be several of these 
paths. The paths to cooperation are not mutually exclusive. The following paragraphs will 
explore in-depth the three paths to inter-organizational cooperation and the hypotheses derived 
from them that shall be tested in this study. I will also present three other alternative paths to 
cooperation mentioned by the literature and their hypotheses that will also be subject to empirical 
analysis.  
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Agents’ Motivations for Inter-Organizational Cooperation 
International organizations cooperate with other IOs in peace operations because of 
rational, cost-benefit calculations. These calculations take into account the burden-sharing of the 
peace operations’ resources, division of labor, and conflict complexity. Cooperation occurs 
because there is a rational interest on the part of the IOs for cooperation.  
 
Financial and Human Resources 
The first path for cooperation concerns resources. International organizations cooperate 
with others because they do not have enough financial and human resources to meet the demand 
for peace operations by themselves. There are many conflicts that would benefit from the 
deployment of peacekeepers but the great costs of such deployments can consume large portions 
of the IOs’ budgets. 85% of OSCE’s budget in 2003 was dedicated to its peace operations 
(OSCE Annual Report 2003). In 2008, the cost of all peace operations in the world was of $9 
billion USD. This is a significant cost for international organizations that are often resource-
strapped and at the will of their principals’ budgets. The African Union and the United Nations 
have their resources often over-stretched to the limit. For example, the African Union Mission in 
Sudan (AMIS) had for a period of time in 2006 only enough finances to function for one month 
at a time (Africa News 2006). Second, national contingents that could serve in African and 
European peace operations are hard to find for any international organization. There are not 
many member-states in the international community willing to risk the lives of its troops to 
defend villages in Darfur or rebuild Afghanistan. Working together with other organizations 
willing to share the burden of peace operations is one major reason why international 
organizations cooperate with each other.  
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In sequential MSPOs, African IOs-ECOWAS and the AU- have the ability to deploy 
forces rapidly, but do not have the financial and human resources to sustain long periods of 
deployment. Thus, their reason for cooperating with the United Nations’ missions taking-over 
from their initial deployments is the lack of resources. The lack of resources leads to an inability 
to perform its peacekeeping duties, and thus, these resource-poor international organizations 
need the financial and human resources support of wealthier IOs. In parallel and hybrid missions, 
we notice the same dynamics. Some IOs are resource dependent on the wealthier IOs, such as the 
EU or NATO, and this dependency is a motivating factor for inter-organizational cooperation.  
Similar dynamics occur in Europe, where the United Nations is resource dependent on 
the EU and NATO in terms of finances and human personnel. The United Nations has usually 
been the initial IO to intervene in an European conflict and after several years it passes the 
responsibility to the European IOs. For example in Bosnia and Kosovo, UN first intervened in 
the 1990s, and approximately one decade later, withdrew, while the peacekeeping 
responsibilities were taken over by the European Union. In this case, the United Nations 
cooperates mainly because it needs the resources of the other IOs. After a decade, the UN 
withdraws in order to focus its limited resources on newer conflicts, having faith in the ability of 
the European international organizations to continue the peace process. The hypothesis derived 
from these stories is that:  
H2: International organizations with small financial and human resources are more 
likely to cooperate with other international organizations. 
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Complementarity 
The second path to inter-organizational cooperation is that of complementarity. 
International organizations active in the crowded market of peace operations have to carve their 
share of the market through developing specialized conflict resolution skills. They develop 
specific comparative advantages. The OSCE developed its conflict prevention expertise. The 
main goal of the OSCE’s activities is listed as “preventing conflicts from arising” and “with its 
institutions and information network, the OSCE closely monitors tensions that could develop 
into a conflict within the OSCE area and takes ‘early action’ at the earliest possible stage.” 
(OSCE 2011) The European Union developed predominantly civilian peace operations. The 
European Union, a late-comer to the field of peace operations, given its civilian experience with 
conflict transformation decided to focus on civilian crisis management. NATO, a military 
alliance with no interests in developing civilian capabilities, as well (interview with NATO 
official, Brussels, 2009) relied on its ability to deploy professional military forces. The United 
Nations also has a comparative advantage in the European arena of peace operations because of 
its ability to coordinate complex peace operations. United Nations’ peace operations often 
require coordinating the activities of multiple UN agencies in conflict areas. The UN applied this 
experience to coordinating multiple international organizations in conflict areas such as Bosnia 
and Kosovo.   
Since the 1990s, policy-makers acknowledged that the establishment of peace requires 
the majority of these complementary skills. They also acknowledged that it is more cost-effective 
for all the IOs involved, to have the employ the best equipped IOs for each particular activity.  
All these international organizations have the same goals: stabilize a country and turn violent 
conflict into peaceful coexistence. Thus, they want to complement them rather than undermine 
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each other’s efforts, in order to achieve their over-arching goals. I expect the following 
hypothesis to be supported by the data:  
H3: IOs with expertise on one specific aspect of conflict resolution are more likely to 
cooperate in peace operations with IOs that have expertise on different complementary aspects 
of conflict resolution. 
 
Complex Conflicts 
The third path to inter-organizational cooperation derives from deployments in highly 
complex conflicts. When faced with highly difficult and complex conflicts such as Darfur, 
Somalia or Kosovo, international organizations realize that their probability of failure is higher 
than in other, lower-level conflicts (such as Namibia). International organizations do not want to 
be singled out in case of failure and thus prefer to cooperate with other organizations deployed in 
those conflicts to increase their chances of success. By working together with other organizations 
in very difficult and complex conflicts, IOs could share the blame with them instead of being 
singled out in case of failure. They would also share the spoils of glory in case of success, but 
that would be beneficial for them because it would portray that the international organization as a 
good team-player to the international community. At the member-states’ level, peacekeeping 
failure could be politically damaging for the government (as it happened for the Dutch 
government in the aftermath of the genocide in Srebenica), but success has less of an impact. The 
hypothesis that derives from this path to inter-organizational cooperation is:  
H4: International organizations are more likely to cooperate with other international 
organizations when they intervene in complex conflicts.  
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This study is framed by the rational choice theory at both levels-the collective principals’ 
motives for cooperation and the agents’ motives for cooperation. All the explanations provided 
above for inter-organizational cooperation from the perspective of the agents, are part of the 
rational choice theory. The IOs can maximize the use of their resources, increase 
complementarity, and better address complex conflicts. The explanations are not mutually 
exclusive, but they do tell us an important story about the reasons for cooperation. An 
organization with limited resources, intervening in a very difficult conflict, with expertise on 
specific conflict resolution aspects is more likely to cooperate with other IOs than one that has 
only two or three of these conditions. At this point, I am not investigating the depth of 
cooperation, but rather in identifying the conditions that determine the initiation of inter-
organizational cooperation. Distinguishing between the individual effects of each of these 
conditions is the work of another study. Nevertheless, this study will provide some suggestions 
about which paths to inter-organizational cooperation are more likely to be pursued by different 
international organizations. For example, organizations with limited resources are more willing 
to cooperate with other IOs because of this specific limitation, regardless of their stance on 
complementarity and conflict complexity.  
 
Social-Constructivist Hypotheses 
I also explore three social constructivist paths to cooperation derived from the scholarly 
literature. Social learning, security cultures, and similarity in the personal background of the 
international organizations’ staff are the social-constructivist paths tested. As is true of the 
rational cost-benefit explanations, these alternative paths to cooperation are not mutually 
exclusive. 
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Social Learning 
The argument about social learning says that international organizations cooperate 
because they want to learn from each other’s peace operations experiences (Koops, 2007). An 
international organization that is a newcomer to deploying peace operations would want to learn 
from the organizations that have more experience with peace operations. Thus, the social 
learning argument suggests that the European Union cooperates with other IOs because it is the 
newcomer to the peace operations market and it wants to learn from more experienced IOs. The 
United Nations had more than 50 years of experience with peace operations before the European 
Union deployed its first peace operation in 2003. NATO had more than a decade of peace 
operations experience in the Balkans by 2003. The European Union needs to learn from the 
others how this is done. EU’s peace and security new program needs to learn from the more 
experienced IOs in this field. The same explanation could be attributed to NATO or the OSCE in 
the early 1990s, when they deployed in conflicts in which there was already a United Nations 
presence. I extend this argument to the hypothesis that:  
H5: Regional IOs are more likely to cooperate with more experienced IOs in the first 
years of the establishment of their peace operations programs.  
The implication of this hypothesis is that the regional organizations should observe a 
decrease in inter-organizational cooperation for future peace operations, as they become more 
experienced. However, this hypothesis is one-sided. It explains why regional organizations want 
to cooperate with the United Nations. It does not account for why the United Nations cooperates, 
as the UN was the first IO to deploy peace operations and there was no one to learn from in the 
late 1940s.  
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My critique of this explanation is that international organizations do not cooperate with 
each other just because they want to learn from each other. Cooperation continues between IOs 
long after they have learned enough from each other’s experiences. Second, the national 
militaries that participated previously in peace operations with the UN already bring their lessons 
learned from previous deployments to the new peace operations program of NATO, OSCE or of 
the European Union. Third, the explanation, even if it were supported by data, only covers half 
of the story. It explains why regional organizations cooperate but fails to explain why the United 
Nations wants to cooperate with them.  
 
Security Cultures 
Common security cultures could be responsible for the initiation of inter-organizational 
cooperation (Koops 2007; Haugevik 2007). Some of the security cultures of international 
organizations are compatible in terms of the norms they use and approaches to peacekeeping 
(military vs. civilian, conflict management vs. peacebuilding). This compatibility could explain 
why we observe increased cooperation between those IOs. For example, the civilian security 
cultures of the European Union and OSCE could account for their high levels of cooperation. As 
one EU Council diplomat told me: “The OSCE helped us [EU] a lot when we started planning 
our mission to Kosovo [EULEX]. They were very friendly and eager to share information with 
us.” (interview in Brussels, summer 2009). The reason for OSCE and EU’s cooperation in 
Kosovo could be found in the fact that their staff members belong to the same civilian cultures 
and shared the same civilian approach to peace-building. They share the same assumptions about 
how to deal with conflicts and work with similar civilian mechanisms to peacebuilding. On the 
other hand, military personnel and civilians have different assumptions about how to deal with 
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conflicts, have different constraints and normative approaches to conflict. From this point of 
view, the distance between the EU and OSCE civilian cultures is much smaller than the distance 
between the EU’s civilian culture and NATO’s military culture for example.  
The compatibility of norms and values of the international staff in such IOs facilitates 
their dialogue, understanding, and cooperation. These individuals speak the same international 
security language and thus could increase the cooperation between their organizations. They 
operate with a civilian only, or a military only mindset, and are thus more likely to understand 
each other. The hypothesis tested is:  
H6: IOs with similar security cultures are more likely to cooperate with each other in 
peace operations. 
My critique to this explanation is that just because two IOs have similar security cultures, 
does not mean they are going to cooperate in peace operations. ECOWAS and NATO have 
similar military-oriented security cultures regarding peace operations, but they have never 
cooperated in peace operations. Specific interests, as those discussed earlier in this chapter, are 
required for inter-organizational cooperation. I believe that similar security cultures can deepen 
cooperation, but are not responsible for the initiation of cooperation.  
 
Personal Background Similarity 
Similar backgrounds of the international staff responsible for peace operations in 
different international organizations could also initiate inter-organizational cooperation (Koops 
2007). Strong personnel ties can spurn cooperation. There is a higher probability of enhanced 
inter-organizational cooperation if individuals in different IOs know each other, have worked 
with each in different context, or even worked for the other IO previously. These personal ties 
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create trust between the individuals. They also exposed the same individuals to each other’s 
organizational cultures, increasing their understanding and cooperation. 
Creating trust through personal ties is an important ingredient for cooperation. As one EU 
Commission official told me: “In the beginning NATO did not want to strengthen cooperation 
with the European Union because it did not trust its ability to protect confidential data.” 
(interview in Brussels, summer 2009). One has to trust their partners to safeguard sensitive 
information and to work together for the agreed goals. No substantive cooperation can exist 
between organizations if there is no trust between individuals from the various IOs. Trust 
enhances cooperation. Nevertheless, IOs do not cooperate with each other because they trust 
each other, but rather because they have an interest to do so, determined by some of the motives 
introduced earlier. Even EU-NATO cooperation existed in the absence of trust, but at much 
lower levels that did not involve transfers of confidential data.  
 IO-IO cooperation actually occurs between individuals. The personalities involved have 
a major say about the existence of cooperation. The two organizations may have signed 
documents attesting their willingness to cooperate, but their implementation is left to people on 
the ground. The individuals can influence the level of inter-organizational cooperation. 
Individual-to-individual cooperation could become IO-to-IO cooperation.  
Thus, the background of the heads of missions and of the top management at the 
headquarters has a major role in enhancing cooperation. One could assume that the same norms 
exist between those individuals with similar backgrounds. If they come from the same country, 
speak the same language, worked together in the same Ministry of Foreign Affairs or Defense or 
worked for the other IO in the past, they are more likely to work better together, even if they 
represent different organizations. European Union’s cooperation with NATO in the form of the 
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Berlin Plus Agreement was initiated, negotiated, and signed, while the former NATO Secretary 
General, Javier Solana, was the EU’s High Representative for Common Foreign and Security 
Policy. In interviews in 2009 with EU and NATO officials I was often told that: “Solana’s 
personnel networks in both organizations played a major role in facilitating the Berlin Plus 
Agreement” (interviews in Brussels, summer 2009).  
H7: The personal background similarity of the international staffs is likely to increase 
inter-organizational cooperation in peace operations.  
My critique of this hypothesis is that the individuals within IOs cannot decide by 
themselves to initiate formal cooperation with other IOs just because they have strong personal 
ties in the other IO. They can open informal cooperation and dialogue channels, but even for 
those there has to be some rational interest for such endeavors to be initiated. The international 
staff can lower the levels of cooperation and place barriers in the path of cooperation, if they do 
not trust people in the other IO’s international secretariat (some UN officials attempted to block 
the establishment of cooperation ties with NATO in 2008). They could also put pressure on the 
member-states and recommend the initiation of formal cooperation with other IOs. The decision 
to initiate inter-organizational cooperation rests with the international staff, but the approval for 
formal cooperation with other IOs rests with the member-states.  
 
Other Conditions Influencing Inter-Organizational Cooperation  
The timing of possible cooperation can increase collaboration. For higher levels of 
cooperation, inter-organizational cooperation should start when the time is ripe for such joint 
ventures, not immediately in the aftermath, or during disagreements between the organizations. 
The timing of cooperation is right when there are incentives for cooperation for both parties.  
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IOs do not cooperate because the timing is right, but because there are shared interests 
that make the timing of cooperation right. For example, if the United Nations would have wanted 
to initiate cooperation with the European Union in the mid-1990s, when the EU did not have a 
common foreign and security policy, that attempt would have failed. Cooperating with the EU 
after 2003 made sense for the United Nations, as the EU was equipped to help the UN in peace 
operations. In a second example, the time for formal cooperation between EU and NATO has not 
been ripe after 2004 when Cyprus joined the European Union. Attempts at formal EU-NATO 
cooperation, even for operations outside Europe, would be futile until the Turkish-Greek Cypriot 
conflict on the divided island of Cyprus is resolved. Turkey blocks EU-NATO cooperation in 
NATO, of which Cyprus is not a member. Cyprus blocks EU-NATO cooperation in the EU, of 
which Turkey is not a member. The two countries have basically a veto power on cooperation 
between EU and NATO, given that decisions in both organizations are taken based on consensus. 
Turkey and Cyprus would, most likely, not use the membership in their respective IOs as 
political tools, if a solution to their conflict would be found. Thus, official EU-NATO 
cooperation depends on the fate of Turkish-Cypriot conflict. The time for EU-NATO 
cooperation will come when the time for solving the Turkish-Cypriot conflict will come.   
Second, a common history of cooperation enhances inter-organizational cooperation for 
future cases. If the organizations have been previously deployed together in conflicts, they know 
how the others operate and what to expect from each other. There will be potentially fewer 
conflicts and misunderstandings between the organizations and more cooperation. If the previous 
MSPOs between the IOs were problematic in terms of cooperation, then the IOs will most likely 
avoid working together. In that situation if they have to work together (because their principals 
  
77 
want them to) they will know how to handle their differences better. This is a testable 
proposition that could be tackled in future research.  
This explanation is a social-constructivist explanation that could tie in well with the 
social learning and personal background explanations. Previously positive interactions taught the 
international organizations how to cooperate with each other, and thus we should expect them to 
want more cooperation in the future. Nevertheless, the problem with this explanation is that it 
can explain only why we observe more inter-organizational cooperation between IOs after the 
first time. It does not explain why inter-organizational cooperation occurs initially, when there is 
no previous positive history between the international organizations.  
The timing and the previous history for cooperation are factors enhancing inter-
organizational cooperation. They do not deal with the rational interests of the organizations, but 
with the ways that their relations and their cooperation are constructed. In my view, these factors 
are very important for increasing the depth of cooperation, for allowing it to develop and become 
deeper and wider. These factors do not determine the initiation of inter-organizational 
cooperation. On the other hand, bad timing, and a problematic previous history can harm 
cooperation by making it more difficult. Yet IOs do not cooperate with each other simply 
because of good timing and a positive previous history. They cooperate because they have an 
interest to do so. Even if the timing is bad and the previous history was problematic they would 
still initiate cooperation to reduce costs, complement each other’s work and reduce audience 
costs. In these cases, the depth of their cooperation may suffer, but not its initiation.  
It was specific interests on the ground that initially dictated the need for ad-hoc inter-
organizational cooperation. Then, these ad-hoc cooperation agreements became institutionalized 
in documents attesting the desire for cooperation between the multiple international 
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organizations deployed in peace operations. In the process of institutionalization of inter-
organizational cooperation, the international community experienced a normative change. Now, 
cooperation with other IOs is part of the goals of each international organization. This goal is 
present in NATO’s comprehensive approach and in EU’s desire to create synergetic relations 
with other IOs. At least at a declaratory stage, most IOs recognize the need for multilateral 
approaches in peace operations. This normative change followed the interests identified in the 
first part of the chapter. This normative change deepens the level of cooperation, but it does not 
determine it.   
IOs cooperate with each other because they stand to gain something out of cooperation. 
The theoretical story of this study is a rational choice one. The reasons for inter-organizational 
cooperation are to be found at two stages of analysis: stage one, member-states (the principals) 
and stage two, the international organizations (the agents). I introduce an innovative collective 
principals-multiple agents model to explain the rationale for collective principals agreeing with 
inter-organizational cooperation between their agents. Collective principals can use their 
multiple agents as control mechanisms on each other. If the principals are not opposed to 
cooperation between their agents, the decision moves to the second level, the international 
organizations’ motivations. My research focuses on the second stage of cooperation, that of the 
international organizations. I show how international organizations cooperate through three paths 
for cooperation: resources, complementarity, and audience costs reasons. The explanations are 
not mutually exclusive. I also test three alternative social constructivist hypotheses.   
The following chapter will outline the research design of this study. I will operationalize 
the variables illustrated in the hypotheses and explain how I empirically test them. Next, I will 
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also introduce the new dataset on inter-organizational cooperation in peace operations, the data 
from the interviews, and the case studies.  
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Figures  
 
Figure 3.1 Collective Principals-Multiple Agents in Africa  
 
 
Figure 3.2 Collective Principals-Multiple Agents in Europe 
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CHAPTER 4. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
This study employs a multi-method research design using statistical analysis on a new 
dataset on multiple simultaneous peace operations, interviews, and case studies. The new dataset 
covers all the incidents of cooperation and non-cooperation between international organizations 
that deploy two or more peace operations at the same time and in the same conflict. The 
interviews were conducted with European Union and NATO officials. The case studies are 
chosen using the most different system design model (MDSD) to represent the European and 
African clusters of peace operations as well as the two focal IOs in the international network of 
peacekeeping- the European Union and the United Nations. The following paragraphs introduce 
the new dataset, the interviews, and the choice of case studies. Before presenting the multi-
method approach used, I will operationalize the major concepts of this study: peace operations 
and multiple simultaneous peace operations. These concepts guide the reminder of the study.  
 
Defining the Concept of Peace Operations  
The following section will identify the concept of peace operations used for this study. 
For peace operations, I adopted the “maximalist” definition developed from Boutros Ghali’s 
(1995) Agenda for Peace. Boutros Ghali identified preventive diplomacy, peace-making, peace 
enforcement, peacekeeping, and post-conflict peace-building, as some of the international 
community’s tools for peace. Boutros-Ghali defined the concepts related to peacekeeping as 
follows:  
“- Preventive diplomacy is action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent 
existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they 
occur. 
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- Peacemaking is action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful 
means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations. 
- Peace-keeping is the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the 
consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police 
personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peace-keeping is a technique that expands the 
possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace.” (Boutros-Ghali 1992) 
The related concept of post-conflict peace-building was defined as “action to identify and 
support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse 
into conflict.” (Boutros-Ghali 1992). I include all these concepts under the label of peace 
operations. Thus, for the purposes of this study, peace operations include a) conflict prevention, 
b) traditional peacekeeping, c) peace enforcement, and d) peace-building missions.  
In order to be considered a peace operation, a mission must deploy either military or 
civilian personnel or both, in a post-conflict or potentially conflictual environment, to deal 
specifically with that conflict. The main goal, among many others, of all these missions, is the 
same: stabilize a country and make sure that the conflict will not (re)start again. I assume that for 
a mission to be considered a peace operation there has to be either a pre-existing conflict or a 
clear threat of future conflict. Thus, the special representative offices of the UN and of the EU in 
specific conflicts (e.g.: UN Special Representative of the Secretary General for the Great Lakes 
Region, EU Special Representative for Central Asia) do not amount to peace operations.  
These representative offices of various international organizations are not peace 
operations. They dealt with a large number of issues from delivering food aid to development, 
from overseeing refugees’ camps to environmental concerns. They did not deal only with those 
issues related to conflict, but had a much larger agenda. Another example is OSCE’s Center in 
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Yerevan, even though OSCE considers it a field mission. OSCE’s Center in Yerevan does not 
deal with the conflict-related aspects of Nagorno-Karabakh, nor with any other specific conflict 
aspects.13 On the other hand, the OSCE Mission to Latvia is considered a peace operation 
because it aimed to prevent conflict between the Latvian and Russian communities in Latvia.  
The maximalist conceptualization identifies the goal of peace operations as being any or 
all of the following:  
1) to prevent conflict through the development of rule of law, good governance, minority rights 
programs, strong civil society, border security measures, implementation of early warning 
systems (conflict prevention activities);  
2) to deploy military personnel with a United Nations Chapter VI mandate in a war-torn area to 
monitor and limit the violence occurring there (traditional peacekeeping activities);  
3) to deploy military personnel with a United Nations Chapter VII mandate which allows them to 
enforce the peace against all conflict parties (peace enforcement activities); 
4) to achieve lasting peace by employing such activities as disarming warring parties, training 
indigenous security personnel, facilitating elections, strengthening institutions, providing 
humanitarian aid, repatriating refugees, and supporting the reconciliation process between parties 
to the former conflict (peacebuilding activities).  
I adopt this maximalist definition because the boundaries between strictly military 
(traditional peacekeeping missions) and strictly civilian missions (some of the current peace-
building missions) have become blurred. The field of peacekeeping has witnessed numerous 
innovations since the mid-1990s, and new types of missions are developed regularly (e.g. robust 
peacekeeping, hybrid missions). Several scholars (Diehl 2008; Durch 2006) already started 
                                                           
13 Several UN DPA political field missions fall in the same category as OSCE-Yerevan. Second, some UN political 
field missions were not included in the dataset, because there is already a UN peace operation on the ground in the 
same conflict, and the role of the political field mission is primordially to coordinate activities among UN agencies.  
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replacing the over-stretched concept of peacekeeping with peace operations, so that they could 
include under the same label, peace-building and other non-traditional, but highly 
interdependent, peace-related activities. My small addition to the concept of peace operations is 
to add civilian peacebuilding missions (OSCE in Latvia) and preventive operations (UNPREDEP 
in Macedonia) sent to conflicts that have not yet become violent.  
I used the latest comprehensive survey of peace operations developed by Tavares et al. 
(2008) to enlarge the Stimson Center’s Dataset on Peace Operations (2006). I enlarged the 
Stimson Dataset both in terms of time (adding all peace operations for the period 2007-2009) and 
also in terms of the concept of peace operations as described above (including a number of 
smaller, regional peace operations, such as League of Arab States’ operation in Kuwait from 
1961-1963 and several OSCE conflict prevention missions). The complete list of all peace 
operations used for this study can be found in Appendix A. When accounting for the 2007-2009 
peace operations update, the differences between this list and Stimson Center’s Dataset on Peace 
Operations are minimal.  
According to a survey of international organizations that have mandates for peace and 
security (Tavares et al. 2008), only a handful of organizations have the capacity to conduct peace 
operations. The list includes the following organizations: the United Nations, a number of 
African IOs (AU, ECCAS, ECOWAS, IGAD and SADC14) and a number of other regional 
organizations such as CIS, CSTO, LAS, PIF, EU, NATO, OAS and OSCE.15 IGAD and CSTO 
have no peace operations to their record, even though they have the capability and resources to 
                                                           
14 African Union (AU), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS), Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), Southern African Development 
Community (SADC). 
15 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), League of Arab 
States (LAS), Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 
Organization of American States (OAS), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
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deploy them. A number of IOs who deployed peace operations have only a few deployments in 
their entire history (ECCAS, CEMAC, SADC, LAS, PIF, OAS, CIS, SADC, Commonwealth 
Secretariat). Seven major international organizations share the burden of most peace operations 
worldwide (UN, AU, ECOWAS, EU, NATO, OAS, and the OSCE) as Table 4.1 suggests.  
 
Overview of All Peace Operations, 1948-2009  
The updated dataset on all peace operations deployed from 1948 to 2009 shows that there 
were 179 peace operations deployed during this period. Most of them were deployed by regional 
organizations (85 peace operations), followed by United Nations deployments (71 peace 
operations), and third multinational coalitions (21 peace operations). Two (2) peace operations 
had a joint regional organization-UN leadership (OAS16-UN in Haiti and AU-UN in Darfur).  
The updated dataset highlights the increasingly important role taken by regional 
organizations in peace operations. That there are 85 peace operations led by regional 
organizations out of the total of 179 peace operations for the period 1948-2009, signals both the 
importance of regional organizations and allows us to observe MSPOs. Without the development 
of regional peace operations capabilities, we could not talk about the increasing importance of 
multiple simultaneous peace operations, because we would observe mostly U.N. missions, and 
thus no simultaneity or multiplicity. 
 Table 4.2 shows the significant increase in the number of peace operations initiated per 
year after 1991. Before the Cold War there were rarely more than 2 peace operations initiated per 
year. In 1992 alone, however, there were 14 different peace operations initiated by both the 
United Nations and regional organizations. The significant increase in the number of peace 
operations starting with 1991 is attributable to two factors: the end of the Cold War allowed the 
                                                           
16 Organization of American States 
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United Nations to deploy peace operations in conflicts that were previously off limits, and 
regional organizations started deploying their own peace operations.  
Table 4.3 shows the number of peace operations active every year since 1948 to 2008. It 
is easy to observe that four years from 1988 to 1992, the number of peace operations active in 
any given conflict in the world doubled from around 10 peace operations to more than 20 peace 
operations. By the end of the 1990s, the number of peace operations doubled again to more than 
40 peace operations. At the beginning of the 21st century, the number of peace operations active 
per year decreased, but picked up by the middle of the first decade of the 21st century breaching 
the barrier of 60 active peace operations per year.  
The distribution of peace operations by continents gives us an indication of what conflicts 
receive the attention of the international community, as well as, which continents have the 
institutions to deploy peace operations. Based on Table 4.4 Africa and Europe are the continents that 
receive the majority of peace operations. They are also the continents with several international 
organizations capable of deploying peacekeepers in conflict areas.  
 
Defining Multiple Simultaneous Peace Operations (MSPOs) 
Multiple simultaneous peace operations are defined as two or more peace operations 
deployed at the same time (simultaneous), in the same conflicts (multiple). In two cases (Georgia 
and the Arab-Israeli conflict), in which there are several related conflicts, involving the same 
country or the larger region as a whole, I consider those peace operations as multiple 
simultaneous peace operations because those conflicts are inter-linked. In these cases, the peace 
processes of the conflicts are interdependent and influence each other, thus creating the need for 
MSPOs.    
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One is hard pressed to find a specific definition for what some scholars argue is a similar 
concept to MSPOs, “peacekeeping partnerships”. No precise definition of “peacekeeping 
partnerships” is ever provided. Nevertheless, based on the type of peace operations that are 
included under the label of “peacekeeping partnerships,” I believe there is added value by 
analyzing peace operations through the different lens of multiple simultaneous peace operations. 
The following paragraphs help differentiate multiple simultaneous peace operations from 
peacekeeping partnerships and provide several arguments for the use of MSPOs as a framework 
for analyzing peace operations.  
The concept of “multiple simultaneous peace operations” is different from “peacekeeping 
partnerships” because it does not assume cooperation between the peace operations, as 
“peacekeeping partnerships” does. Peacekeeping partnerships contain the implicit assumption 
that independent peace operations deployed at the same time, in the same conflicts, cooperate 
with each other. A partnership implies some kind of cooperation between various parties. 
Multiple simultaneous peace operations do not make a similar assumption. Cooperation (or lack 
thereof) is an issue that could be further explored. In further research, the occurrence of inter-
organizational cooperation in peace operations could thus be explained, rather than assumed.17 
Analyzing cooperation in peace operations by using peacekeeping partnerships would be 
selecting on the dependent variable, because these partnerships already assume cooperation in 
their definition.  
Second, the concept of “multiple simultaneous peace operations” deals with all forms of 
interventions that could be labeled peace operations, such as peace-building and conflict 
prevention, not only with peacekeeping activities. Thus, from this point of view, the concept of 
                                                           
17 Intra-organizational cooperation is another interesting phenomenon which could be studied (e.g.: cooperation 
between the different UN agencies in post-conflict environments). However, the concept of MSPOs cannot be used 
to study this phenomenon, as MSPOs refer to the peace operations of different international organizations.  
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MSPO has a broader application than the concept of peacekeeping partnerships. I do 
acknowledge that the concept of “peacekeeping partnerships” covers more than merely 
traditional peacekeeping operations, but, at least in theory, its focus is on “peacekeeping” rather 
than other types of peace operations.  
Thus, the main value added of employing multiple simultaneous peace operations instead 
of peacekeeping partnerships is that it allows scholars to use it in the analysis of inter-
organizational cooperation in peace operations. That the UN Security Council authorized the 
peace operations of various IOs does not mean that they will cooperate with each other. There 
are many reasons why in some cases, inter-organizational cooperation does not occur. Inter-
organizational rivalries, turf battles, and some member-states’ opposition (e.g., EU-NATO post-
2004) can easily block cooperation. Second, MSPOs encompass a broader range of peace 
operations activities, beyond peacekeeping. The concept of “peacekeeping partnerships” needs a 
clearly stated definition to be considered a valuable candidate to explain the phenomena 
explained in this study. This concept also needs a clear list of which peace operations are 
considered “peacekeeping partnerships” and which peace operations are not considered as such. 
Such a systematic list is currently missing. I believe that multiple simultaneous peace operations 
could have a broader application for research and policy because it has a clearly stated definition, 
is useful to analyze inter-organizational cooperation in peace operations, and provides a 
systematic list of cases.  
Some examples of multiple simultaneous peace operations are the separate peace 
operations of NATO, the United Nations, and of the European Union in Afghanistan as of 
January 2009 (ISAF, UNAMA,18 and EUPOL, respectively). Multiple simultaneous peace 
operations also include peace operations deployed at the same time but not necessarily in the 
                                                           
18 United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 
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same country: EUBAM Rafah19, EUPOL COPPS/Palestine20, and UNTSO21 are three peace 
operations deployed in the Arab-Israeli regional conflict. EUBAM Rafah is deployed in Gaza 
while, EUPOL COPPS/Palestine and UNTSO have their headquarters in the West Bank. They 
are MSPOs because they are deployed in the same conflict-- the Arab-Israeli conflict.  
Any peace operation that is active in a conflict without the deployment of any other peace 
operation at the same time in the same conflict is not a multiple simultaneous peace operation. 
For example, the United Nations’ ONUSAL22 mission was the only peace operation in El 
Salvador. ONUSAL does not satisfy the two conditions to be part of a MSPO: multiple (two or 
more peace operations) and simultaneous (temporal overlap with another peace operation) in the 
same conflict. We might encounter a peace operation deployed in the same conflict (e.g., African 
Union’s OMIB23 in Burundi) but without having a temporal overlap with other peace operations 
in Burundi. Eight years after the withdrawal of OMIB, there was another peace operation 
deployed in the same conflict, UN’s ONUB.24 These peace operations in Burundi were multiple, 
but not simultaneous.    
Any peace operation can start as a MSPO, become a MSPO during its existence, or never 
be a MSPO. At its birth, a peace operation can be an individual peace operation (e.g., UNTSO in 
the Middle East in 1948, the first UN peace operation to the region). There were no other peace 
operations at the time deployed in the same conflict. This same mission that started as an 
individual peace operation can, later in life, become a multiple simultaneous peace operation 
(e.g., when UNTSO was joined by EU’s EUBAM Rafah and EUPOL/COPPS Palestine in 2005 
                                                           
19 European Union Border Assistance Mission at Rafah Crossing Point 
20 European Union Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories  
21 United Nations Truce Supervision Organization 
22 United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador  
23 Observer Mission in Burundi 
24 United Nations Operation in Burundi 
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and 2006, respectively). A peace operation can also be born directly as a multiple simultaneous 
peace operation (e.g., as EU’s EUBAM Rafah and EUPOL/COPPS Palestine were) when there is 
already another peace operation deployed in the same conflict and they overlap in time (e.g.: 
UNTSO). An individual peace operation could also begin and end without any spatial and 
temporal overlap with other peace operations (e.g.: UN’s ONUMOZ25 in Mozambique from 
1992-1994  
 
Multiple Simultaneous Peace Operations Datasets 
I created three datasets for multiple simultaneous peace operations. One of them is 
dyadic, the second is based on dyad-years, and a third one is monadic. The dyadic dataset 
combines the MSPOs by conflict and overlapping temporal domain. Each entry is a pair of two 
peace operations deployed at the same time and in the same conflict. In order to make sure that 
the findings are robust, I also created a dyad-year dataset that contains the years in which each 
dyad contained multiple simultaneous peace operations. The dyad-year dataset basically expands 
the dyadic year dataset by adding one observation for each year in which the MSPOs were 
deployed at the same time, in the same conflict. The monadic dataset contains all individual 
peace operations that were deployed at the same time, in the same conflict. Each entry is one 
multiple simultaneous peace operation. 
It would have been impossible to use only one dataset to test all the hypotheses 
mentioned in the previous chapter. I use the dyadic dataset for testing hypotheses 3 
(complementarity), 4 (conflict complexity), and 6 (security cultures). The activities of a peace 
operation, the conflict characteristics, and the security cultures of international organizations do 
not vary year to year, and thus a dyadic dataset is used to test these hypotheses.  I also used the 
                                                           
25 United Nations Operation in Mozambique 
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dyadic dataset to test Hypotheses 2 (resources) and 7 (personal background). Even though I do 
acknowledge that the human and financial resources, as well as the leadership of a peace 
operation vary from year to year, I used their averages to incorporate them in the dyadic dataset. 
In order to check the robustness of the findings from the dyadic dataset given that resources and 
personal background vary on a yearly basis, I used a dyad-year dataset to test Hypotheses 2 
(resources) and 7 (personal background). The monadic dataset is useful for testing Hypothesis 5 
(learning). The monadic dataset is appropriate for Hypothesis 5 because it allows me to trace the 
cooperation willingness of each individual peace operation deployed by international 
organizations. 
 
Dyadic MSPOs Dataset 
The dyadic and the dyad-year datasets are the most important ones for the purposes of 
statistical analysis. Whenever there were three or four multiple simultaneous peace operations 
deployed at the same time, in the same conflicts, each dyad was coded separately. I chose to 
focus on a dyadic approach to the datasets because I believe that cooperation occurs at this level. 
Some scholars (Haugevik 2007; Biermann 2008) suggested that we should use a network 
analysis framework to understand inter-organizational cooperation. I argue that the cooperation 
between two IOs is not informed by their cooperation, or lack of it, with a third IO. The network 
nodes do not necessarily inform cooperation between other organizations in peace operations. 
That the African Union’s peace operation cooperated with the United Nations’ peace operation 
in a specific conflict does not influence the probability of cooperation between the African 
Union’s peace operation and ECOWAS’ peace operations in a different conflict, for example. 
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Inter-organizational cooperation is merely a function of the dyadic international organizations 
and of the conflict characteristics.  
The dyadic multiple simultaneous peace operations dataset contains 99 dyads of possible 
IO-IO cooperation in 24 conflicts involving 11 IOs over the time period 1978-2009. In the dyads 
involving a UN mission and a regional organization mission, if the UN mission changed names 
over time, I assumed them to be different dyads. A change in name generally reflects a 
significant change in mandate and thus I considered the relations different. For example, in Ivory 
Coast, UN’s MINUCI26 and ECOWAS’ ECOMICI27 are one dyad, different from UN’S 
ONUCI28 and ECOWAS’ ECOMICI. 
Figure 4.1 shows the most common links between IOs deploying peace operations. The 
UN is the IO that deploys most often together with other IOs in peace operations, with a total of 
60 dyadic MSPOs, most of them with the EU (16) and the AU (10). The European Union follows 
with 41 dyadic MSPOs, most of them with the UN (16) and NATO (10), while OSCE has 28 
dyadic MSPOs-most of them with the EU (9) and the UN (9). The United Nations deployed 
peace operations simultaneously and in the same conflicts with all 11 other IOs in this system. 
The next “friendliest” IO, the EU, deployed MSPOs with only 7 other IOs.  
There are two clusters of multiple simultaneous peace operations deployments: the 
European cluster (EU-NATO-OSCE-CIS29-UN) and the African cluster (EU-UN-AU-
ECOWAS-SADC30-CEMAC31-ECCAS32). The Organization of American States and the League 
of Arab States cooperated only with the United Nations. The European cluster is represented by 
                                                           
26 United Nations Operation in Cote D’Ivoire 
27 ECOWAS Mission to Cote D’Ivoire (Ivory Coast) 
28 United Nations Operation in Ivory Coast 
29 Commonwealth of Independent States  
30 Southern African Development Community 
31 Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa 
32 Economic Community of Central African States 
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dyadic MSPOs such as the UN, EU, OSCE, and NATO’s separate peace operations in Bosnia. 
The African cluster is represented by dyadic MSPOs such as the UN and AU’s peace operations 
in Sudan, or EU and CEMAC’s sequential peace operations in the Central African Republic.  
The European cluster is much more integrated than the African cluster. Although in the 
European cluster every organization deployed MSPOs with each other organization, the links are 
not so strong in the African cluster. In the latter most of the multiple simultaneous peace 
operations come from UN-AU (10) and UN-ECOWAS (6) deployments. The intra-African IOs 
do not deploy MSPOs with each other as often as the intra-European IOs do. This may be a 
result of the African Peace and Security strategy that assigns a division of labor between 
different IOs intervening in conflicts in their respective regions.   
 There are several lessons to learn from Figure 4.1. First, we observe that the EU and the 
OSCE are the two regional organizations most willing to deploy with other organizations. The 
EU, a relatively new IO in the field of peace operations, deploys peace operations where there 
are other IOs already deployed. One argument says that the EU deploys with other IOs because it 
wants to learn from others how this is done. The EU wants to become a global actor on issues of 
peace and security and learning by co-deploying with other organizations is part of its strategy. 
(Koops, 2008) That the UN has most MSPOs is of no surprise, given that most of the time, 
regional IOs deploy in the same conflicts where the UN was already deployed.  
Second, as discussed above, there are two clusters of MSPOs: the European and the 
African. The European cluster is well integrated with the UN-EU-NATO-OSCE as the main IOs 
deploying peace operations, while the African cluster is less integrated, with the UN deploying 
MSPOs mainly with the AU or ECOWAS. The existence of these clusters will determine the 
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patterns of inter-organizational cooperation in peace operations in future research. I expect to 
observe stronger cooperation for the European cluster and less so for the African cluster.  
Third, Figure 4.1 shows that the European Union has become the second most important 
international actor in peace operations, regarding areas of deployment and the number of peace 
operations. The European Union deployed 23 peace operations out of which 22 are MSPOs for 
the period 2003-2009. EU’s 23 peace operations in 6 years are second only to the United 
Nations’ 70 peace operations over 6 decades. The European Union is the international 
organization that is deploying most multiple simultaneous peace operations with almost all its 
peace operations being MSPOs. The EU is also the only regional organizations to be a significant 
actor in both the African and the European clusters, on par with the UN. Future research could 
analyze the reasons for EU’s preferences for MSPOs that could range from comparative 
advantages to the burden-sharing of peace operations costs.  
For the dyadic dataset, I coded the dependent and the independent variables for each 
dyad. The dependent variable is inter-organizational cooperation. By inter-organizational 
cooperation between inter-governmental organizations (IO-to-IO cooperation) in peace 
operations, I understand those actions through which, in varying degrees, IOs exchange 
information, plan, decide, and work together (joint patrols, joint exercises) in peace operations in 
the same conflict. Inter-organizational cooperation, for the purposes of this study, refers only to 
those instances in which there are two or more peace operations, from different international 
organizations, deployed on the ground.  
The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable coded as 0 for no cooperation and 1 for 
cooperation. I used the following indicators to code the existence (or lack) of inter-organizational 
cooperation: joint planning, joint patrols, joint exercises, the existence of regular official 
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meetings between the two peace operations, the existence of smooth transitions as well as the 
rehatting of troops. I coded these data using the historical narratives for each peace operation, 
previous case studies done on specific conflict environments that had more than one peace 
operation, as well as newspaper articles from Lexis Nexis. For each multiple simultaneous peace 
operation I researched the official documents posted on the websites of those peace operations 
and interviews conducted with their top management. Second, I analyzed the structures of the 
peace operations, searched for any contacts without multiple simultaneous peace operations in 
the same conflict, and used scholarly and newspaper articles analyzing the activities of those 
peace operations. In all these data I searched for the presence or absence of any indicators of 
sharing of information, joint planning, joint patrols, joint exercises, the existence of regular 
official meetings between the two peace operations, the existence of smooth transitions, as well 
as the rehatting of troops. If I found indications that such activities occurred I coded the 
relationships as displaying inter-organizational cooperation (1). If there was no evidence for such 
type of activities, then I coded the relationship as not displaying inter-organizational cooperation 
(0).  
I operationalize cooperation as more than the mere exchange of information between the 
two peace operations. There has to be a shared sense of interdependence reflected in the 
establishment of formal mechanisms for working together. Having regular meetings between the 
staff of the peace operations, ensuring smooth transition and rehatting of personnel, having joint 
patrols and exercises are the signs that the two international organizations work together. 
Whenever there is a transition from one peace operation to another one, a smooth change of 
authority and having troops change their hats (for example from AU’s green berets to UN’s blue 
  
96 
helmets in Darfur, Sudan) while remaining stationed as peacekeepers, are signs of cooperation 
between the organizations.   
For the dyadic dataset, I coded the following independent variables: cooperation blockage 
from member-states’ level for Hypothesis 1, yearly averages of financial and human resources 
for Hypothesis 2 (resources), the type of intervention of each peace operation for Hypothesis 3 
(complementarity), conflict type, conflict fatalities, and rivalry for Hypothesis 4 (audience costs), 
security cultures for Hypothesis 6 (security cultures), and nationality for the heads of the peace 
operation (Hypothesis 7). .  
Hypothesis 1 (member states’ acquiescence) is tested using the dyadic dataset. For all the 
instances of non-cooperation I analyzed the historical narratives of the cases to identify if the 
cooperation blockage came at the member-states’ level or at the international organizations’ 
level. I gathered data from international newspapers through Lexis Nexis about any attempts by 
member states to block inter-organizational cooperation. For example, if a member-state vetoed a 
document recommending inter-organizational cooperation with another organization’s peace 
operation, then this was considered an attempt y a member-state to block cooperation. Another 
example of member-states’ blocking inter-organizational cooperation was represented by a 
member-state, that provided most of the finances and peacekeepers for a peace operation in a 
specific conflict, and lobbied against the deployment of another international organizations’ 
peace operation in the same conflict. On the other hand if there was no public evidence 
suggesting that a member-state did not want inter-organizational cooperation between two or 
more peace operations, I coded that as evidence in favor of inter-organizational cooperation. The 
member-states do not have to support inter-organizational cooperation, but merely to be 
acquiescent to it. In these situations, silence and neutrality are indicators of acquiescence.  
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Hypothesis 2 (resources) is tested using both the dyadic and the dyad-year datasets. For 
the dyadic dataset, the yearly averages of financial and human resources for each peace operation 
were included in the dataset. Financial resources represent the cost of the peace operation for 
each year. Human resources represent the aggregate number of personnel deployed by the peace 
operation (military, police, and civilians). The financial and human resources data were gathered 
from SIPRI’s Multilateral Peace Operations Database (Soder 2009). When the financial and 
human resources data were not available in this database, I used the websites of the peace 
operations to gather data.  
Regarding Hypothesis 3 (complementarity), there are three types of peace operations 
coded: traditional peacekeeping, military peace enforcement, and civilian peacebuilding. I 
acknowledge that most peace operations do a little bit of several of these activities. Nevertheless, 
I focus on the major activities of the peace operation to determine in which of these three 
categories they should be placed.  
There are multiple differences between these three types of peace operations: goals, 
activities, and conflict phase deployment. Traditional peace operations are characterized by a UN 
Chapter VI mandate, the deployment of troops between the combatants and ceasefire monitoring 
activities. The UN mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) is a very good example of a 
traditional peace operation deployed in-between Ethiopia and Eritrea to monitor a ceasefire. 
Peace enforcement operations are characterized by a UN Chapter VII mandate and the use of 
military force to stop a violent conflict and to implement the provisions of the mandate. For 
example, the European Union’s peace operation Artemis was a military peace enforcement 
mission with a UN Chapter VII mandate. Civilian peacebuilding operations are focused on the 
establishment of the rule of law, organizing elections, and on the disarmament, demobilization 
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and reintegration (DDR) processes in the aftermath of violent conflicts. European Union’s peace 
operations in Macedonia (Proxima, Concordia, and EUPAT) were all civilian peace operations 
focused on establishing the rule of law and organizing free and fair elections for all the ethnic 
groups involved in the conflict. I coded all the dyads, for each peace operation, using these types 
of interventions. 
Hypothesis 3 would be supported if cooperation between peace operations with different 
types of intervention (e.g. traditional peacekeeping-civilian peacebuilding) is observed in more 
cases than cooperation between peace operations with the same types of intervention (e.g. 
military peace enforcement-military peace enforcement). Thus, in those instances of cooperation 
between different types of intervention, complementarity would be the reason why cooperation 
occurs.  
Hypothesis 4 states that if peace operations are deployed in very difficult and complex 
conflicts, then we should observe the initiation of inter-organizational cooperation. I use two 
different indicators to capture the concept of difficult and complex conflicts: conflict type and 
rivalry.  
Peace operations generally experience more problems in intrastate (civil) conflicts than in 
interstate conflicts (Diehl 1994; Wesley 1997; Jett 2000). Peacekeepers deployed in civil wars 
usually have higher chances of encountering spoilers because of the number of disputants (Diehl 
1994), the greater opportunity and willingness for spoilers to undermine agreements (Most and 
Starr 1989), and the rebel groups’ looser command-and-control mechanisms (Vinci 2008; 
Autesserre 2008). This increased opportunity for renewed conflict makes the peacekeepers’ work 
more difficult and may require the deployment of several peace operations with different sets of 
expertise. Internationalized civil wars pose an even more complex situation, in which the 
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elements of civil war are combined with characteristics of interstate war.  Thus, based on type of 
conflict, we should expect to observe most multiple simultaneous peace operations deployed in 
internationalized civil wars, followed by civil wars and lastly interstate wars. For this conflict 
complexity indicator, I used the PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset 4 (Gleditsch et al. 2002) which 
codes conflicts as extra, intra, inter, and internationalized intrastate. They define interstate 
conflict as “a conflict between two or more countries and governments.” (Gleditsch et al. 2002, 
8) Intrastate conflict is defined as “conflict within a country between a government and one or 
more opposition groups, with no interference from other countries.” (Gleditsch et al. 2002, 8) 
Internationalized intra-state conflicts are similar to intra-state conflict, “but where the 
government, the opposition or both sides receive support from other governments.” (Gleditsch et 
al. 2002, 8) Extra-state conflicts are of no importance for the purposes of this study as there are 
no peace operations deployed in such conflicts.  
The second indicator for conflict complexity is the type of relationship between the 
parties. Rivals are states who perceive one another as enemies and most disputants expect to 
handle their disagreements with one another militarily (Diehl and Goertz 2000; Colaresi, Rasler, 
and Thompson 2007).  If the relationship between the disputants is seriously strained and 
militarized (i.e., rivalry), it will take multiple efforts for peacekeepers from different IOs to solve 
the issues between the conflict parties, than if the violence was sparked by an isolated conflict 
episode (i.e., no rivalry). Rivals have a shared history of militarized conflict, a common 
perception that “the other” is the problem, and an expectation that future militarized encounters 
will occur, and are appropriate mechanisms for resolving disputes. Thus, the job of the 
peacekeepers is much more difficult in rivalries. If the parties are in a rivalry relationship (intra-
state or inter-state rivalry), we know from previous research (Diehl and Goertz 2000; DeRouen 
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and Bercovitch 2008), that there is a higher probability for future conflict compared with a non-
rivalry relationship. Thus, given all the difficulties of dealing with rivalries we should expect to 
see more multiple simultaneous peace operations deployed in rivalries rather than non-rivalries. 
For this conflict complexity indicator, I used three datasets. For inter-state rivalry I used 
both Goertz and Diehl’s Rivalry Dataset 5.1 (Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006) and Thompson’s 
Rivalry Dataset (Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson 2007). For the intra-state rivalry I used 
DeRouen and Bercovitch’s (2008) Enduring Internal Rivalries dataset. Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 
(2006) consider that two states are in a rivalry if they had three or more interrelated militarized 
interstate disputes (MIDs). If the MIDs were on the same issue then they are part of the same 
rivalry, regardless of any temporal constraints. Colaresi, Thompson and Rasler (2007) define 
rivalries as inter-state relations that exhibit explicit threats, competitive behavior, and enemy 
perceptions on the part of the decision-makers of each state. DeRouen and Bercovitch take the 
concept of rivalries inside the state and look at intra-state rivalries. They define them as "internal 
conflicts between a government and an insurgency with at least 10 years of armed conflict in 
which there are at least 25 deaths- regardless of whether or not these years are consecutive.” 
(DeRouen and Bercovitch 2008, 60) 
Hypothesis 6 argues that international organizations with similar security cultures are 
more likely to work together. I coded the security cultures of all international organizations as 
civilian, military or mixed, depending on the major type of activities conducted during the daily 
business of the IO. I analyzed the organizational structure of international organizations and the 
number of staff members attributed to military activities within each IO. If the majority of its 
units and staff were conducting civilian activities then that IO’s security culture was coded as 
civilian. If it was difficult to identify which type of activities (civilian or military) were 
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predominant, those IOs’ security cultures were coded as mixed. If, on the other hand, the 
evidence suggested that the majority of that IO’s activities were military, then the security 
culture of that IO was coded as military.  For example, the European Union, the OSCE, and the 
CIS do not have much of a military component, and were coded as civilian organizations. NATO 
and ECOWAS were coded as military organizations, while the African Union and the United 
Nations were coded as mixed. I then turned the codes for the dyad into a dichotomous variable 
with a 0 when security cultures were not the same, and 1 for when the security cultures were the 
same.  
For Hypothesis 7 (personal background), I coded the nationality of the heads of mission 
for each peace operation. If the nationalities were the same I coded it as a 1. If the nationalities 
were different I coded the entry as a 0. For the dyadic dataset, I coded a 1 if there was at least 
one year in which the heads of missions in multiple simultaneous peace operations were from the 
same country. I coded a 0 if the nationality of the heads of missions was not the same. It is very 
difficult to aggregate the information for this hypothesis for the dyadic dataset, given that the 
leadership of peace operations changes yearly. Thus, this hypothesis is also tested using the 
dyadic-year dataset.  
The dyadic dataset is useful for developing a typology of multiple simultaneous peace 
operations: sequential, parallel, and hybrid. There are several ways to classify the relationships 
between two or more peace operations (Jones and Cherif, 2004; Tardy 2005; Derblom et. al, 
2008). I borrow a simple and straight-forward typology, based on temporal overlap and the type 
of activities conducted between the peace operations (Bah 2008). There are three types of 
multiple simultaneous peace operations: 1) sequential peace operations (either bridging or hand-
overs), 2) parallel deployments, and 3) hybrid peace operations.  
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Sequential peace operations refer to those cases in which one IO’s peace operation 
immediately follows (or is followed) by another IO’s peace operation. In sequential multiple 
simultaneous peace operations, there is limited, if any, temporal overlap between the 
deployments (e.g., UN finished their work in Kosovo on December 31, 2008 and the European 
Union took over on January 1, 2009). Still, when the deployments start/end within one day, I 
consider that there is some time overlap between the peace operations because the incoming 
peace operation has had officers deployed on the ground for weeks, if not months, previous to 
the hand-over, to ensure a smooth transition. Second, the planning, activities, and effectiveness 
of the new peace operation are conditioned by the accomplishments and the relationships of the 
previous peace operation with the local population and institutions. Thus, I believe that 
sequential peace operations have the main characteristics of multiple simultaneous peace 
operations, even though their simultaneity condition could be criticized as an over-stretch.  
There are two types of sequential peace operation: bridging and hand-over operations, 
respectively. Bridging operations occur when one peace operation deploys very fast for a short 
period of time and with a clear end-date, until another international organization steps in to take 
over the responsibilities. For example, a bridging operation was European Union’s first peace 
operation outside Europe, Operation Artemis, which was deployed for only three months, in the 
eastern region of D.R.Congo until UN’s MONUC could find more troops to cover that area as 
well. Hand-over operations occur when one international organization withdraws its peace 
operation from a conflict to let another one take over those responsibilities. A sequential, hand-
over peace operation occurred in Kosovo with the transition from the United Nations’ UNMIK33, 
which was deployed from 1999 to 2009, to EU’s EULEX34 in January 2009. The difference 
                                                           
33 United Nations Mission in Kosovo 
34 European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo 
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between the two sequential types of peace operations, bridging and hand-over, is that with 
respect to  the former it is understood that the first operation will be very short in time before 
another organization takes over (months usually) and it has a clear end-date. For the latter, an 
organization withdraws from a conflict after a longer period of deployment (years usually).  
In the case of bridging operations, the first peace operation just announces that its 
intervention will be for a short, limited amount of time, with specific goals. Any operation can 
step in after it. This usually tends to be the United Nations. This clarification is important to 
dispel the perception that there might be some sort of joint planning from the onset in bridging 
operations. 
Parallel peace operations refer to those cases in which two or more peace operations are 
deployed independent of each other during an overlapping time period in the same conflict. 
Parallel peace operations are characterized by each organization’s independence of the other. 
Each retains political and military control over its own resources, including the time and 
character of resources usage, and the costs involved. The two peace operations run side by side, 
either in different regional areas of the conflicts (e.g. OSCE deployed in South Ossetia and UN 
in Abkhazia in the two conflicts within Georgia during the period March 1994-December 2008) 
or in different functional areas (e.g. NATO has been conducting peace enforcement, while the 
UN and the EU have been conducting peace-building activities in Afghanistan since June 2007).  
I define hybrid peace operations as those in which there is a joint mission between 
international organizations. There should also be a unified, joint chain of command involving 
personnel from several international organizations. All the planning and activities of the hybrid 
peace operations are conducted together by the international organizations that deployed them. 
Two or more international organizations all share the responsibility for the joint mission.  
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Hybrid peace operations are defined as those cases in which there is an integrated 
approach to peace operations between the international organizations. There should also be 
formal mechanisms of coordination and cooperation between the IOs, a unified, joint chain of 
command involving personnel from several international organizations, and a clear division of 
labor. All the planning and all the activities of the hybrid peace operations are conducted 
together by the international organizations that deployed them.   
There are not many examples of hybrid peace operations as this is a novel and 
cumbersome type of peace operations with unclear effectiveness. Hybrid peace operations in 
general have been confined to only three conflicts (Haiti, Kosovo, and Sudan). The peace 
operations in Haiti (MICIVIH, which was an integrated mission between the UN and the OAS) 
and Sudan (UNAMID, which was an integrated mission between the UN and the AU) are not 
multiple peace operations, but rather single, integrated missions. Nevertheless, when considering 
the other peace operations in Haiti (MIPONUH, UNMIH, UNTMIH) and Sudan (EU-AMIS, 
AMIS) with which MICIVIH and UNAMID interacted, they become multiple simultaneous 
peace operations. But they are parallel operations and not hybrids. Thus, the only hybrid MSPOs 
included in this dataset are confined to the conflict in Kosovo.35  
In including only some of the Kosovo peace operations as hybrids I follow the 
conventional approach in the peacekeeping literature (Jones and Cherif 2004) in considering 
these missions as hybrids: “In ‘tightly-coupled’ hybrid missions, such as KFOR/ UNMIK in 
Kosovo, the UN and non-UN components are jointly mandated and share some common 
command or political decision-making structure.” (Bellamy and Williams 2009, 48) Diehl (2008, 
76) argues that: “Hybrid operations occur, in part, because of the comparative advantage that one 
                                                           
35 All the dyads between the UN, NATO, the OSCE, and since 2008, the EU were considered hybrid MSPOs, with 
the exception of the UN-EU dyad which was considered a sequential type of multiple simultaneous peace operation.  
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actor has in carrying out a particular aspect of a mission.” In the example mentioned above, 
NATO provided the peace enforcement troops for the conflict in Kosovo, while the United 
Nations was conducting peace-building activities, as well as coordinating the myriad of 
international organizations and NGOs active in Kosovo.  
The Kosovo missions could be also considered as parallel or sequential (UN-EU hand-
over in 2008) missions. Their characteristics as MSPOs, regardless of their hybrid or parallel 
labels, are the reason why they are included as such in this dataset. This study is interested in 
multiple simultaneous peace operations, rather than in the label distinctions between hybrid and 
parallel peace operations.   
I used the dyadic multiple simultaneous peace operations dataset to identify the frequency 
distribution of the three MSPOs’ types. The typology is determined by the relationships between 
two or more MSPOs. Some peace operations have multiple partners and the dyadic relationships 
often fall into different categories. If, for example, there were four peace operations deployed in 
the same conflict, at the same time, I included all six possible dyads between the four peace 
operations. I have done that because the relations between peace operations differ depending on 
the dyads. Thus, in the case of Kosovo, for the period 1999-2008, I considered the relations 
between NATO, OSCE, and the UN as hybrid peace operations. When the EU replaced the UN 
in Kosovo, the EU-UN relationship was a sequential hand-over MSPO, but the EU-
NATO/OSCE relationships were hybrid peace operations, because the EU took UN’s position in 
the hybrid peace operations structure.  
As shown by Table 4.5, out of 99 dyads for multiple simultaneous peace operations, 76% 
are parallel deployments (75 peace operations), 19% are sequential (19), and 5% are hybrids (5). 
I would still be left with more than 81% of MSPO dyads, in need of an analysis, even if I would 
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eliminate the sequential peace operations.36 I argue that there is value in keeping these operations 
as MSPOs, even while stretching the simultaneity condition to its limit. By keeping the 
sequential peace operations in the MSPOs dataset, several links between the outgoing and 
incoming peace operations in a sequential format could be researched. One of these links 
analyzes the patterns of deployment in different contexts.  
There is value in maintaining sequential operations as MSPOs, even while stretching the 
simultaneity condition. There are several links between the outgoing and incoming peace 
operations in a sequential format that should be researched. One of them analyzes the patterns of 
deployment in different contexts. This dataset helps to assess Derblom, Frisell, and Schmidt’s 
claim that in Africa, in the case of sequential peace operations, responsibility shifts from the 
regional organization (AU/ECOWAS) to the more experience organization (UN). He argues that 
in Europe the responsibility shifts in the opposite direction, from the more experienced 
organization (UN/NATO) to the regional organization (EU). "In Europe, the tradition has been 
for the UN and NATO to hand over missions to the EU. In Africa, a widespread perception is 
that the UN normally would take on the responsibility for long-term peace building after an early 
intervention by the AU, possibly also including a short-term reinforcement by the EU. The AU 
forces can be deployed early in a conflict situation and the UN only engages after there is an 
overarching peace agreement in place."(Derblom, Frisell, and Schmidt 2008, 45)  
Derblom, Frisell, and Schmidt’s suggestion that there are different patterns for the 
sequencing of peace operations for Africa and for Europe is supported by the data. There are 19 
sequential peace operations (15 in the African cluster and 4 in the European cluster). In 13 out of 
the 15 African cases the peace operations responsibilities are transferred from the regional 
                                                           
36 If some scholars disagree with the label of hybrids for the UN-NATO-OSCE multiple simultaneous peace 
operations in Kosovo, they could easily be relabeled as parallel, and there would be 81% parallel peace operations in 
need of an analysis.  
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organization (AU, ECOWAS, CEMAC) to the more experienced and resourceful organizations 
(UN). In one case the responsibilities are transferred between two African regional IOs, both 
having limited experience with peace operations (CEMAC-ECCAS), and once the UN 
transferred peace responsibilities to the AU (Burundi in 2007). These empirical results show that 
their suggestion for the African pattern is supported by the data. In Africa, less experienced 
regional IOs intervene first, and than transfer the responsibilities to more experienced IOs.    
In the four sequential peace operations that occur in European conflicts, the transfer of 
responsibility occurs from the more experienced IO to the less experienced IO, in all the cases. 
The United Nations tended to intervene first, and than handed-over the peace operations to 
OSCE, NATO (both of them inexperienced regional IOs in the early 1990s), and to the European 
Union. These empirical results show that their suggestion for the European pattern is also 
supported by the data. In European conflicts, more experienced organizations intervene first and 
are followed by less experienced IOs. 
This finding highlights that the more complex and bloody conflicts of Africa are left to 
inexperienced regional organizations until enough political support is gathered within the U.N. to 
send a peace operation there. This approach could also represent a way to gain experience for 
such IOs as the African Union and ECOWAS regarding peace operations deployments, by 
allowing them some action before the experienced IOs step in. On the other hand, violent 
conflicts in Europe receive the best expertise first from UN, and only latter, when the conflicts 
have been stabilized, they are left to the more inexperienced European IOs. Does this finding 
suggest a bias of the international community to initially send the best resources to Europe, 
rather than to the more difficult conflicts of Africa? Does it show that African IOs prefer to try 
African solutions for African problems first, before asking for help? Could this pattern of 
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deployment explain why there is a high recurrence of conflict after peace operations withdraw 
from African conflicts than after withdrawals from European ones? These are all valuable 
questions that could be answered by using the dataset on multiple simultaneous peace operations 
and maintaining the sequential type in the dataset. 
 
Dyad-Year Dataset 
 In order to test Hypothesis 2 about the role of financial and human resources on the 
initiation of inter-organizational cooperation, and Hypothesis 7 about the role of the personal 
background of the missions’ leaders in initiating inter-organizational cooperation, I assembled a 
dyadic-year dataset. The amount of financial resources and the number of human resources, as 
well as the heads of mission, vary yearly for each mission. As noted above, I also took averages 
for these three variables that were included and tested in the dyadic dataset. As they vary by year 
however, I decided to test them in a dyadic-year dataset, too. 
For Hypothesis 2 (resources), I coded the financial and human resources for each peace 
operation, for each year during which that peace operation was a MSPO. I took the data for the 
cost of the peace operation and the number of peacekeepers deployed (military and civilian) from 
the SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations 2009 dataset. The cost of peace operations was coded in 
millions of dollars. For approximately one quarter of the cases I could not find information in the 
SIPRI dataset. In cases without readily available information on costs and personnel numbers, I 
researched the history (websites, United Nations reports, European Union reports, missions’ 
newsletters) of those peace operations to find information about the cost and number of 
peacekeepers deployed. For each dyad I then divided the financial and human resources costs of 
one IO, to the financial and human resources costs of the other IO, respectively (financial costs 
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divided by financial costs, and human resources divided by human resources). Whenever there 
were more than twice as many peacekeepers deployed by one organization compared with the 
other one in the same dyad, or the financial expenditures were quadruple for one peace operation 
than for its dyadic counterpart, I considered that there was a major difference in resources. 
Whenever the reverse was true, I considered that the financial and human resources were similar. 
There are 184 dyad-years, out of 332, that have information about the cost of both peace 
operations. There are 190 dyad-years, out of 332 dyad-years, that have information about the 
number of peacekeepers deployed for both peace operations. 
For example, in 2007 UNAMA’s cost was of $US 74.17 million, while EUPOL’s cost in 
Afghanistan was of $US 17.6 million. Dividing one number by the other we get a ratio of 4.21. 
This means that in 2007, the UN spent 4.21 times more money on its peace operation in 
Afghanistan than the EU did. This gets a code of 1, as the financial resources were not similar 
(4.21 being more than the cut-off ratio of 2). On the other hand, in 2008, UNAMA spent $US 
86.35 million, while EUPOL spent $US 48.19. The ratio in this case is of 1.79 and the code is 0, 
as the financial resources were similar (1.79 is lower than the cut-off ratio of 2). I did the same 
for all the human resources dyads but with the cut-off ratio of 4. Lower than 4 it meant that the 
peace operations had allocated similar human resources. Higher than 4 it meant that the peace 
operations did not allocate similar human resources.  
 For Hypothesis 7 (personal background), I coded the nationality of the heads of mission 
for each peace operation. According to Hypothesis 7, similar nationalities for the heads of 
missions should increase the probability of inter-organizational cooperation. There were 181 
dyad-years that have this information for the heads of missions of both operations. 
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Monadic MSPOs Dataset 
If a peace operation experienced, even for a brief period of time, spatial and temporal 
overlap with another one, the two peace operations will both be considered as different entries 
for MSPOs in the monadic dataset. There are 99 peace operations that were MSPOs, even for a 
brief period of time, in the monadic dataset. These 99 peace operations were deployed in 25 
conflicts involving 11 international organizations over the period 1978-2009.  
The monadic dataset is useful for identifying the percentage of MSPOs out of the total 
number of peace operations and the existence of any trends. Second, I use the monadic dataset to 
test Hypothesis 5. If Hypothesis 5 is correct, I should observe a decrease in the initiation of inter-
organizational cooperation after a specific number of peace operations for all regional 
international organizations. The peace operations for each international organization were 
ordered chronologically. Then, using the codes for inter-organizational cooperation from the 
dyadic dataset, I identified if a specific peace operation cooperated or not with other peace 
operations. If a peace operation was involved in several dyads and cooperated in some of them, 
and not in others, I calculated the overall percentage of cooperation of that MSPO. To test the 
hypothesis I plotted cooperation initiation over time for each international organization. A 
significant drop in cooperation initiation after a specific number of years would indicate that H 
Hypothesis 5 is supported by the data.  
 
Interviews 
I complemented the statistical analysis with data from 32 semi-structured interviews 
conducted with European Union, NATO and ECOWAS policy-makers in charge of peace 
operations. The interview protocol can be found in Appendix E. I conducted 85% of these 
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interviews with bureaucrats from the following EU institutions: EU Council Directorate General 
External Affairs, EU Military Staff, EU Cell at NATO SHAPE, EU Commission Crisis Response 
and Peacebuilding Unit and the EU Commission Multilateral Cooperation Unit. I conducted 
interviews with all the desk officers from EU’s Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability Unit 
for EU’s active peace operations in 2009. The remaining 15% of interviews were conducted with 
NATO officials responsible for the planning of NATO’s field operations and for NATO’s 
cooperation with other international organizations (3), the ECOWAS ambassador to Brussels (1) 
and with two individuals currently working for foreign and security policy think-tanks in 
Brussels who were previously deployed in EU peace operations. 
I focused the interviews on the European Union bureaucrats because of the central role 
that the EU plays in the MSPOs network. With 21 MSPOs out of the 23 peace operations 
deployed as of December 2009, the EU is one of the most influential actors in inter-
organizational cooperation. I wanted to understand what determines the organization that deploys 
the most with other IOs in peace operations, to cooperate with those IOs in certain 
circumstances.  
The sample of interviews was identified based on the desire to have a good mixture of 
individuals from the heads of units and several middle-level bureaucrats representing various 
units. I also wanted to get a good balance of military and civilian personnel. Third, I wanted to 
have a balance between people who were previously deployed in peace operations and people 
who worked at the headquarters. The entire population of people that could have been 
interviewed (and were invited) was of about 80 bureaucrats within the EU and NATO. I invited 
all of these people and interviewed the 32 individuals that responded to my invitations.  
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The interview protocol I used was composed of four parts: 1) questions about the 
individual’s background; 2) questions about the existence of inter-organizational cooperation; 3) 
questions about the mechanisms of inter-organizational cooperation, and 4) questions about the 
motives for cooperation. I specifically mentioned several possible motives for cooperation and 
asked the respondents if they thought any of those could explain cooperation. I also allowed 
them to add their own motives for cooperation. The interviews lasted on average 45 minutes.  
 I coded each interview using discourse analysis. I identified the motives of inter-
organizational cooperation for each interview. If they mentioned several motives for cooperation, 
I recorded all of them as possible explanations. I also recorded if they mentioned that a specific 
motive is their favorite explanation for inter-organizational cooperation. If they thought some 
motives were not a reason for cooperation, they were coded as such. I then compiled the overall 
percentages of approval and disapproval for specific hypothesis tested in this study.  
 For example, if the officials interviewed would say things such as “Resources don’t play 
a role…” or “We all struggle with resources…” these would be evidence against the hypothesis 
stating that international organizations cooperate because of resources. If they would answer that 
“funding is a major reason to cooperate” that would be evidence in favor of inter-organizational 
cooperation. I did the same for all the other hypotheses. Phrases such as “the best explanation for 
cooperation is…” or “I do not believe that this is an explanation for cooperation” were used as 
indicators of support and lack of support for the hypotheses tested in this study, respectively.  
 
Case Studies 
  The third methodological approach incorporated case studies. Besides the statistical 
analysis and the points of view of the policy-makers, I thought it was necessary to conduct an in-
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depth analysis of several case studies in order to understand the motives for inter-organizational 
cooperation. The case studies come to complement the findings from the statistical analysis and 
the interviews.  
There are three case studies analyzed in this study: EU-NATO cooperation in 
Afghanistan (EUPOL-ISAF), AU-UN cooperation in Darfur, Sudan (AMIS-UNMIS cooperation 
and later the UNAMID peace operation) and UN-EU cooperation in Kosovo (UNMIK-EULEX 
Kosovo). I chose these three case studies because they fit the most different system design 
(MDSD) for comparative case studies. The three case studies differ on many levels and in 
regards to most variables, but the processes of inter-organizational cooperation at work are 
similar. First, the most different system design (MDSD) is a very useful method when using 
exemplar cases for typology development. The three case studies I chosen are exemplar cases of 
inter-organizational cooperation for three different types of peace operations (sequential, parallel, 
and hybrid):  sequential hand-over peace operations (EULEX-UNMIK), parallel peace 
operations (ISAF-EUPOL), and hybrid peace operations (UNAMID). Second, the case studies 
also differ in terms of the independent variables. The eight independent variables used (financial 
resources, human resources, complementarity, conflict type, rivalry, learning, security cultures, 
and personal background) have a different value in at least one case study, compared to the other 
two case studies. In those cases, we should observe different results for the dependent variable. 
A second reason for these case studies is the desire to have one case study for each 
cluster of peace operations, the European and African clusters, and one case study for the 
cooperation of the two focal IOs, the EU-UN cooperation. A third reason explaining the decision 
to use these case studies was to capture as many of the six IOs contributing to peace operations 
as possible. The UN, EU, NATO, OSCE, AU and ECOWAS are the six IOs deploying over 80% 
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of all peace operations. I analyze inter-organizational cooperation between 4 of these 6 IOs in 
these case studies. Moreover, in the cases of Afghanistan and Sudan, I will also make references 
to the UN and NATO respectively, as these two IOs also have/had missions on the ground there. 
ECOWAS was not included in this list because it has only two missions where it cooperates with 
another IO (in both cases, the UN): Liberia and Ivory Coast.  
 The case studies illustrate the motives for inter-organizational cooperation as well as the 
mechanisms of inter-organizational cooperation. I conducted literature reviews of previous 
research on these peace operations, analyzed interviews with peacekeepers deployed in these 
conflict areas, and examined data gathered through newspaper articles and from the official 
publications of the peace operations. Through these different methods I searched for any 
evidence about inter-organizational cooperation in these specific peace operations. I also 
searched for any evidence for or against the hypotheses tested in through this study. 
 Applying a multi-method research design to this study allows for a better analysis of the 
conditions under which international organizations cooperate in peace operations. We get a 
better picture of inter-organizational cooperation from the statistical analysis of the first dataset 
on MSPOs, from interviews with relevant policy-makers, and from in-depth case studies. The 
next chapters will present the findings of this study for every research method employed.  
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Figures and Tables 
 
Table 4.1 Number of Peace Operations By Sending Authority  
 
Table 4.2 Peace Operations Initiated Per Year, 1948-2008 
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Table 4.3 Number of Peace Operations Active per Year 
 
 
Table 4.4 Distribution of All Peace Operations by Geographic Region 
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Figure 4.1 Clusters of IGO-IGO Cooperation in Peace Operations
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37 The numbers represent the number of multiple simultaneous peace operations dyads that exist between those two 
organizations. For example, the number 1 on the European Union-ECCAS link refers to EU’s EUFOR Tchad-
Central African Republic operation take-over from ECCAS’ MICOPAX operation. 
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Table 4.5 Typology of Multiple Simultaneous Peace Operations  
Types of MSPOs Percentage (out of total) 
Sequential 19%  (N=19 MSPOs dyads) 
Parallel 76%  (N=75 MSPOs dyads) 
Hybrids 5%    (N=5 MSPOs dyads) 
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CHAPTER 5. STATISTICAL ANALYSES FINDINGS 
 
In this chapter I present the findings from the statistical analyses on the motivations for 
inter-organizational cooperation in multiple simultaneous peace operations. I start the findings 
with stage one of the theoretical model: the member-states approval for inter-organizational 
cooperation. Afterward, I present the findings from the three rational actor hypotheses for the 
second stage, international organizations, as well as for the three socio-constructivist alternative 
hypotheses suggested by the literature.  
For the second stage, I present the findings from a statistical model in which I tested most 
of the hypotheses using the dyadic dataset (Hypothesis 2 on resources, Hypothesis 3 on 
complementarity, Hypothesis 4 on conflict complexity, Hypothesis 6 on security cultures, and 
Hypothesis 7 on personal background). To reinforce the findings for the two hypotheses on 
resources and personal background (2 and 7), I also present the findings from a similar statistical 
test using the dyadic-year dataset. Finally, I present the findings for Hypothesis 5 on social 
learning. For Hypothesis 5 I used the monadic dataset. I could not use the dyadic dataset to test 
Hypothesis 5 because this hypothesis does not deal with dyads, but with the way the peace 
operations of an international organization are sequenced over time.  
 
Findings-Stage 1 
Findings for Hypothesis 1   
Hypothesis 1 states that: Member-states approve of inter-organizational cooperation in 
peace operation. In order to test this hypothesis I used the dyadic dataset. For all the instances of 
non-cooperation, I analyzed the historical narratives of the cases to identify if the member-states 
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or the international organizations were responsible for blocking cooperation. Out of 99 dyads in 
which cooperation could occur, there are 32 cases of non-cooperation. The least cooperative 
relations between international organizations are the ones between the European Union and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (no cooperation in 3 multiple simultaneous peace 
operations). No inter-organizational cooperation is also present in a number of relations between 
the European Union, African Union, and the United Nations, on one side, and small regional 
African organizations that only sent one peace operation, such as CEMAC, ECCAS, and SADC. 
In one-third of the cases, there is no cooperation between the EU and OSCE (3 out of 9 cases 
lack cooperation), and the EU and the UN (5 out of 16 cases lack cooperation), respectively. The 
remaining dyads of international organizations have much higher percentages of cooperation.  
Non-cooperation occurs in 13 out of the 24 conflicts in which multiple simultaneous 
peace operations were deployed. In four cases there is 100% of non-cooperation between the 
international organizations: Iraq (0 cooperation out of 3 multiple simultaneous peace operations), 
Middle East-Israel-Palestine (0 out of 2), Sierra Leone (0 out of 2), and Somalia (0 out of 3).  
I searched for evidence that the member-states blocked inter-organizational cooperation 
in these 32 cases of non-cooperation. The default assumption, based on the arguments presented 
in Chapter 3, is that member-states approve of inter-organizational cooperation, because they 
stand to gain from it. Evidence of blockage from the member-states would be represented by 
veto votes in the UN Security Council that would end a peace operation, and with it the 
possibility of inter-organizational cooperation. Given that many resolutions are negotiated before 
they would come to a vote, specific statements from a leading member-state in an IO that 
discourage inter-organizational cooperation are also evidence of member-states’ blockage.  
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The strongest evidence for member-states blocking inter-organizational cooperation 
comes, surprisingly, from two Brussels-based international organizations, the European Union 
and NATO. The EU and NATO do not cooperate in four out of their ten multiple simultaneous 
peace operations. The lack of cooperation between EU and NATO, after 2004 when Cyprus 
joined the European Union, can be attributed to the dual veto power of Cyprus in the EU and 
Turkey in NATO. As decisions in both organizations are based on consensus, the disagreement 
of one member state is sufficient to block formal cooperation between these IOs.   
In 2002, the European Union and NATO signed the most comprehensive inter-
organizational cooperation package to date, the Berlin Plus Agreement, which entered into effect 
in May 2003. This agreement facilitates the deployment of EU-led peace operations, whenever 
NATO does not want (or cannot) intervene in a specific conflict. The EU is given access to 
NATO’s assets and resources, from the use of NATO SHAPE headquarters for operational 
planning, to heavy airlift capabilities. A specialized EU Cell at NATO SHAPE Headquarters was 
established to oversee the EU-NATO cooperation. This was the first time a unit within an 
international organization was double-hatted, as belonging both to the EU and to NATO. There 
are two EU peace operations deployed under the banner of the Berlin Plus Agreement: Operation 
Concordia in Macedonia (March-December 2003) and EUFOR-Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(December 2004-present). The relations between the EU and NATO are excellent in these two 
cases.  
The problems for the EU-NATO relationship started in 2004 when Cyprus joined the 
European Union. Turkey, a NATO member, but not an EU member, does not recognize the 
government of the Republic of Cyprus. The dispute between the two countries goes back to the 
ethnic violence on the Mediterranean island started in the 1960s, and the Turkish military’s 
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invasion of the northern side of the island in 1974 to protect the Turkish minority there. Turkey 
established the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on the northern side of the island under its’ 
military control. The Berlin Plus Agreement allows for NATO member-states to monitor how the 
European Union is using NATO’s resources and assets. Turkey’s opinion is that the Berlin Plus 
Agreement is a very good mechanism that proved its usefulness in the Balkans, but it does not 
want Cyprus involved in EU-led peace operations under this agreement. Theoretically, Cyprus’ 
involvement would allow it to use military assets provided by Turkey. This would amount to a 
quasi-recognition of the government of Cyprus, by the Turkish authorities. That is an occurrence 
that Turkey wants to avoid at all costs. For example, “Turkey prevents high-level formal 
meetings between NATO and the P.S.C.[EU’s Political and Security Committee] on the grounds 
that Cyprus does not have any security clearance from NATO.”(Dempsey 2010) Gerard Araud, 
the political director of the French Foreign Ministry admitted on a visit to Ankara in 2008 that 
“for Turkey, giving something to Cyprus would mean recognition of Cyprus" (Demirtas 2011). 
Practically, Cyprus needs to make a security agreement with NATO in order to establish ties 
with the alliance, which is being blocked by Turkey. On the other hand Cyprus vetoes and 
initiatives of the European Union to bring Turkey closer to the Union. For example, Cyprus 
vetoed a partnership between the European Defense Agency and Turkey, in 2004. (Dempsey 
2010)  
As a high-ranking NATO official said in an interview in 2009, “the result is that we are 
there in Afghanistan, NATO military, EU civilians, in Kosovo NATO military, EU civilians, and 
we cannot institutionally cooperate with the EU because Turkey wants to use the agreed 
framework with the exclusion of Cyprus and the EU does not want to do that because it doesn’t 
want to discriminate between its members, to the exclusion of Cyprus itself. Thus there is a 
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complete deadlock and there is no institutional dialogue either in Afghanistan or on the issue of 
piracy [in Somalia].” (interview with NATO official, Brussels, 2009). To the lack of cooperation 
between the EU and NATO in Afghanistan and Somalia, we could add the lack of cooperation 
between the EU and NATO in Macedonia (NATO’s KFOR and EU’s EUPAT during their six 
months of overlap in 2006), and Iraq (NATO’s Training Mission in Iraq and EU’s EUJUST LEX 
from August 2005 onwards).  
The Cypriot-Turkish blockage of inter-organizational cooperation between EU and 
NATO in peace operations is a prime example of how member-states can, if they want to, block 
cooperation between their respective IOs.  There are only two other instances in which the 
responsibility for the lack of inter-organizational cooperation could be attributed to a member-
state. These two cases involve the lack of cooperation between the EU and the Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS). Russia is the most powerful member-state in the CIS, and it has the 
power to decide CIS’ interactions with other IOs. CIS has peacekeepers deployed in Moldova, 
for the Transdniestrian conflict, and in Georgia, for the South Ossetian conflict. The European 
Union has two peace operations in these conflicts, too, EU Border Assistance Mission in 
Moldova (EUBAM) dealing with the Transdniestrian conflict, and the European Union 
Monitoring Mission in Georgia, dealing with the South Ossetian conflict.  
In Moldova and Georgia, Russia deliberately blocked cooperation with the European 
Union peace operations. In Moldova, Russia opposed any change in the peacekeeping format 
established since the early 1990s, protecting thus Russia’s influence in the region. The EU 
Border Assistance Mission to Moldova was established in November 2005 to curb the illegal 
smuggling between the Transdniestria side of the Moldovan border and Ukraine. EUBAM 
officials were not allowed in Transdniestria and had to deploy on the Ukrainian side of the 
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border. In 2006, when a beefed up EU peacekeeping presence was advocated by some EU 
member-states, other EU member-states opposed such an operation on the grounds that it may 
make relations with Russia more difficult (Popescu 2005). Previously, in 2003, Russia strongly 
rejected a EU-led military peace operation in the region. Thus, EUBAM has focused on activities 
that do not require cooperation with the Russian peacekeepers deployed in the break-away 
republic of Trandsniestria, such as strengthening border controls and fighting illegal smuggling. 
In Georgia, Russian peacekeepers that make the majority of the CIS peace operation, blocked 
entrance to South Ossetia for the EUMM peacekeepers: “The EU monitors have no permission to 
cross borders from Georgia proper into the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, 
which have been recognized by Russia as independent states, and where Moscow says at least 
7,000 Russian troops will remain.” (Radio Free Europe 2008).  
These cases illustrate the power of an influential member-state such as Russia to block 
inter-organizational cooperation within an organization that was established to promote Russia’s 
interests in its neighborhood, the Commonwealth of Independent States. Nevertheless, these six 
cases (four cases in which the EU-NATO inter-organizational cooperation was blocked by 
member-states, and two in which the CIS-EU inter-organizational cooperation was blocked by a 
member state) are the only ones in which there is any evidence of principals blocking 
cooperation between their agencies.  
In some cases, pre-existing inter-organizational cooperation is brought to an end, because 
a member-state vetoes the prolongation of a mission (e.g., Russia’s veto over the OSCE and UN 
peace operations in Georgia in 2008 or China’s veto over UN’s peace operation in Macedonia in 
1995). But these cases already experienced inter-organizational cooperation for a period of time, 
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and thus are of no interest for this study which focuses on the initiation of cooperation, rather 
than its termination.  
I would argue that the evidence presented above supports the hypothesis that member-
states rarely block inter-organizational cooperation. Overall, in six out of the 32 cases of non-
cooperation (18%), the lack of cooperation between international organizations, can be 
undoubtedly attributed to member-states’ preferences. Inter-organizational cooperation is 
blocked at the member-states’ level for two major reasons: a) geo-strategic interests of a major 
member-state within an IO, such as Russia, and b) issues relating to the recognition of an enemy 
state, as in the Cyprus-Turkey case within two IOs (EU-NATO) where decisions are taken by 
consensus. Nevertheless, more often than not, member-states are acquiescent to international 
organizations cooperating because they stand to gain from such cooperation through the 
reduction of information costs, increase of technical expertise, legitimacy, and control over their 
agents (IOs) as explained in Chapter 3. States do not need to show signs of willingness for inter-
organizational cooperation. For the purposes of this hypothesis, it is sufficient if they do not 
block cooperation and are merely acquiescent to inter-organizational cooperation. Thus, 
Hypothesis 1 is supported by the evidence.  
 
Findings - Stage 2- Statistical Analysis Using the Dyadic Dataset 
Hypothesis 2 states that: International organizations with small financial and human 
resources are more likely to cooperate with other international organizations. In order to test 
this hypothesis I took the average expenditures and numbers of peacekeepers deployed for each 
peace operation over all the years of deployment. I introduced these averages in the dyadic 
dataset and compared the difference of resources through a ratio of resources in the dyad. I 
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assumed as a cut-off point a difference of at least four times the resources of the other IO in the 
dyad38. The assumption here is that big disparities in resources may lead IOs to cooperate 
together to mute the effects of the resources disparity. I coded as a 0 all cases in which the 
difference between the resources of the IOs was less than four times, and a 1 the cases in which 
the difference between the resources was four times or larger.  
Hypothesis 3 states: IOs with expertise on one specific aspect of conflict resolution are 
more likely to cooperate in peace operations with IOs that have expertise on different, 
complementary, aspects of conflict resolution. 
 There are three types of peacekeeping interventions coded: traditional peace operation, 
military peace enforcement, and civilian peacebuilding. If there was similarity between the 
activities of the two peace operations (e.g.: both of them traditional peace operations) I coded 
them as 1. If there was no similarity between the activities of the peace operations (e.g.: one of 
them traditional peace operation, the other one civilian peacebuilding), I coded them as 0.  
Hypothesis 4 states that: International organizations are more likely to cooperate with 
other international organizations when they intervene in very difficult and complex conflicts. I 
operationalized “very difficult and complex conflicts” based on the conflict type (intra-state, 
inter-state, and internationalized intra-state wars) and the existence of rivalry between the 
conflict parties.  
Hypothesis 6 states: IOs with similar security cultures are more likely to cooperate with 
each other in peace operations. I coded the security cultures of international organizations as 
follows: military, civilian, and mixed, based on the majority of activities conducted by an IO. 
                                                           
38 I also tested for a cut-off point of two times less resources than the other IO in the dyad. In this test, for the 
logistic regression, the statistical significance was lost for the human resources explanation. One reason why this 
may have happened is because of the limited number of cases that had similar human resources and thus were coded 
a 0 (less than 7%). The financial resources explanation was statistically significant even with a different cut-off 
point.  
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Thus, the European Union, the OSCE, and the CIS were coded as civilian organizations. NATO 
and ECOWAS were coded as military organizations, while the African Union and the United 
Nations were coded as mixed. Then, I transformed the codes for the dyad into a dichotomous 
variable with a 0 for lack of similarity and 1 for similarity of security cultures.  
Hypothesis 7 states that The personal background similarity of the international staffs is 
more likely to increase inter-organizational cooperation in peace operations. For this hypothesis 
I tested if the national similarity of the heads of mission increases the likelihood of inter-
organizational cooperation between the two peace operations. I coded a 1 if there was at least 
one year in which the heads of missions in multiple simultaneous peace operations were from the 
same country. I coded a 0 if the nationality of the heads of missions was not the same.  
I included all the indicators for the five hypotheses mentioned above in one statistical 
model and I ran a logistic regression. I chose the logistical regression as the test because of the 
dichotomous dependent variable. Table 5.3 shows the results for the logistic regression.  
 
Findings for Hypothesis 2 
The results support the argument that significant differences in human resources will lead 
IOs to cooperate more often than not. The results for the human resources component of 
Hypothesis 2 are positive and statistically significant. The results for the argument that 
asymmetry of financial resources will increase the likelihood of inter-organizational cooperation 
are statistically significant but in the negative direction. The negative direction for the financial 
resources argument suggests that inter-organizational cooperation is more likely whenever there 
is symmetry of financial resources between the IOs, but an asymmetry of human resources. 
Whenever the IOs have similar amounts of funds, but big differences in the number of people 
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deployed, there is a higher probability of inter-organizational cooperation. For example, in the 
case of NATO and OSCE’s peace operations in Bosnia, there is symmetry of financial resources 
($25.6 million for NATO’s SFOR compared to $24 million for OSCE’s mission) but an 
asymmetry of human resources (more than 14800 peacekeepers for NATO’s SFOR compared to 
128 peacekeepers for OSCE’s mission). Inter-organizational cooperation is more likely in 
situations like Bosnia where there is symmetry of financial resources but an asymmetry of 
human resources.   
There are several explanations for why the results for the financial resources explanation 
are in the opposite direction than predicted. One explanation for this phenomenon could be that 
some organizations cannot deploy as many peacekeepers as others, but given the general 
difficulty of finding peacekeepers at the international level, their small contingents are very 
much welcomed.  On the other hand, all international organizations should be able to collect and 
use financial resources for issues of peace and security. The wealthier IOs will not accept other 
international organizations to become “free-riders” in peace operations. When it comes down to 
protecting and helping each other on the ground, peacekeepers of various organizations are more 
willing to do that because they are in the “same boat” in Kabul or Sarajevo. But, when it comes 
down to paying the bills, the international organizations need to prove to their member-states that 
other IOs, peacekeeping the same conflict, are pulling their weight, too. 
Regardless, the logistic regression results show that there is definitely a relationship 
between financial/human resources and the initiation of inter-organizational cooperation. 
Hypothesis 2 is partially supported by the statistical analysis of the dyadic dataset. International 
organizations cooperate in peace operations when there is an asymmetry of human resources and 
when there is symmetry of financial resources.  
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Findings for Hypothesis 3 
The statistical analyses show that there is a relationship between complementarity and 
inter-organizational cooperation, but in the opposite direction than predicted. The logistic 
regression suggests that the likelihood of inter-organizational cooperation increases when the 
peace operations conduct similar activities (e.g.: both of them conduct civilian peacebuilding). 
The findings may be suggesting this because the categories used are too large.  
There are many different activities occurring under the labels of military peace 
enforcement or civilian peacebuilding. These specific divisions of labor would avoid duplication 
and reduce the costs of the overall interventions. A more specific differentiation between the 
types of peacekeeping activities could have different results. For example, the EU’s peace 
operation in Iraq (EUJUST LEX) and the United Nations’ peace operation in Iraq (UNAMI) are 
both coded as conducting similar civilian peacebuilding activities. But, while the EU is mainly 
responsible for “strengthen[ing] the rule of law and promot[ing] a culture of respect for human 
rights in Iraq by [reforming] the criminal justice system” (European Union 2011), the United 
Nations is responsible for a variety of activities ranging from delivery of humanitarian aid to 
assisting in the national reconciliation process and organizing elections. The activities of the 
European Union and of the United Nations are different but they fall in the same broad category 
of civilian peacebuilding. Future research projects on this topic should create smaller categories 
for the activities of peace operations.  
 
Findings for Hypothesis 4 
Conflict type and the existence of rivalries between the conflict parties do not influence 
the initiation of inter-organizational cooperation. According to the results from the logistic 
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regression, the probability of inter-organizational cooperation does not increase for 
internationalized intra-state wars, nor does it increase in the case of rivalries. Based on these 
findings I argue that Hypothesis 4 is not supported by the data. The likelihood of inter-
organizational cooperation does not increase in very difficult and complex conflicts. For example 
in the very difficult conflict of Somalia (based on conflict type and the existence of intra-state 
rivalries) there is no inter-organizational cooperation between the African Union’s peace 
operation on the mainland (AMISOM) and EU’s peace operation at sea (EU NAVFOR). In 
future research, I would add other possible variables that could account for very difficult and 
complex conflicts, such as conflict fatalities or conflict intensity.  
 
Findings for Hypothesis 6 
Hypothesis 6, which predicts that the similarity of security cultures will increase the 
probability of inter-organizational cooperation, is not supported by the results from the logistic 
regression model. The probability of inter-organizational cooperation does not increase if the 
international organizations have similar security cultures. Based on these findings from the 
statistical model, I argue that Hypothesis 6 is not supported by the data. For example, the 
OSCE’s civilian peace operation in Macedonia and NATO’s military peace operations in 
Macedonia cooperated well together despite their lack of similar security cultures.  
 
Findings for Hypothesis 7 
The results of the logistic regression analysis show that national similarity has no impact 
on the likelihood of inter-organizational cooperation. I acknowledge that personal background 
similarity means much more than national similarity, and in future projects I plan to employ a 
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more refined indicator (e.g.: the heads of mission worked for each other’s IOs in the past). 
However in its current form, Hypothesis 7 is not supported by the data based on the results of the 
statistical analysis. The social constructivist explanation about individuals creating inter-
organizational cooperation because of their similarity in personal backgrounds does not hold.  
 
Findings - Stage 2 - Statistical Analysis Using the Dyadic-Year Dataset    
One possible critique against Hypotheses 2 (resources) and 7 (national background 
similarity) could be that the amount of financial and human resources, as well as the nationality 
of the heads of missions, vary significantly from year to year. For example, in 1999, the costs for 
MONUC were of $142 million and it had 420 peacekeepers deployed. In 2008, the costs for 
MONUC increased almost tenfold to $1.180 billion and the personnel deployed increased more 
than forty times to 19,373 peacekeepers. Heads of missions are generally changed on a yearly 
basis, and rarely every two years. A potential critique to my use of averages for these indicators 
included in the dyadic dataset is that in order to capture the real difference between the resources 
of each IO in a multiple simultaneous peace operation, a dyadic-year approach would be more 
appropriate, at least for these indicators. Nevertheless, I do not argue that inter-organizational 
cooperation varies on a yearly basis. Once inter-organizational cooperation is set, it will continue 
in the following years, too.  
As explained in Chapter 4, I also constructed a dyadic-year dataset for the financial and 
human resources, as well as the national background similarity. The logistic regression 
conducted on the dyadic-year dataset show similar results to the findings from the dyadic dataset 
(see Table 5.4). Symmetry of human resources increases the probability of inter-organizational 
cooperation, while asymmetry of financial resources has the same effect. The national 
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background similarity of the heads of missions is not statistically significant. Thus, even the 
statistical analysis using a dyadic-year dataset that some may argue captures the changes in 
finances, human resources, and nationalities better, has the same results as the dyadic model that 
includes all the indicators.  
 
Findings – Stage 2 - Statistical Analysis Using the Monadic Dataset   
Findings for Hypothesis 5 
Hypothesis 5 states that Regional IOs are more likely to cooperate with more experienced 
IOs in the first years of the establishment of their peace operations programs. In order to test 
Hypothesis 5, I used the monadic dataset that contains each peace operation of the international 
organizations that was a multiple simultaneous peace operation for a period of time. There are no 
statistical tests that could be run for this hypothesis. If Hypothesis 5 were true we should observe 
a decrease in the initiation of inter-organizational cooperation over time. Inter-organizational 
cooperation should be highest for the first peace operations of a regional IO. I have arranged the 
peace operations of each IO over time and assessed the existence of inter-organizational 
cooperation for each of them. The results are graphs that track the existence (or lack) of inter-
organizational cooperation over time for each IO. These graphs represent the plausibility probe 
for Hypothesis 5.   
There are 21 multiple simultaneous peace operations deployed by the European Union. 
Figure 5.1 shows the level of inter-organizational cooperation, the year of deployment (e.g.: 03 
means 2003) the name of each mission and the number of the mission in relation to the other 
EU’s peace operations. For example, Concordia was the second peace operation ever deployed 
by the European Union and thus it has number 2. The 03 in the Concordia column represents the 
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year when this mission started its deployment, 2003. The cooperation level for Concordia is at 
66.6% because there were three other peace operations in Macedonia with whom Concordia 
interacted. With two of them there was inter-organizational cooperation (Concordia-KFOR, 
Concordia-Allied Harmony), but not with the third one (Concordia-OSCE). Thus, I took an 
average of the level of inter-organizational cooperation for all the dyads in which a peace 
operation is involved.   
The results show that there is no decrease of inter-organizational cooperation after the 
first few peace operations deployed by the European Union. Cooperation took a dip in 2005 and 
2006, with only two instances of cooperation out of 9 new multiple simultaneous peace 
operations, but cooperation peaked again throughout 2007 and 2008. There is no clear pattern 
suggesting a decrease of EU’s interest in inter-organizational cooperation because of a learning 
process. 
For the African Union, I also included the peace operations deployed during the OAU 
period. There are 9 multiple simultaneous peace operations for the AU initiated during the period 
1992-2007. At the end of the chapter you will also find a graph showing inter-organizational 
cooperation over time. In Figure 5.2 you can notice that there is no drop in inter-organizational 
cooperation as one may expect if Hypothesis 5 was true.  
There are 10 NATO multiple simultaneous peace operations deployed from 1995 to 
2007.  As shown in Figure 5.3, NATO’s level of inter-organizational cooperation drops for the 
2004 and 2007 missions providing some limited support for Hypothesis 5. Nevertheless the two 
missions in question, NATO’s Training in Iraq, and NATO’s naval counter-piracy operation off 
the coast of Somalia, are in conflicts in which there is limited cooperation between the different 
peace operations, anyway. There is a lack of inter-organizational cooperation in the six dyads for 
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Iraq and Somalia combined. In Iraq, the UN, EU, and NATO did not work together. In Somalia, 
the AU, NATO, and the EU did not cooperate. Thus, I would argue that it is not clear how much 
is learning responsible for the decrease in inter-organizational cooperation, and how much is the 
conflict environment responsible for the decrease in cooperation.  
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe has 7 multiple simultaneous 
peace operations deployed from 1992 to 1999, in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. 
There has always been some level of inter-organizational cooperation between the OSCE and the 
other IOs deployed in these conflicts. There is no trend of lower levels of inter-organizational 
cooperation for the OSCE over time as shown in Figure 5.4. Thus, Hypothesis 5 is not supported 
by the data for OSCE.   
I tested Hypothesis 5 only for the European Union, the African Union, the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, as these are 
the only regional international organizations that have 5 or more multiple simultaneous peace 
operations. The other regional international organizations have just a few multiple simultaneous 
peace operations, thus making it impossible to identify a trend for a learning process that would 
decrease inter-organizational cooperation for those cases.  
Another plausibility probe for Hypothesis 5 is to combine all the international 
organizations in the same graph. I calculated the average inter-organizational cooperation for all 
the IO’s first peace operation, second peace operation, and so on. The results can be found in 
Figure 5.5. I only included up to the 11th peace operation, because only the European Union has 
more than 11 peace operations and the graph from the 12th peace operation onwards will only 
reflect EU’s levels of cooperation. As you can notice there is a dip in inter-organizational 
cooperation from the 2nd to the 4th peace operations, but afterwards inter-organizational 
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cooperation goes up again, only to decrease starting with the 8th peace operation. Is this strong 
evidence in favor of Hypothesis 5? Probably not, given the lack of support from the individual 
IOs graphs presented before.  
 Hypothesis 5 is not supported by the data. Inter-organizational cooperation does not 
decrease as the number of multiple simultaneous peace operations of a regional IO increases over 
time. There may be a learning process for regional international organizations, but if anything, 
the learning process teaches the regional IOs to continue with inter-organizational cooperation 
rather than to eliminate it. We do notice that cooperation is at its highest for the first peace 
operation of all these four regional IOs. This finding however is not supported by a sustained 
decrease in the level of inter-organizational cooperation that could suggest a learning process. 
However, I do have to admit that it is hard to establish a pattern with only 11 entry points.  
 Next, a summary of findings from the statistical analyses will be presented. The findings 
from the interviews and the case studies will follow.  
 
Summary of Statistical Analysis Findings  
The findings presented in this chapter show strong support for three explanations for the 
initiation of inter-organizational cooperation: Hypotheses 1 (member-states’ acquiescence), 2 
(resources) and 3 (complementarity). First, member-states are acquiescent to inter-organizational 
cooperation in peace operations. In only 6 of the 32 cases of non-cooperation, the member-states 
were responsible for blocking it (Hypothesis 1). Second, the likelihood of inter-organizational 
cooperation increases when there is symmetry of human resources between the IOs (Hypothesis 
2). Third, the statistical analyses suggest that, opposite to what Hypothesis 2 and 3 predicted the 
likelihood of inter-organizational cooperation increases when there is an asymmetry of financial 
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resources (Hypothesis 2), and a similarity of peace operations activities (Hypothesis 3). The 
statistical analyses strongly support the argument that there is a relationship between financial 
resource and inter-organizational cooperation, as well as complementarity and inter-
organizational cooperation. Nevertheless, the findings about the role of the financial resources 
and of complementarity are in the opposite direction than predicted. Symmetry of financial 
resources leads to inter-organizational cooperation because all international organizations are 
expected to pull their weight and provide finances for peace operations. In these circumstances 
inter-organizational cooperation has a higher probability of occurring. Second, inter-
organizational cooperation occurs more often when the activities of peace operations are similar 
rather than complementary. This apparent anomaly is probably generated by the broad categories 
used for peace operations activities. 
The hypothesis that inter-organizational cooperation increases in cases of very difficult 
and complex conflicts was not supported by the data. The alternative hypotheses of learning 
processes, similarity of international organizations’ security cultures, and national similarity of 
the heads of missions were not supported by the statistical analyses. 
The next chapter will introduce the findings from the interviews conducted with the 
officials from international organizations in Brussels. These findings could explain the potential 
anomalies regarding the financial resources and complementarity hypotheses that are in the 
opposite direction than initially predicted.  
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Figures and Tables 
 
Table 5. 1 Cooperation Percentages Between International Organizations 
 
DYADS MSPOs with 
Cooperation / 
All MSPOs in the Dyad 
Cooperation 
Percentages 
UN-AU 10/10 100% 
OAS-UN 7/7 100% 
OSCE-NATO 6/6 100% 
LAS-UN 1/1 100% 
NATO-UN 6/7 85.7% 
OSCE-UN 7/9 77.7% 
EU-UN 11/16 68.75% 
EU-OSCE 6/9 66.6% 
UN-ECOWAS 4/6 66.6% 
CIS-OSCE 2/3 66.6% 
NATO-EU 6/10 60% 
CIS-UN 1/2 50% 
EU-ECCAS 0/1 0% 
EU-CEMAC 0/1 0% 
UN-SADC 0/1 0% 
UN-ECCAS 0/1 0% 
UN-CEMAC 0/1 0% 
EU-CIS 0/3 0% 
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Table 5. 2 Percentage of Inter-Organizational Cooperation by Conflict  
 
 
Conflict MSPOs with cooperation /  
Total MSPOs in the Conflict 
Cooperation 
Percentage 
Bosnia 12/12 100% 
Serbia (Kosovo) 6/6 100% 
Haiti 5/5 100% 
Burundi 3/3 100% 
Ivory Coast 2/2 100% 
Liberia 2/2 100% 
Rwanda 2/2 100% 
Ethiopia/Eritrea 1/1 100% 
Guinea-Bissau 1/1 100% 
Lebanon 1/1 100% 
Nicaragua 1/1 100% 
Sudan 4/5 80% 
Macedonia 8/12 66.6% 
Georgia 6/9 66.6% 
Moldova 2/3 66.6% 
Afghanistan 2/3 66.6% 
D.R. Congo 4/8 50% 
Middle East 0/2 0% 
Sierra Leone 0/2 0% 
Iraq 0/3 0% 
Somalia 0/3 0% 
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Table 5.3 Logistic Regression for the Dyadic Dataset 
                                                     
IO-to-IO Coop Coefficients Std. Err P-values         
    
Financial Res. -1.613651    .7829834 0.039** 
Human Res. 1.826465 .8590942 0.034** 
Complementarity -2.521031 1.161034 0.030** 
Conflict Type -.9750864 .8549981 0.254 
Rivalry -1.268661 .8977994 0.158 
Security Cultures .1684262 .6808247 0.805 
Nationality Similarity .7886581 .9523413 0.408 
Constant 5.461448 2.847901 0.055 
 
Number of obs   =         66   
Log likelihood =  -33.560674                         
Pseudo R2       =      0.1870 
 
 
 
Table 5. 4 Logistic Regression for the Dyad-Year Dataset 
IO-to-IO Coop Coefficients Std. Err P-values         
Financial Res. -.9117998 .3916004 0.020** 
Human Res. 1.187158 .443454 0.007*** 
National Similarity .6826588 .6801355 0.316 
Constant .4454009 .4369588 0.308 
 
Number of obs   =        160 
Log likelihood = -88.937215                         
Pseudo R2       =     0.0734 
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Figure 5.1 Inter-Organizational Cooperation in European Union’s Peace Operations  
 
 
Figure 5.2 Inter-Organizational Cooperation in African Union’s Peace Operations  
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Figure 5.3 Inter-Organizational Cooperation in NATO’s Peace Operations  
 
 
 
Figure 5.4 Inter-Organizational Cooperation in OSCE’s Peace Operations  
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Figure 5.5 Average Levels of Inter-Organizational Cooperation For All IOs 
 
 
Table 5.5 Summary of Findings from the Statistical Analyses  
Hypotheses Findings from the Statistical Analyses 
H1: Member-States’  Acquiescence YES 
H2: Financial Resources 
       Human Resources 
YES, but negative relationship 
YES 
H3: Complementarity YES, but negative relationship 
H4: Audience Costs NO 
H5: Learning NO 
H6: Security Cultures NO 
H7: Personal Background Similarity NO  
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CHAPTER 6. INTERVIEW FINDINGS 
 
 
This chapter will present the findings from thirty-two interviews conducted in Brussels 
during the summer of 2009. Twenty-six interviews were conducted with European Union 
officials from all the institutions and units responsible for peace operations within the EU 
(Council of the European Union, European Union Military Staff, Civilian Planning and Conduct 
Capability Unit, European Commission, EU Cell at NATO SHAPE). I also conducted three 
interviews with NATO officials (the director and deputy director of the policy unit, as well as the 
head of section for NATO’s cooperation with other international organizations), one with the 
ECOWAS ambassador to the Brussels-based international organizations and two with former 
officials of international organizations (European Union and NATO) that currently work within 
think-tanks.  
The sample of officials interviewed is a very experienced one in terms of field 
deployments, previous peace operations jobs in other IOs, and planning expertise at the 
headquarters level. Almost 40% of the officials interviewed had field experience in peace 
operations and worked for other international organizations on the same security and peace 
related activities. European Union’s military personnel interviewed showed the greatest 
experience with previous peace operations, having served in previous deployments under the UN 
or NATO leadership. One interviewee has been deployed in peace operations since Cambodia 
1990 on a regular basis with both the UN and NATO. Another interviewee listed 9 peace 
operations that he participated in, with the UN, NATO, and the EU, and multiple terms of duty 
for most of them. The remaining 60% of officials interviewed had at least 2 years experience 
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working directly on organizing and planning crisis management interventions and peace 
operations within the European Union or NATO, respectively. 
I conducted semi-structured interviews. Similar questions were asked to all the 
interviewees but the order of the questions and the exact phrasing used were changed from 
interview to interview. These minor changes occurred because the interviewees sometimes 
already answered to some of my questions even before I posed them. The interviews lasted an 
average of 45 minutes. Afterward I used discourse analysis to code the interviews. For each 
statement related to the hypotheses I assigned either a 0, 1 or N/C. I assigned a 0 if the 
interviewees specifically rejected those hypotheses. I assigned a 1 if the interviewee accepted the 
hypotheses. An N/C stands for not coded for those instances in which the interviewee did not 
address at all a specific hypothesis presented to them. For example if an interviewee said “I 
believe the motivation for inter-organizational cooperation is burden-sharing”, then I coded that 
statement as in favor of Hypothesis 2 and thus a 1. If an interviewer said “Burden-sharing does 
not explain inter-organizational cooperation” then I coded that statement as against Hypothesis 2, 
and thus a 0. If they avoided an answer to a direct question about the role of burden-sharing in 
inter-organizational cooperation I coded that as N/C (not coded). In a few cases the interviewees 
referred to the same hypothesis several times throughout an interview. Then I made sure that 
their answers, regarding the role of a specific factor in influencing the initiation of inter-
organizational cooperation, were similar. The following sub-sections will present the findings 
from the interviews for each hypothesis. 
Thirty out of the thirty-two interviewees acknowledged that there is a trend toward 
increase inter-organizational cooperation in peace operations. But is it merely talk about 
cooperation as one interviewee suggested? “There is a notion of comprehensiveness and a lot of 
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talk about it. Inside all international organizations, there is some sort of civilian-military 
coordination and a lot of talk in favor of inter-organizational cooperation. It seems to be mainly 
talk. It is trendy to talk about inter-organizational cooperation and politically incorrect not to talk 
about it nowadays“ (interview with EU official, Brussels, 2009). Or is it that given the current 
state of global security problems “with the asymmetric rather than the conventional nature of 
wars, cooperation became indispensible because some of the organizations are focused on 
different areas so that they need to work together” (interview with EU official, Brussels, 2009)?  
Most of the people interviewed argued that even though inter-organizational cooperation 
could be improved significantly, there are many activities in which the IOs already cooperate 
with each other, both at the headquarters level and in the field. As one interviewee pointed out 
“[p]olitical cooperation is difficult [sometimes] but operational cooperation exists most of the 
time” (interview with EU official, Brussels, 2009). Thus, there is clearly a trend towards more 
and better inter-organizational cooperation between international organizations in peace 
operations. Next, I will present the findings from the interviews.  
 
Findings - Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 1 states that: Member-states approve of inter-organizational cooperation in 
peace operation. About 53% of the officials interviewed acknowledged that the member-states’ 
acquiescence is important for the initiation of inter-organizational cooperation in peace 
operations. Some of these member-states could block cooperation, but that occurs rarely. Forty 
percent of them mentioned the post-2004 Cyprus-Turkey blockage of the European Union-
NATO cooperation. One interviewee described this as “an insane situation, the most absurd 
problem we have to deal with on a day to day basis. […] We still have not solved in the military 
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area the problems we have with Cyprus, Turkey etc. Therefore plenty of contacts are limited 
because of this question. With NATO, cooperation in the field is probably better than 
cooperation in the headquarters. Because in the field we try to solve plenty of practical problems 
as we can without doctrine and ideology.” (interview with EU official, Brussels, 2009). There is 
EU-NATO inter-organizational cooperation, but it occurs at an informal level. With NATO, 
there are staff-to-staff meetings under the radar. There is unofficial cooperation, sharing of 
information on the crises, and ensuring that the other side knows the missions.” (interview with 
EU official, Brussels, 2009).  
A handful of the officials interviewed also mentioned the role played by Russia in the 
Commonwealth of Independent States to block cooperation with the European Union’s peace 
operation in Georgia: “But now[2009] in Georgia we[the EU] will be the only ones left and UN 
and OSCE are vetoed out by Russia” (interview with EU official, Brussels, 2009). The Turkey-
Cyprus and Russia’s role in Georgia, are the same examples identified in the previous chapter. 
This strengthens the finding that member-states approve of inter-organizational cooperation in 
the majority of cases.  
The officials interviewed mentioned the role of “politics” or “high politics” in interfering 
with inter-organizational cooperation. By this they meant politics played by the member-states’ 
involvement. One of the officials acknowledged, that except the blockage of EU-NATO 
cooperation, it is easier to get the European Union member-states acquiescent when most of 
EU’s deployments are civilian crisis management: “From experience it is clear that politically it 
is easier to start with civilian crisis management because it’s probably perceived as less 
audacious” and thus, less of a political risk (interview with EU official, Brussels, 2009). The 
member-states are less likely to block cooperation on political grounds if the mission is 
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considered as a lower level type of peace operation because it means the peace operation is les of 
a political risk for them.  
The majority (53%) of the interviewees did not mention the member-states’ level, but 
spoke about inter-organizational cooperation. This finding points to the belief that the member-
states do not play a major role in determining inter-organizational cooperation, at least from the 
perspective of the policy makers. Some of the interviewees pointed out to the examples of 
Georgia-Russia and Turkey-Cyprus as member-states blocking inter-organizational cooperation, 
but acknowledged that these cases represent the exceptions not the norm. Overall, the findings 
from the interviews support the hypothesis that member-states either approve or are acquiescent 
of inter-organizational cooperation in peace operations. The decisions to initiate inter-
organizational cooperation are taken by the international organizations.  
 
Findings - Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2 states that: International organizations with small financial and human 
resources are more likely to cooperate with other international organizations. Forty percent of 
the officials interviewed argued that resources are the main explanation for the occurrence of 
inter-organizational cooperation. “Resource and efficiency coordination are primordial” 
(interview with EU official, Brussels, 2009) for inter-organizational cooperation. Sixty-eight 
percent (68%) of them mentioned resources as either the main explanation for inter-
organizational cooperation or just an explanation among others. There is significant support for 
Hypothesis 2 from the point of view of the policy-makers. As one of the highest ranking EU 
officials in charge of peace operations said in 2009: “everybody is resource strained. You have a 
single resource pool for military and civilian crisis management cooperation and you need to find 
  
148
ways, you absolutely need to find ways, to use those resources in the most efficient ways and to 
use the right forums for channeling those and cooperation with other international and regional 
organizations is one of the ways, that can be achieved.” (interview with EU official, Brussels, 
2009).  
Peace operations are a very expensive endeavor. In 2008, the total bill for all the on-
going peace operations was approximately $9.2 billion dollars39. Most international 
organizations depend on their member-states for funds, and payments to the IOs are not high on 
the member-states’ budget disbursement. Some regional international organizations, like the 
African Union, have to get engaged in inter-organizational cooperation because of their lack of 
resources. “The European Union provides the capacity and has an interest in peace in Africa. The 
African Union cooperates with the European Union because it wants these capabilities. […] 
Basically, all African Union peace operations are funded with European Union’s money.” 
(interview with EU official, Brussels, 2009).  
But even organizations that have substantial amounts of resources, both human and 
financial resources, such as the United Nations and the European Union, want to cooperate with 
other IOs to cut their costs down. The United Nations is often over-stretched, having too many 
peace operations in too many conflicts. They are happy whenever they can pass the high costs of 
some parts of a peace operation to someone else, such as the European Union or NATO. Thus, as 
one EU official said, “There is utility for ESDP peace operations because there are gaps in the 
peace operations market-place where the UN cannot go because it is overstretched.” (interview 
with EU official, Brussels, 2009). On the other hand, within the European Union, the country 
that provides a significant portion of the EU budget, “Germany has voted to outsource peace 
                                                           
39 Calculated by author based on the publicly available data from the peace operations.  
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operations to other international organizations whenever possible because there are financial 
constraints.” (interview with EU official, Brussels, 2009).  
Other officials echoed this concern by saying that many of the European Union member-
states were hesitant (in 2009) of new peace operations because of the economic crisis that 
affected all EU members. Another example of a comparatively rich organization such as the 
European Union looking to cut costs is their desire in Kosovo to “take over the buildings, the 
cars from the UN, but then the UN could not just give them to the EU” (interview with EU 
official, Brussels, 2009). The European Union, much to its displeasure, ended up having to pay 
for new buildings, cars, and office equipment for the EULEX-Kosovo mission. That EULEX 
was the largest and most expansive EU peace operation to date, with a total cost of more than US 
$ 146 million, explains EU’s desire to cut costs wherever possible. As one of the interviewees 
said “There is usually already someone else big, where the EU goes and thus the EU has an 
interest to get access to their resources.” (interview with EU official, Brussels, 2009).   
The majority of policy-makers mentioned the need to share the burden of peace 
operations. Most of the people interviewed in Brussels argued that other regional organizations 
need to pull their weight and help the over-stretched United Nations. There is a limited pool of 
resources given by wealthier member-states around the world. As one interviewee said “we are 
to share the same resources, all of us in all the international organizations. It is timely to increase 
the efficiency of all. We have to do better with the same resources and one of the essential points 
is to steer all assessment process to have this knowledge in sharing the resources. And this is a 
general trend for inter-organizational cooperation.” (interview with EU official, Brussels, 2009). 
The findings support Hypothesis 2 and suggest the need to improve the efficiency of resource-
sharing among IOs.  
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Inter-organizational cooperation is also associated with costs, not only with cost-cutting 
desires on the part of the IOs. “Cooperation is there but we don’t have the resources for it. Even 
the logistics of learning…it takes a lot of time and resources.” (interview with EU official, 
Brussels, 2009). New staff within the organizations has to be hired with the sole goal to liaise 
with the other IOs, making sure that everyone is on the same page in a conflict area. There is the 
danger of too much inter-organizational cooperation, too. “Coordinating everything will create 
“elephantine” international organizations which is not good for fast-reacting missions.” 
(interview with EU official, Brussels, 2009). Too many third-parties, too many peace operations, 
and the subsequent need of inter-organizational cooperation could create difficulties and slow 
down the overall peacebuilding process. Peacekeepers should not spend all their time 
coordinating and in meetings with their counterparts in other international organizations, but they 
should actually perform their peacekeeping responsibilities. A vocal minority of officials 
interviewed within the European Union stated that inter-organizational cooperation is good, but 
within limits that will allow each international organization to actually do some peacekeeping, 
rather than brief each other’s IO all the time. “Joint missions mean more bureaucracy and more 
problems and it is more cumbersome.” (interview with EU official, Brussels, 2009). The peace 
operations’ staff and time are limited and adding more activities on their daily agendas, such as 
coordinating with other IOs, would take away from their main goal of peacekeeping.  
The majority of policymakers interviewed (68%) mentioned resources as either the 
primary explanation or one of several explanations for inter-organizational cooperation. Forty 
percent (40%) of the policymakers argued that the desire to the burden-sharing of financial and 
human resources is the main explanation for inter-organizational cooperation. There is strong 
support for Hypothesis 2. However, a vocal minority of policy-makers draw attention to the costs 
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of inter-organizational cooperation. A fine balance has to be found between the time and 
resources spent on inter-organizational cooperation and the time and resources spent on 
implementing the peacekeepers’ primary responsibilities.  
 
Findings - Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 3 states: IOs with expertise on one specific aspect of conflict resolution are 
more likely to cooperate in peace operations with IOs that have expertise on different, 
complementary, aspects of conflict resolution. Fifty-three percent of the officials interviewed 
answered that complementarity is the main reason for inter-organizational cooperation. Seventy-
five percent of the officials interviewed said that complementarity is definitely a motive for inter-
organizational cooperation, either the primary one, or one among others.  
The officials interviewed answered that the European Union and NATO want to 
complement the good work done by the United Nations. These regional organizations identified 
shares of the peace operations market in which they have a comparative advantage against other 
international organizations (civilian peacebuilding for the European Union, military enforcement 
for NATO). The work of the EU and NATO complements the work of the United Nations and of 
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The European Union wants to create 
“synergetic relations with other international organizations and avoid duplications” (interviews 
with EU officials, Brussels, 2009), as many of the officials interviewed said.  
The European Union cooperates when there is added value. The European Union does 
not want to duplicate the mandate and the activities of other international organizations. These 
fears of duplication are diminishing: “So in a sense there are all the fears that existed until some 
time ago of duplication, stepping into each other’s territory…These fears are dissipating because 
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there is space for everybody. In fact none of these organizations is capable to fulfill the required 
task because plenty of crises are not managed in fact.” (interview with retired NATO official, 
Brussels, 2009).  
All the international organizations deploying peace operations are specialized on a 
specific aspect of peace operations on which they have a comparative advantage.. One official 
said that “It is a question of tools that other international organizations have at their disposal that 
drives inter-organizational cooperation.” (interview with EU official, Brussels, 2009). The 
United Nations does not have the best expertise for every single peacekeeping tool. NATO is the 
main organization when strong military enforcement is required. OSCE is called for conflict 
prevention and to diffuse potentially violent conflicts regarding minority-rights. The European 
Union’s tool of trade is civilian peacebuilding. One EU official defended the rationale for 
European Union’s peace operations by saying that “There is utility for European Security and 
Defense Policy operations, first because there are gaps in the peace operations market-places 
where […] other international organizations cannot go because they do not have the expertise.” 
(interview with EU official, Brussels, 2009).  
NATO officials also echoed the answers by their Brussels-based colleagues from the 
European Union. Jamie Shea, the head of the NATO policy planning unit, said that: “We 
[NATO] are not going to do civilian stuff ourselves, it is not our job. There is no political support 
to give civilian functions to NATO. But we can have better sort of planning liaison arrangements 
[with the European Union and other international organizations], so we could join on a 
temporary basis these planning structures.” (interview with Jamie Shea, Brussels, 2009). NATO 
recognizes the value of the different peacekeeping tools other organizations have, and wants to 
cooperate with them in order to a) avoid duplications and related costs, and b) get the best 
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expertise on the market from those international organizations that are the best at a specific 
peacekeeping tool.  
NATO acknowledges that the United Nations is better at peacebuilding, especially in the 
African context.  Jamie Shea sees a complementary role for NATO, as “giving the United 
Nations a ‘shot in the arm’ [a boost of energy], so that it is able to do an effective job” whenever 
needed. (interview with Jamie Shea, Brussels, 2009). This “shot in the arm” could take different 
forms from strategic airlift capability to NATO-run trainings of UN peacekeepers.  
There is a significant amount of agreement between officials from different international 
organizations, such as the European Union and NATO, that the most important motivation for 
inter-organizational cooperation is complementarity. The findings strongly support Hypothesis 
three. Nevertheless, one also has to be aware that there are still “turf battles” between 
international organizations about who is responsible for different peacekeeping activities and 
over the geographical distribution of responsibilities. The Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe was not very happy about European Union’s peace operation in Georgia 
in 2004. The OSCE felt that the EU was encroaching on its functional and regional expertise. 
These “turf battles” exist even within an international organizations, between their different 
institutions and units. Nevertheless, as the good relationship between the OSCE and the EU has 
shown since 2004, most of these “turf battles” seem to be fading away.  
 
Findings - Hypothesis 4 
Hypothesis 4 states that: International organizations are more likely to cooperate with 
other international organizations when they intervene in very difficult and complex conflicts. For 
Hypothesis 4 there was no variation on the independent variable. All the officials interviewed 
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answered that from their perception all the conflicts in which both the European Union and 
NATO have sent peace operations were very difficult and complex conflicts. Nevertheless, they 
did acknowledge that there is variation regarding inter-organizational cooperation in very 
difficult and complex conflicts. This variation could not be attributed to conflict characteristics 
though, as these are constant, at least based on the answers received from interviews. The lack of 
variation in the independent variable of complex conflicts but the presence of variation in the 
dependent variable of inter-organizational cooperation means that Hypothesis 4 is not supported 
by the interviews.  
Nevertheless, Hypothesis 4 and the role of conflict complexity would be better tested in 
interviews with politicians from the European Union’s member states. They, and not the 
European Union bureaucrats, are the ones to receive the audience costs in case of peace 
operations’ failure. These politicians may be the ones most interested in inter-organizational 
cooperation. This hypothesis may be better placed at the member-states level of the theoretical 
model, instead of the international organizations level. This shall be tested in future 
developments of this research.  
 
Findings - Hypothesis 5 
Hypothesis 5 states that Regional IOs are more likely to cooperate with more experienced 
IOs in the first years of the establishment of their peace operations programs. The rationale 
behind this hypothesis is that in the first years of their peace operations, international 
organizations may want to learn from the more experienced IOs. I asked the officials interviewed 
if they thought there was any learning process at work between international organizations in 
peace operations.  
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The message from the interviews was that the European Union has nothing to learn from 
other international organizations. Only nine percent (9%) of the people interviewed said that 
learning was the main reason for inter-organizational cooperation, with only twelve percent 
(12%) acknowledging that learning was one of the many causes of inter-organizational 
cooperation.  
One of the officials who said that there is learning between the organizations, gave as an 
example the relationship between the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and 
the European Union: “EU has a learning relationship with OSCE. OSCE is very small but very 
efficient. EU would like to run as smoothly as OSCE. EU learns from the OSCE’s expertise and 
OSCE is willing to cooperate with EU as it sees itself as a fading away organization which will 
sooner or later be taken over by the EU.” (interview with EU official, Brussels, 2009).  
The answer received most of the time from the officials interviewed was the following: “I 
don’t think it is a question that we learn from other international organizations. All of our 
countries have deployed their troops in the UN, NATO, and in the EU. As a country we are all 
aware of the requirements. My country [Belgium], we lived the period of the blue-helmets from 
the beginning. We were founding members of UN, NATO, and the EU. We don’t have to learn 
anything, we were around the table at the beginning.” (interview with retired NATO official, 
Brussels, 2009). European Union member-states such as Ireland, Sweden, and Austria have 
contributed significant numbers of troops for United Nations’ peace operations. Their troops do 
not need learn how to do peace operations under the European Union mandate.  
Second, a majority of the officials interviewed also said that the military staff of the 
European Union is very well trained in peace operations, having been previously deployed either 
with the United Nations or NATO.  “Originally, all the colleagues involved in the political-
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strategic level, in the operational level, all the EU pioneers in peace operations had a previous 
experience in a different organization. They were coming from the United Nations, OSCE and 
from the Western European Union and also from NATO. The EU pioneers in peace operations 
previously had military and even civilian experiences with NATO.” (interview with Michel 
Savary, Brussels, 2009).  
Thus, the findings from the interviews do not support Hypothesis 5. It appears that 
learning plays no motivating role for inter-organizational cooperation, at least for the European 
Union. It may well be that the answers received from the officials of other international 
organizations with supposedly less experience of peace operations, such as the African Union, 
may be different. At least several European Union officials thought that the African Union has a 
significant amount of experience with peace operations, and that the AU officials do not really 
need to learn much from other international organizations, as they have been deployed 
previously with the UN peace operations.  
 
Findings - Hypothesis 6 
Hypothesis 6 states: IOs with similar security cultures are more likely to cooperate with 
each other in peace operations. The message from the interviews was that “security cultures are 
a myth”. Only twelve percent of the officials interviewed said that similarity in security cultures 
is responsible for inter-organizational cooperation with a total of twenty-eight percent 
acknowledging that similar security cultures play a role in the initiation of inter-organizational 
cooperation.  
The majority of the officials interviewed said that the European Union cooperates with all 
international organizations based on needs and not based on similarity of security cultures. The 
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European Union does not cooperate with other international organizations because they share a 
common civilian security culture. Most EU officials interviewed refused the label of “civilian 
security culture” for the European Union, arguing that the EU’s peace operations are as much 
military as they are civilian operations: “The security cultures are a myth. The whole idea that 
NATO is military, the European Union is civilian, and the United Nations are doing mixed 
peacekeeping is actually a myth. They converge towards the same type of activities regardless of 
the international organizations and security cultures.” (interview with EU official, Brussels, 
2009). Another official said that “The security cultures argument does not hold. Security cultures 
are changing. The European Union is not only civilian but also military, too.” (interview with EU 
official, Brussels, 2009). A former NATO official from an European Union country said that 
“there are 80,000 military officials from European Union member-states deployed over the 
world”. The lowest figure is in ESDP operations. Than we have the blue helmets and than we 
have NATO. It’s not about the culture of people’s organizations. That’s completely false.” 
(interview with former NATO official, Brussels, 2009).  
Officials that have worked for both the European Union and NATO also acknowledged 
that the security cultures argument is a myth: “NATO is a big M-military, and a small P-political 
organization and it subcontracts to EU and others when the issues get stuck at the political level. 
The OSCE is technically civilian but made out of former military people. NATO’s mission in 
Bosnia was doing 20-30% combat and 70% humanitarian operations from building schools to 
veterinary projects. On the other hand, the European Union peace operations in Georgia and 
former Yugoslavia have quite a few former military people. The concept of interchangeability is 
very important (changing between civilian and military missions) for all international 
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organizations. Thus, security cultures do not play a role.” (interview with NATO official, 
Brussels, 2009).   
On the other hand, some of the military personnel that I interviewed from both the 
European Union and NATO, tended to agree that there are tensions whenever military and 
civilian personnel interact in the field. “This is based from my experience since Cambodia. In the 
UN missions usually the military officials are experts and try to organize the mission. Than more 
and more civilians come and my experience from Cambodia and other missions was that when 
military work alone everything went smooth and without problems. When the civilians came, the 
bureaucracy started. The military system emphasizes less bureaucracy and more action. When 
civilians come acting, when civilians are in power, because military serve to civilians, the 
operation is more bureaucratic and more problems for later. At the political level, we [military 
personnel] serve the political masters, without a problem. But civilians on an operational level, in 
the field, from my perspective provide too much bureaucracy and slow down the process.” 
(interview with EU official, Brussels, 2009).  
There is a certain anti-magnetism between civilian and military sides of peace operations. 
There are differences in everything from the history, culture, and legal aspects of the two 
security cultures. One official said that these differences play a role when choosing with whom to 
cooperate in a specific peace operation: “We always try to get the partner that is having the most 
synergies in a particular case. It is obvious that we’re partnering with whom it matches you.” 
(interview with EU official, Brussels, 2009). Nevertheless, this opinion was the minority opinion 
among the officials interviewed.  
The diverging organizational cultures of the European Union and NATO explain why the 
two organizations do not work together, according to one French diplomat who said the 
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following about the partnership between EU and NATO: “This is a logical impossibility because 
NATO is an instrument, meaning coordinating defense policies of the member-states but EU is a 
project, an ever closer union and so on…And than a project cannot talk to an instrument”. 
(interview with NATO official, Brussels, 2009) As the NATO official who conveyed this story 
told me, “there is a kernel of truth” about the different ways of conducting business in the two 
organizations that make it difficult for them to work together. Nevertheless, the majority of 
people interviewed did not find the similarity in security cultures to be responsible for inter-
organizational cooperation. The findings do not support Hypothesis 6. However, the interviews 
suggest that the depth of inter-organizational cooperation may be positively influenced by the 
similarity of security cultures.   
 
Findings - Hypothesis 7 
Hypothesis 7 states that The personal background similarity of the international staffs is 
more likely to increase inter-organizational cooperation in peace operations. Thirty-four percent 
of the people interviewed said that the personalities of the heads of missions have a significant 
impact on inter-organizational cooperation. If the people do not get along together, there will be 
no, or limited, inter-organizational cooperation. Sixty-two percent of the officials interviewed 
agreed that personality has an important role for cooperation at the institutional level. 
“Personality is very important. Sometimes people have to be withdrawn from the peace operation 
because of personality incompatibility.” (interview with EU official, Brussels, 2009).  
There was less agreement among the officials interviewed about how constricted the officials 
are in the field, by directives from the headquarters. One official answered that “Yes, obviously 
it [personal background] matters. I think that is sensible. I think however that sometimes they are 
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constrained by the orders they get from headquarters or from the line of command. Sometimes 
they have their strict rules.” (interview with EU official, Brussels, 2009). 
Second, the majority of the people interviewed said that is not necessary that people 
sharing the same nationality will work together better and thus increase the probability of inter-
organizational cooperation: “I am not so sure about nationality but experience in other 
international organizations definitely matters. Sometimes different nationalities get along very 
well rather than the same nationality. Different cultures, like in Kosovo, the Anglo-Saxon vs. the 
Latin cultures do not think the same way.” (interview with EU official, Brussels, 2009).  
Having experience for the other organization is a point raised by NATO officials, too: 
“The final problem is that coordination on the ground is OK because again you’re on the ground, 
the headquarters are far away, we know the EU guys, they know the NATO guys. For example in 
Kosovo, Peter Faith, head of EU operation. He was here [at NATO] for 5 years. Yves de 
Kermabon, head of EULEX, he was the NATO commander for one year. People know each 
other. In Afghanistan, the UNAMA, head of UNAMA, Kie Adie, was the Norwegian 
Ambassador to NATO, worked a lot for us[NATO]. On the ground labels count for nothing. 
People know each other, they’ve been in each other’s organizations. They pragmatically get on 
with it.” (interview with Jamie Shea, Brussels, 2009).  
The European Union officials also acknowledge the importance of personal networks 
across organizations. One of the major reasons why the Berlin Plus Agreement was reached 
between the European Union and NATO is the role played by Javier Solana and his personal 
networks in both organizations. As a previous Secretary General of NATO, Javier Solana, in 
2003 the European Union’s High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, 
used his personal networks in both IOs to get inter-organizational cooperation going between the 
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two organizations: “Very good cooperation based on previous work experience in international 
organizations. People worked for UN, NATO, OSCE and know the system. The fact that Solana 
was previously NATO’s Secretary General helped the EU very much because you already had 
someone who knew where to go to NATO to get things done. The EU countries –Ireland, 
Sweden- with troops in UN peace operations are also very good at bridging cooperation between 
the EU and UN.” (interview with EU official, Brussels, 2009).  
The findings from the interviews indicate that personal background matters. It could be 
either the personality of the individuals that influences cooperation, or their previous experiences 
in each other’s organizations that play a role. That people from similar nationalities work better 
together does not get significant support from the interviews. Another problem mentioned by 
several officials is that individuals rotate every six months or every year in most peace 
operations. Only a handful of officials serve for the same peace operations for more than two 
years: “Personal background counts, but there is the problem of continuity, because even if they 
are the best people in the field, they leave after 6, 9 or 12 months depending on the rotation. And 
than the institutional knowledge and the personal connections can easily get lost” (interview with 
EU officials, Brussels, 2009). I would argue that we need to corroborate the findings from the 
other methods used to get a good understanding of what part of the personal background matters, 
and how much personnel rotation in peace operations impact inter-organizational cooperation.  
 
Summary of Findings from the Interviews  
At stage one, member-states’ acquiescence, the interviews strengthen the findings from 
the statistical analysis. The officials interviewed acknowledge that member-states are 
acquiescent of inter-organizational cooperation. At stage two, the international organizations 
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level, the findings from the interviews support two cost-benefit explanations, resources, and 
complementarity, and one constructivist hypotheses, personal background similarity. Hypothesis 
4 about audience costs could not be tested due to the lack of variation in the independent 
variable, difficult and complex conflicts. Table 6.1 shows the interview findings for each 
hypothesis tested. 
The strongest findings are for Hypothesis 3, complementarity. Most officials interviewed 
believe that inter-organizational cooperation occurs because of a desire of international 
organizations to complement each other’s specific tools and instruments deployed in peace 
operations. When compared with the findings from the statistical analyses for Hypothesis 3, I 
notice that the officials interviewed in Brussels, have a narrower view of complementarity than 
the one I suggested for the statistical analyses. For these officials, international organizations 
using different tools, does not necessarily mean that the IOs also conduct different type of 
interventions. They conduct different activities, but one has to look at the narrower difference 
rather than the overall type of peace operations I used in the previous chapter. The European 
Union conducting civilian peacebuilding could well complement OSCE’s civilian peacebuilding 
in Bosnia or Georgia. The EU deals with issues of conflict transformation and economic 
development (important aspects for building peace in a conflict-torn region), while the OSCE 
deals with elections supervision and civil society training. They employ different tools but in 
what are considered similar civilian peacebuilding operations. I believe that these narrower 
differences between peacekeeping tools paint a better image of complementarity rather than the 
macro-level differences in peace operation types.  
The findings for resources and personal background similarity are also mentioned by a 
majority of officials, as possible motivating factors for inter-organizational cooperation. 
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Nevertheless, they are not identified as the main motives for inter-organizational cooperation by 
a majority of interviewees (only 40% and 34%, of them respectively). The findings from the 
interviews are generally similar to those from the statistical analyses. Hypothesis 1, 2, and 3 
receive the highest support from the policy-makers, too, similar to the support received from the 
statistical analyses.  
For Hypothesis 2, the officials interviewed did not make a difference between financial 
and human resources. They argued that all international organizations are over-stretched and thus 
they look for inter-organizational cooperation to alleviate these burdens. Hypothesis 2 is phrased 
mainly from the perspective of the international organizations that have lower resources in the 
dyad. They would be looking to the resourceful international organization to share with them 
some of their larger resources through inter-organizational cooperation. Yet, a “free-riding” 
dilemma may appear, from the perspective of the international organization having larger 
resources in the dyad. They do not want the IO with lower resources to get a “free-ride” on the 
former’s expenses, and get some of the glory in case of success. This suggests that a very large 
financial resources disparity between two international organizations may actually block inter-
organizational cooperation. Nevertheless, the findings from the interviews do point out that some 
level of disparity in terms of resources, be it either financial or human resources, plays a major 
role in the initiation of inter-organizational cooperation. The findings from the previous chapter 
indicate a similar relationship, at least for disparity in terms of human resources.  
Hypothesis 7 receives support from the interviews, but not from the statistical analysis. 
This difference in findings may be the result of the way personal background similarity was 
operationalized for this research, as similar national background for the heads of missions. In 
future research, I plan to operationalize personal background similarity based on the previous 
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experiences in each other’s international organizations. This type of operationalization has 
received the highest support from the policy-makers interviewed to the detriment of national 
background similarity. The next chapter on case studies, should provide us with a better 
understanding of the role played by personal background similarity. Learning and similarity of 
security cultures play no role for policy-makers in deciding inter-organizational cooperation, as 
predicted by the statistical analyses, too.  
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Tables 
 
Table 6.1 Summary of Findings from Interviews 
 
Hypotheses Identified as Main Motivation 
For Inter-Organizational 
Cooperation 
Identified as One Motivation  
Among Others For Inter-
Organizational Cooperation 
H1: Member-States 
Acquiescence 
 N/C  53% (did not think that member-
states play a role in inter-
organizational cooperation) 
H2: Resources 40% 68% 
H3: 
Complementarity 
53% 75% 
H4: Audience Costs N/C N/C 
H5: Learning 9% 12% 
H6: Security Cultures 12% 28% 
H7: Personal 
Background 
Similarity 
34% 62% 
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CHAPTER 7. CASE STUDIES 
 
This chapter will illustrate the findings from the statistical analyses and the interviews 
through three case studies. I will explore how well the findings hold when applied to a number of 
cases of inter-organizational cooperation in peace operations. Case studies are an opportunity to 
understand what the findings of the previous chapter really mean in practice. I have chosen three 
case studies to illustrate the motivations for inter-organizational cooperation in peace operations: 
EU’s EUPOL-NATO’s ISAF in Afghanistan, AU-UN’s UNAMID in Darfur, Sudan, and EU’s 
EULEX-UN’s UNMIK in Kosovo.  
I have chosen these three case studies because they fit the most different system design 
(MDSD) for comparative case studies (Druckman 2005). The three case studies differ on many 
levels and in regards to most independent variables, but the processes of inter-organizational 
cooperation (the dependent variable) are similar. First, the most different system design (MDSD) 
is a very useful method when using exemplar cases for typology development. The three case 
studies analyzed are cases of inter-organizational cooperation for three different types of peace 
operations:  sequential hand-over peace operations (EULEX-UNMIK), parallel peace operations 
(ISAF-EUPOL), and hybrid peace operations (UNAMID). Second, the case studies also differ in 
terms of the independent variables. The eight independent variables used (financial resources, 
human resources, complementarity, conflict type, rivalry, learning, security cultures, and 
personal background) have different values in at least one case study, compared to the other two 
case studies. In those cases, we should observe different results for the dependent variable. For 
example, complementarity is present in two of the three case studies (ISAF-EUPOL, and 
UNAMID), but not in the third (UNMIK-EULEX). If the complementarity hypothesis was 
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correct, then we should observe inter-organizational cooperation for ISAF-EUPOL and 
UNAMID’s cases, but not for UNMIK-EULEX. There is also variation on the dependent 
variable: inter-organizational cooperation. One of the three case studies (ISAF-EUPOL) has no 
inter-organizational cooperation. This variation will allow us to observe if the presence or (lack 
of) inter-organizational cooperation can be attributed to a different reason than the burden-
sharing and complementarity explanations provided in this study.  
The case studies were also chosen in order to have at least one case study for the three 
major clusters of peace operations: the European, African, and one case study for the cooperation 
of the two focal international organizations, the United Nations and the European Union. 
Another reason explaining the choice of cases is to be able to generalize the motivation of inter-
organizational cooperation beyond specific dyads of international organizations. The three case 
studies will be useful for analyzing inter-organizational cooperation in peace operations for four 
(out of the six) major international organizations active in peace operations (the United Nations, 
the European Union, the African Union, and NATO – the other two major IOs in peace 
operations are ECOWAS and OSCE). The following sections are organized based on variation 
on the dependent variable. I will first tackle the case study that has no inter-organizational 
cooperation, and than the two case studies that display cooperation.  
 
Afghanistan: European Union’s EUPOL- NATO’s ISAF 
NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was deployed in December 
2001, in the aftermath of the U.S.-led multinational coalition against the Taliban government of 
Afghanistan. The mandate of ISAF was to create security and stability in Afghanistan, support 
reconstruction and development projects, and contribute to the improved governance of the 
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Afghan authorities. ISAF’s role is different than that of the US-led coalition forces in 
Afghanistan. The US has about 50,000 soldiers that are not under the command of ISAF, but 
rather under the direct command of the US government. The objectives of the non-ISAF US 
forces are to find terrorists and conduct counter-insurgency operations.  
The European Union sent a police mission, EUPOL, to Afghanistan in June 2007 to help 
train Afghanistan’s police forces. It also provides rule of law expertise and helps the Afghan 
institutions by contributing “to the establishment of sustainable and effective civil policing 
arrangements that will ensure appropriate interaction with the wider criminal justice system 
under Afghan ownership.” As the EUPOL chief, Kai Vittrup described EUPOL tasks in 2009, " 
[t]he tasks of the police go from helping with dogs, to crossing the street, to arresting people, to 
act on a crime scene, to know how to act on a case with suicide bombers. It's a huge, huge 
task"(Cook 2009). The EU identified several niche policing activities for which it can provide 
assistance to the Afghani government, such as intelligence-led policing, criminal investigations, 
anti-corruption, and city policing, and it invested most of its efforts into these niches.  
ISAF and EUPOL are multiple simultaneous peace operations only from June 2007 
onwards as before EUPOL’s deployment, ISAF was the only peace operation in Afghanistan. 
Both peace operations were ongoing as of December 2009 (the last month for the multiple 
simultaneous peace operations dataset). Thus, the period under analysis is only from June 2007 
onwards. These are parallel multiple simultaneous peace operations, because they are deployed 
independently of each other at the same time and in the same conflict. Both organizations started 
their deployments in Kabul and the surrounding area around the capital city, only to expand later 
to other provinces of the country.  
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Hypothesis 1 – Member-States’ Acquiescence 
Both the European Union and NATO have called numerous times for cooperation 
between the two organizations. The European Council, in the document establishing EUPOL 
Afghanistan, called for “[c]lose coordination between the EU police mission and other 
international actors involved in security assistance, including the International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF), as well as those providing support to police and rule of law reform in 
Afghanistan.” (Council of the European Union  2007) NATO, on the other hand, through the 
voice of its NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, said in reference to the EU-
NATO relations in Afghanistan that "pragmatic and practical steps" had to be taken immediately 
while waiting for "a general solution to the well-known political problems [Cyprus blocking EU-
NATO cooperation within the EU and Turkey blocking EU-NATO cooperation with in NATO]." 
(Deutsche Presse Agentur 2010). Nevertheless, leaving aside these calls from both IOs, there is 
no inter-organizational cooperation on the ground between the EU and NATO peacekeepers, 
even though they are deployed in the same geographical areas of Afghanistan. 
The European Union and NATO do not cooperate in Afghanistan mainly because of the 
Cyprus-Turkish issue. Because these two states, Cyprus and Turkey, do not recognize each 
other’s existence, they do not want their respective organizations, the EU and NATO, to work 
together either. Cyprus is only a member of the European Union, and not a member of NATO, 
while Turkey is a member of NATO, but not of the European Union. Given that the decisions in 
both IOs are taken based on consensus, one vote is enough to block formal inter-organizational 
cooperation between the EU and NATO in Afghanistan. Turkey argues that the Berlin Plus 
Agreement should be used to regulate cooperation between the EU and NATO, but without 
Cyprus’ presence. The European Union does not want to exclude one if its member-states from 
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the EU-NATO cooperation. The situation is so complicated at the political level that NATO’s 
forces that were initially mandated by the United Nations to provide security to the European 
Union civilian police peacekeepers cannot perform their mission due to the Cyprus-Turkish 
political blockage. Finnish troops deployed with NATO could not provide security for their 
fellow countrymen deployed with the European Union (Aitamurto 2007). In the field, the 
organizations had to use informal agreements between the national units under NATO in charge 
of the provincial reconstruction teams, and national units under the European Union, to have 
security provided for the EU civilian policemen. Yet even that has proven to be difficult. “A 
Finnish lawyer who is working for the operation, Jari-Pekka Paajala, reports from Kabul that, 
thus far, only two of the regional ISAF troop contingents have reached agreements on how they 
will cooperate with EUPOL. All in all, about a dozen such agreements need to be reached.” 
(Aitamurto 2007) This is a case in which formal inter-organizational cooperation is blocked at 
the member-states level and the IOs can do little about it.  
However, the EU and NATO could cooperate informally. That does not happen either, as 
the Finnish lawyer quoted above shows. If even informal inter-organizational cooperation does 
not exist between EUPOL-ISAF, then the independent variables should be in the opposite 
direction than the one predicted by the hypotheses. This means that the asymmetry of financial 
and human resources, the complementarity of peace operations activities, conflict complexity, 
the similarity of security cultures, social learning, and the similarity of national backgrounds of 
the heads of missions will lead to a lack of inter-organizational cooperation (opposite than what 
the hypotheses predict). The following sections will analyze the independent variables used for 
this study. This will provide a chance to illustrate some of the variables and their role when 
cooperation is blocked at the first stage of the member-states.  
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Hypothesis 2- Financial and Human Resources 
The financial and human resources of ISAF easily dwarf those of EUPOL. ISAF spent on 
average $152 million dollars per year, while EUPOL spent only $35 million dollars per year. 
ISAF has an average of 25,000 peacekeepers deployed in Afghanistan while EUPOL has a little 
bit more than 130 civilian peacekeepers deployed. These large differences in allocated resources 
should lead to inter-organizational cooperation according to this study’s Hypothesis 2. 
Nevertheless, that does not happen. This case study is very useful for showing that too much of 
an asymmetry in terms of resources can actually hinder inter-organizational cooperation. NATO 
does not want to shoulder most of the burden in Afghanistan. In interviews in Brussels NATO 
officials expected the European Union and other international organizations to be present in 
Afghanistan, just as they were previously in Kosovo or the Balkans. “[…] Because you had the 
UN there in Kosovo-UNMIK, the EU there looking after civilian reconstruction, every 
organization was automatically there. And I think NATO, a bit naively, assumed that these guys 
will be there automatically wherever we are in the future. As a kind of a mechanical response. 
And I think it was a bit of a surprise when we went to Afghanistan and discovered that these 
organizations were not automatically there.” (interview with Jamie Shea, Brussels, 2009). NATO 
wants the European Union to pull its resource weight and to deploy more civilian policemen to 
train Afghanistan’s forces. Speaking on behalf of NATO, the British Foreign Secretary David 
Milliband, declared in December 2009 that "[o]ne of the things the European Union needs to do 
is make sure that its EUPOL mission is delivering the sort of service, both in terms of quality and 
quantity, that's needed. […] The training mission is absolutely essential to make good on our 
promise not to create a colony in Afghanistan but instead to build a society that can defend 
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itself."(quoted in Ames 2009) This call for more resources from EU has been repeated numerous 
times since early 2008 by NATO officials and also by some of their member-states speaking on 
behalf of NATO, such as the United States. 
The reason why the statistical analyses shows that inter-organizational cooperation occurs 
when there is a symmetry of financial resources may be because the international organization 
that puts in a significantly larger amount of financial resources is not willing to cooperate with 
the other IO until the latter also chips in a significant amount of financial resources. No 
international organization wants “free-riders”, but rather, at least in this case study, NATO wants 
the European Union to pull its weight too. Second, NATO asking for more resources from the 
European Union in Afghanistan, is also an indication that even a “rich members’ club” as NATO 
has limited resources, and that it wants to share the burden of peace operations with other IOs. 
The discussion about financial and human resources provides evidence that all IOs are resource-
strapped and want to share the burden of peace operations with others. It also provides some 
additional support to the statistical finding that big disparities in resources may block inter-
organizational cooperation until both IOs give more resources to their peace operations and no 
one takes advantage of the other one’s resources.  
 
Hypothesis 3 - Complementarity  
Regarding complementarity, NATO conducts a peace enforcement mission, while the 
European Union conducts a civilian peacebuilding mission. NATO has troops deployed on the 
ground that have as a primary goal stabilizing the country and providing security. The 
International Assistance Security Force (ISAF) was authorized by the United Nations Security 
Council under a Chapter VII mandate, which allows it to use military force to attain its goals. On 
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the other hand, the European Union Police Mission to Afghanistan is a civilian peacebuilding 
operation aimed at training Afghanistan’s policemen and implementing a rule of law system. The 
previous NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, pointed out that NATO and the EU 
should be working together in Afghanistan as they have complementary skills: "NATO does not 
have the civil means to drive reconstruction forward, and we also have no interest at all in 
acquiring such means.  It is the EU that has such means (...). In other words, the two institutions 
are dependent upon one another."(Shimkus 2007) His successor, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, 
emphasized the complementary division of labor between the two organizations in Afghanistan: 
“the EU's EUPOL mission should focus on civilian aspects of policing, leaving NATO to deal 
with operationally more demanding areas, particularly the development of a gendarmerie-style 
armed police.” (Deutsche Presse-Agentur 2010). 
The activities of both NATO and the EU complement each other’s efforts. NATO has an 
interest in cooperating with the European Union because as some top NATO officials said: 
“Whatever strategy NATO uses to fight insurgents in Afghanistan, its exit strategy is centered on 
building the Afghan army and police until they can ensure security.” (Cook 2009). That is 
something for which the European Union is partially responsible. The European Union is well 
aware that NATO needs EU’s work as a possible exit strategy for NATO’s troops. That is why 
the EU officials ask for increased cooperation from the commanders of ISAF’s provincial 
reconstruction teams in providing security for EU’s personnel on the ground: “commanders of 
ISAF's provincial reconstruction teams, which are spread around Afghanistan, needed to be more 
willing to host and provide security for EU police training teams, whose work is seen as vital to 
an eventual NATO exit strategy. A credible police force in Afghanistan is one of the ways 
[NATO] can downgrade [its] military presence in the long run" (Ames 2009). Although, as 
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Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer often says, NATO is not a relief or humanitarian 
organization, the realities of Afghanistan have driven home the lesson that security cannot be 
sustained without reconstruction, and reconstruction is doomed to failure without security.   
NATO officials have repeatedly complained about the level of training provided by 
EUPOL’s civilian policemen. In September 2007, Daan Everts, NATO’s Senior Civilian 
Representative in Afghanistan said that “[t]he build-up of a national police in Afghanistan is 
crucially important for a lasting solution in maintaining security and stability in the country. 
Right now the [EU] police is there, and that is far from perfect. […] There is a discrepancy ... 
between our military efforts and our police law enforcement efforts." (Xinhua 2007) Daan Everts 
basically complains about EU’s training activities in Afghanistan. In 2009, “NATO ha[d] also 
recently launched police training through 24 so-called police operational mentor and liaison 
teams', which are embedded with Afghan police units.” (Ames 2009). This is one piece of 
evidence in which NATO is portrayed as trying to take over EU’s responsibilities in training the 
police.  
 Second, NATO is not willing to give too many responsibilities to the European Union, 
not trusting its ability to train well the Afghani police. The two organizations had a dispute over 
where a military unit charged with civilian police responsibilities, such as the new French 
Gendarmes should be deployed. Should it be incorporated within the EUPOL? Should it be 
incorporated within NATO? Finally NATO won by including these troops that have dual 
military and civilian responsibilities, into the newly created NATO Training Mission-
Afghanistan (NTM-A) in 2009. France wanted its gendarmes to go initially with European 
Union’s EUPOL, and not with the US-dominated NATO (Ricard 2009). NATO’s accusations are 
not without foundation. As evaluated by EU officials, EUPOL was a “disaster” in 2007 (Ames 
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2009). It started poorly, losing its first commander, and faced serious problems recruiting high-
caliber staff.  (Japan Times 2008). During its first year it has also “become tangled in a maze of 
confusion, bureaucracy, and financial weakness. The planned 195 EU police officers from 17 
countries would not take their posts until March 2008. Reportedly things cannot go faster 
because new accommodations with appropriate conveniences must first be built (BBC 2007). It 
would make sense that given these circumstances the training of the Afghani police force was 
not having the same high standards of quality as the training of the Afghani military forces by 
NATO. After all, NATO has a professional army with decades of training experience plus the 
experience of six more years of deployment in Afghanistan than the EU, and it already dealt with 
the start-up problems of a new peace operation.  
 On the other hand NATO keeps calling for more and better peacekeepers from the 
European Union. NATO is actually very eager to cooperate with the EU, but only after the EU 
deploys to its full capacity, and starts considering Afghanistan as a major security concern, as 
does NATO. I have observed NATO’s eagerness to cooperate with other international 
organizations during my interviews with NATO officials in Brussels, too: “The problem is to be 
frank that NATO has been a little bit more receptive [to inter-organizational cooperation] than 
the other organizations so we need to better balance. “(interview with Jamie Shea, Brussels, 
2009). Shimkus (2007) also noted that “[t]he length and frequency with which this issue is cited 
in NATO documents suggest a consistent prioritization of this question.  Similar EU 
presentations, however, appear to give relatively short shrift to co-operation with NATO.” 
NATO’s desire to portray itself as a partner may be due to its military role and the desire of other 
IOs to differentiate between military and civilian operations. Second, the overwhelming power of 
the US may place NATO bureaucrats in a tough spot to get cooperation with other international 
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organizations. These IOs may fear that cooperating with NATO could mean losing their 
autonomy to US’s military will and thus are less receptive to NATO’s suggestions.  
  Different activities conducted by EU and NATO in the case of Afghanistan did not cause 
inter-organizational cooperation. This actually led to one of the IOs being dissatisfied with the 
quality of peacekeeping conducted by the other IO and deciding to duplicate the peacekeeping 
efforts. On top of NATO’s dissatisfaction over the number of EU’s personnel deployed, 
dissatisfaction over the quality of EU’s activities was added. To be fair to the European Union 
though, EUPOL’s work has been damaged by NATO’s refusal to provide security. EU’s 
policemen could not perform their duties without the NATO’s military protection. Second, 
EUPOL did achieve significant results under the circumstances, and “has proved its value, its 
relevance, as Klompenhouwer, the EU's civilian operations commander told the members of the 
European Parliament. […] EUPOL is now regarded as a key actor within the Afghan police 
reform.” He warned that the EU had to take a long-term view of the mission's eventual success. 
(Ames 2010). Third, most of NATO’s complaints came in 2007, the first and most difficult year 
for the new European Union peace operation in Afghanistan. The EU had to deal with the start-
up problems for a peace operation, and to operate without any security protection from NATO. 
In later years, NATO asked the European Union to provide more peacekeepers, and was less 
concerned with the quality of its peacekeepers in Afghanistan.  
 
Hypothesis 4 – Complex and Difficult Conflicts 
Hypothesis 4 (complex and difficult conflict) deals more with the conflict characteristics 
and less with the relationships between the peace operations. The two peace operations are 
deployed in an internationalized intrastate war but not in a rivalry setting. Afghanistan has been 
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virtually in a state of war since Soviet Union’s invasion in 1979. It is a very complex war with 
several conflict parties, and many splinter groups of the major conflict parties. Internationalized 
intrastate war is one of the most difficult types of conflict and thus I would expect the two 
organizations to work together.  
 There is no rivalry between the United States and Afghanistan or between the different 
rebel groups within Afghanistan. I would argue though that the lack of rivalry in this case can be 
deceiving as it does not give a full account of the complexity of the conflict. The factions have 
changed names and alliances numerous times. United States controls Afghanistan’s government. 
Thus, technically there is no rivalry. Practically though, this is one of the most complex conflicts 
of modern history with two great powers (Soviet Union and the United States) unsuccessfully 
trying to control Afghanistan at different moments in time. Add to this the Taliban movement, 
Pakistan’s constant meddling into Afghanistan’s internal affairs, and a prolonged civil war and 
you have a very difficult and complex conflict.    
 The type of conflict indicates that we should observe inter-organizational cooperation 
between the two organizations. On the other hand, the lack of rivalry between the conflict parties 
indicates the opposite. Given that these two variables are used to capture conflict difficulty and 
complexity, I would argue that hypothesis four is overall not supported by this case.  
 
Hypothesis 5 – Learning  
 Regarding Hypothesis 5 (learning), both international organizations have deployed 
numerous peace operations before going into Afghanistan, and thus this hypothesis does not 
apply to this case. EUPOL Afghanistan was European Union’s 16th multiple simultaneous peace 
operation, while NATO’s ISAF mission was its 8th MSPO. Thus, neither of the two organizations 
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is in its early days regarding the deployment of peace operations and neither needs the 
cooperation of a more experienced institution. 
 
Hypothesis 6- Security Cultures Compatibility  
 Regarding Hypothesis 6 (security cultures compatibility), there is a significant difference 
in the security cultures of the two organizations. One is a military organization (NATO) and the 
other one is primarily a civilian organization (the European Union). Their activities in 
Afghanistan fit this description of their separate security cultures. While NATO does military 
enforcement, the European Union does civilian peacebuilding. The lack of similarity in their 
security cultures should lead to a lack of inter-organizational cooperation between the two 
organizations.  
 An internal NATO report about the cooperation between the two organizations in 
Afghanistan has identified bureaucratic distrust and issues regarding security clearances and the 
lack of trust in transferring classified documents to the other organization as major barriers for 
their inter-organizational cooperation (Shimkus 2007). NATO deals mainly with classified 
documents, and this impeded cooperation with the European Union until 2008/2009. The reason 
was that NATO did not trust that the European Union could handle classified information and 
maintain its classified status. As one EU official told me in Brussels, there was some truth in 
that, as the European Union needed to upgrade its computer network systems to manage 
classified information at the standards that NATO wanted. (interview with EU official, Brussels, 
2009).  
 Thus, the lack of similarity between the security cultures of the two organizations, 
especially at the level of headquarters, seems to have trickled down to the level of their field 
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operations in Afghanistan. The bureaucratic distrust between the two organizations leads to 
different work cultures on the ground and as expected a lack of inter-organizational cooperation 
for the case of EUPOL-ISAF.  
 
Hypothesis 7 – Personal Background Similarity 
 Regarding Hypothesis 7 (personal background similarity), the mission commanders of 
EUPOL and ISAF did not share the same nationality from 2007 onwards. The same NATO 
internal report mentioned above (Shimkus 2007) indicated that incompatibilities between 
national and institutional leaders are another major stumbling block for cooperation between the 
two organizations. NATO’s ISAF was led by two U.S. generals for the period 2007-2008, while 
EUPOL was led by a German and a Dane for the same period. Thus, in this case there is no 
reason to believe that the similarity of nationalities played a role for inter-organizational 
cooperation. 
 An in-depth analysis of inter-organizational cooperation between EUPOL and ISAF in 
Afghanistan shows that Hypothesis 1 does not hold and that in this case member-states did not 
approve of inter-organizational cooperation. Their lack of approval blocked formal cooperation 
between the two organizations. For this case the inter-organizational cooperation was blocked at 
stage one by the member-states. This is one of the six cases of non-cooperation identified in the 
dataset that could be attributed to the member-states’ level. 
Informal cooperation between the peace operations of the two organizations does not 
exist either, as the previous analyses show. Even though there are significant disparities in terms 
of financial and human resources, there is complementarity between their activities, and the 
conflict is a very difficult and complex one, there are no signs indicating the existence of inter-
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organizational cooperation between EUPOL and ISAF. On the contrary, the lack of similarity 
between their security cultures and the nationality of the heads of mission indicate that one 
should expect no cooperation between the EU and NATO in Afghanistan. These two hypotheses 
seem to be supported by data from the case study.  
 
Kosovo: United Nations’ UNMIK- European Union’s EULEX 
United Nations’ Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) started its 
deployment in June 1999, right after the end of the NATO bombing campaign against Serbia. 
UNMIK was placed in charge of a complex system of international organizations that work for 
peace in the region of Kosovo. Four different pillars of activities were created with UNMIK 
coordinating the overall peace process. The United Nations led the first two pillars – Pillar 1- 
Police and Justice and Pillar 2- Civil Administration. Pillar 3- Democratization and Institution 
Building was led by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, while Pillar 4- 
Reconstruction and Economic Development was given to the institutions of the European Union. 
NATO’s KFOR forces provided the security for the entire peace operation.  
The European Union deployed its own peace operation in Kosovo, the European Union 
Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), starting in February 2009. The EULEX mission 
consists of civilian police, customs officers, prosecutors, and judges.  They were tasked to take 
over from UNMIK the activities under Pillar 1 (Police and Justice) and Pillar 2 (Civil 
Administration). This is a hand-over type of multiple simultaneous peace operations in which the 
United Nations passes on its peacekeeping responsibilities to the European Union. UNMIK 
reduced its personnel in Kosovo by about 70%, but continued its presence there. “UNMIK was 
progressively shifting its focus towards an increasingly diplomatic and political role aimed at 
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facilitating dialogue and external relations, and fostering minority rights,” as stated by Mr. 
Lamberto Zannier, the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General, and the 
head of UNMIK (States News Service 2009). 
 There has been close cooperation between EULEX and UNMIK from the very beginning. 
In August 2008 the two organizations signed an agreement of cooperation “which covers 
technical aspects, such as transfer of UNMIK equipment to EULEX and use of UNMIK 
premises by the personnel of the European mission.”(BBC 2008) This agreement made clear the 
lines of communication and cooperation between the two organizations, even before the EU 
deployed its peacekeepers on the ground. The EULEX spokesman Victor Reuter said in 
December 2008 that “EULEX has come to build rule of law structures in line with European 
standards and will start work in close cooperation with the UN mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).” 
(Xinhua 2008) “On 6 April, 2009 the European Union announced that EULEX had reached full 
operational capability. UNMIK and EULEX exchange information and coordinate on issues of 
mutual concern on a regular basis.” (States News Service 2009) These reports show the excellent 
working relations between the two missions in Kosovo. This is not to say that there have not 
been problems in the pre-deployment period. One EU official who’s office was responsible for 
EULEX told me that there have been times when the official went to Kosovo and tried to talk 
with European officers working for UN but was not allowed immediate access to them on the 
grounds that the base was still a UN base.(interview with EU official, Brussels, 2009)  
Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority of the facts show the existence of inter-organizational 
cooperation between the two peace operations.  
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Hypothesis 1 – Member-States’ Acquiescence 
 Regarding Hypothesis 1, we notice that the member-states allowed for formal inter-
organizational cooperation between UNMIK and EULEX. There were several UN members 
(Russia, China, and Serbia) that strongly opposed the deployment of an EU peace operation to 
overtake the responsibilities of UNMIK. In June 2008, Russia rejected the proposal to pass 
UNMIK’s responsibilities to a European Union peace operation, as it feared it may lose its 
leverage over the peace operations in Kosovo. (Deutsche Presse Agentur 2008). In August 2008, 
the “Serbian Prime Minister Mirko Cvetkovic said the Serbian government did not recognize the 
EULEX mission. According to Serbian Minister of Defence Dragan Sutanovac, this is disturbing 
because it violates the international law and does not have the support of the United Nations 
organization.” (BBC 2008) In briefings at the United Nations, the Chinese ambassador 
underlined the need for UNMIK’s presence in Kosovo and that EULEX should operate under 
UN’s umbrella. Similar to Russia, China wants to maintain leverage over the peace process in 
Kosovo and not lose it to the European Union. Eventually the UNMIK mission played a 
mediating role between EULEX and the Serb and Russian authorities in order to gain their 
acquiescence to European Union’s deployment in Kosovo.   
 These examples show that member-states reluctantly accepted inter-organizational 
cooperation between the European Union and the United Nations. There have been some initial 
attempts to block cooperation from its early days, but once EULEX was deployed on the ground, 
those member-states (Serbia, Russia, and China) sought an increased cooperation between 
UNMIK and EULEX so that they could still have leverage over the peace process in the former 
Yugoslav republic. Thus, Hypothesis 1 is supported by this case study.  
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Hypothesis 2- Financial and Human Resources 
Regarding Hypothesis 2, we observe a similarity between the amount of the financial 
contributions provided by UNMIK, US $305 million and those provided by EULEX, US$ 136 
million. This is the most expansive peace operation ever deployed by the European Union. 
Nevertheless, it is not even half of the costs of UNMIK for 2008. In terms of personnel deployed, 
UNMIK deployed more than twice as many people as EULEX, 3872 for UNMIK compared with 
almost 1700 people for EULEX. The EU was eager to cooperate with the United Nations over 
the transfer of equipment to its peace operation. But, the EU did not get it for free as they 
initially expected, but at a cost. EU’s expectation to receive UN’s equipment and to be able to 
use its bases for free is a sign of EU’s interest to save as much as possible resources from this 
already very expansive, for them, peace operation (interview with EU official, Brussels, 2009).  
 In this case, inter-organizational cooperation cannot be attributed to a disparity in 
financial and human resources. The two organizations deployed similar financial and human 
resources and still cooperated very well together. This finding supports those from the statistical 
analyses: the peace operations are more willing to cooperate with each other when they deploy 
similar resources. This could be caused by a desire to avoid free-riding on the part of some rich 
IOs, and to make sure that everyone pulls their weight. 
 
Hypothesis 3- Complementarity  
Regarding hypotheses 3, there is no complementarity between UNMIK and EULEX. On the 
surface of it, they are both doing civilian peacebuilding. UNMIK’s activities in Pillars 1 and 2 
were handed-over to EULEX. But, if we go more in-depth to analyze their activities, we notice 
that the European Union took over the police, justice, and rule of law activities, while UNMIK 
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refocused on protecting minority rights, implementing diplomatic agreements, and overseeing 
the whole process. Avoiding the duplication of efforts is a major goal of the United Nations: 
“UNMIK's resources and skills, combined with those of EULEX and the OSCE, provided a full 
panoply of expertise and staff for implementing the United Nations mandate, while promoting 
synergies and avoiding duplication of efforts.”(States News Service 2009).  
Thus, I would argue that even though, Hypothesis 3 is not supported by the statistical 
analyses, an in-depth look at the case studies shows that there is complementarity. This 
complementarity operated at a more detailed different level than the one operationalized in this 
study. EULEX and UNMIK implement civilian peacebuilding activities which would indicate no 
complementarity and thus no cooperation. But if we look at their specific activities, we realize 
that they are different activities that fall under the same broad umbrella of civilian peacebuilding. 
Analyzing the role of complementarity through this specific type of activities is a more fruitful 
way than the broader categories used in this study. Further research should operationalize 
complementarity at a more specific level of activities. 
 
Hypothesis 4- Complex and Difficult Conflict 
 Regarding Hypothesis 4, the conflict in Kosovo was listed as an internationalized 
intrastate conflict by the PRIO Armed Conflicts 2009 Dataset. There were more than 10,000 
people who died during the conflict (Kifner 1999) and this was one of the worst conflicts in the 
world at the turn of the 21st century. Nevertheless, there was no rivalry listed between the 
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the Serbian government or between the latter and the 
coalition forces. There was inter-organizational cooperation between the two peace operations. 
This suggests that Hypothesis 4 was supported in respect to the idea that difficult and complex 
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types of conflicts require more cooperation between the 3rd parties deployed there, but does not 
support the idea that rivalry attracts this type of cooperation. Given that the rivalry component of 
Hypothesis 4 is not present in this conflict, I would argue that overall this hypothesis is not 
supported by the case study.  
 
Hypothesis 5 – Learning  
 Hypothesis 5 (learning) does not apply to this case study. The United Nations had 
deployed peace operations for five decades before sending a mission to Kosovo, while the 
European Union was already at its 19th multiple simultaneous peace operation when it deployed 
EULEX. Neither of the two organizations was a beginner in peace operations, and thus 
Hypothesis 5 does not apply to this case, as they were not in their early years of peace operations 
and would not need the cooperation of another organization. 
 
Hypothesis 6 - Security Cultures 
 Hypothesis 6 (security cultures) on the other hand presents a good case for analysis. The 
United Nations has been coded as mixed for the purpose of security culture, as it employs both 
civilians and military personnel, while the European Union was coded as having a civilian 
security culture. In the case of Kosovo though, most of UNMIK’s deployment was made up of 
civilian personnel, given their responsibilities for Pillar 1 (Police and Justice) and 2 (Civilian 
Administration). Thus, one could argue that UNMIK’s civilian security culture matched well 
with the civilian security culture of the European Union and led to inter-organizational 
cooperation between the two peace operations. In order to come to this conclusion, the level of 
analysis for the security cultures should be moved to the level of the peace operations, instead of 
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the broader level of the entire international organization. But if that were to happen it would be 
hard to talk about security cultures at all, as each peace operation is formed ad-hoc and there is 
no security culture per se for each of them. I would argue that Hypothesis 6 is not supported by 
the data from the case studies, given the way it was operationalized. 
 
Hypothesis 7- Personal Background  
 The argument about the national similarity of the heads of mission made for Hypothesis 7 
is not illustrated in this case study. UNMIK was led by Lamberto Zannier, an Italian, in 2008, 
while EULEX was headed by Yves de Kermabon, a Frenchman. More research is needed for the 
other top management personnel to have a better understanding of the role of common 
nationality or common personal background on inter-organizational cooperation.  
Thus, we could conclude that for the case of UNMIK-EULEX, Hypothesis 1(member-
states’ acquiescence) and 3 (complementarity) are supported by the evidence, while the rest are 
not. The member-states of UN and of EU agreed to inter-organizational cooperation. Second, the 
activities of the two peace operations were complementary, once we looked at the appropriate 
level of analysis. The other independent variables did not play a role in determining inter-
organizational cooperation. In the case of EULEX-UNMIK, the complementarity of their 
activities seems to be the main explanation for inter-organizational cooperation.  
 
AMIS-UNMIS and the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur 
The African Union was the first international organization to deploy peacekeepers to 
Darfur in April 2004 after the signing of a peace agreement between the conflict parties. The 
African Union deployments started at 300 peacekeepers and there were more than 7,000 
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peacekeepers by late 2006. The role of the African Union peacekeepers was initially that of 
military observers but it was enlarged to include the protection of civilians as the conflict 
escalated.  
The United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) has been deployed since March 2005. 
UNMIS was concerned with the conflict in Southern Sudan, though, and had no initial 
responsibilities for Darfur. In August 2006, the United Nations Security Council passed 
resolution 1706 that authorized UNMIS to help African Union’s peacekeepers. This was the first 
stage in a three-stage process that culminated with the deployment of a African Union/United 
Nations hybrid mission (UNAMID) that took over from the AMIS responsibilities in December 
2007. UNAMID integrated the United Nations peacekeepers together with the previous AMIS 
peacekeepers into a new type of peace operation: a hybrid. UNAMID was authorized under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter to contribute to the protection of civilian populations, support, 
promote, and implement the ceasefire agreements as well as provide for the humanitarian 
assistance efforts in Darfur.  
UNAMID became a multiple simultaneous peace operation in December 2007. 
Previously, UNMIS and AMIS have been multiple simultaneous peace operations since March 
2005. This case study is concerned mainly with inter-organizational cooperation within 
UNAMID, as both the UN and the AU have their own command and control mechanisms for this 
joint hybrid peace operation. I shall also provide evidence from the inter-organizational 
cooperation that occurred between UNMIS and AMIS on the conflict of Darfur, as this is 
pertinent information for UNAMID’s inter-organizational cooperation.  
UNAMID is a hybrid peace operation: A combined [joint] operation in a particular area 
of responsibility conducted by … forces from different organizations under a common command 
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and control arrangement, for the purpose of achieving a common objective or end state, with 
each force retaining its organization’s identity throughout the operation.” (Aboagye 2007, 3) The 
United Nations and the African Union have cooperated on the peace operations in Darfur since 
early 2006, when the joint UN/AU technical assessment mission was authorized for Darfur. The 
goal of this mission was to figure out how the UN can better help the African Union 
peacekeepers already on the ground. Ever since then the two organizations have created a close 
inter-organizational cooperation relationship between them.  
In December 2006, the two organizations started the Tripartite Mechanism, which 
brought together officials of UNMIS, AMIS and of the Sudanese government, to implement the 
three phases of the hybrid UN-AU peace operation in Darfur (Africa News 2007). The Tripartite 
Mechanism has been used regularly in the pre-deployment stages of UNAMID to make sure that 
inter-organizational cooperation between AMIS and UNMIS at the time, was very good. This 
mechanism continued being used after the deployment of UNAMID as a cooperation mechanism 
between the United Nations and the African Union (Africa News 2009). These meetings have 
been attended by UNAMID’s Joint Special Representative, African Union’s Commissioner for 
Peace and Security as well as UN’ Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping. Neither the 
United Nations nor the African Union could afford a public relations fiasco in the case of Darfur, 
given the complexity of the conflict, and the new, hybrid type of peace operation they used. 
Thus, they were eager to make sure that inter-organizational cooperation works at its very best 
from the very beginning.  
A second innovative mechanism of inter-organizational cooperation between the two 
organizations has been the establishment of the UN Assistance Cell in the African Union 
Headquarters in Addis-Ababa. This mechanism included for the second time in the history of 
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international organizations, and the first time for the United Nations, a UN team embedded 
within the structure of the African Union for the purposes of better cooperation between the two 
organizations. The initial application of this model has been the European Union Cell within the 
military structures of NATO. Murithi (2008, 79) points out “This innovative approach of 
embedding UN staff within the operational structures of a regional organization represents a 
completely new form of partnership.”  
 
Hypothesis 1 – Member-States’ Acquiescence   
Regarding Hypothesis 1, we notice that the member-states of the United Nations and 
African Union generally accepted the cooperation between the two organizations in the case of 
Darfur. Most of the African Union countries contributing troops to AMIS (Rwanda and Nigeria, 
especially) welcomed the cooperation and support they received from UNMIS and later under 
the hybrid new mechanism, UNAMID. Their soldiers were in harm’s way on the ground in 
Darfur, and thus their nations were eager to receive UN’s help. The United Nations member-
states were also willing to cooperate with the African Union on the issue of Darfur, as the AU 
has been deployed there earlier and already had the cultural knowledge on how to deal with rebel 
groups. The only two countries that tried to block inter-organizational cooperation between the 
African Union and the United Nations peacekeepers in Darfur were Sudan and its’ ally in the 
Security Council, China. One day after the UN’s Security Council passed Resolution 1706 
calling for more than 20,000 UN peacekeepers to be deployed in Darfur, Sudan’s president, 
Omar Bashir threatened that all UN peacekeepers will be treated as foreign invaders (Financial 
Times 2006). Similar threats were made by Bashir on a regular basis since 2006, including as 
early as August 2010, when the President of Sudan threatened the international organizations 
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operating in Darfur that if they do not cooperate with the Sudanese government they risk being 
expelled (Al Jazeera 2010).  
China was the second member of the United Nations to question the need to deploy 
United Nations peacekeepers in Darfur. China abstained on the vote for resolution 1706 and has 
maintained throughout the discussions that no UN peace operation should be deployed to Darfur 
without the consent of the government of Sudan. “The Chinese government's consistent stance 
was that peacekeeping actions should first have the permission of the country concerned, not 
only on the issue of Darfur, but also in other actions in which China had participated” was said 
by Qin Gang, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson on September 28, 2006 (BBC 2006). 
In the fall of 2007, China, Sudan’s largest economic and trade partner, has put pressure on the 
government of Omar Al-Bashir to accept the United Nations peacekeepers which it finally did 
(Africa News 2007). In early October 2007, a 315-men multifunctional engineering unit was 
deployed by China within the new UNAMID peace operation in Darfur.   
Thus, Hypothesis 1 is supported by the evidence from this case study. Most member-
states of the African Union and the United Nations supported the deployment of a UN peace 
operation in Darfur to help the Africa Union’s peacekeepers there. Subsequently, these member-
states also supported the close inter-organizational cooperation between the African Union and 
the United Nations peacekeepers. Even the two countries that were mostly opposed to this 
cooperation, Sudan and China, have changed their position before the deployment of the new 
UNAMID peace operation. Sudan, that was keen on having African peacekeepers on the ground 
and not Western peacekeepers, wanted closer cooperation with the African Union. China, on the 
other hand, realized that it stood to lose in terms of image in the international community if it did 
not put pressure on Sudan to accept UNAMID as the new peace operation in Darfur.  
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Hypothesis 2- Financial and Human Resources 
Regarding Hypothesis 2, there is strong support for the argument that inter-organizational 
cooperation between the African Union and the United Nations was brought about by the 
disparity in financial and human resources between the two organizations. The African Union 
Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was poorly financed and never managed to deploy the maximum 
number of peacekeepers proposed: “The mission in Darfur in particular has been criticized as 
being ineffective” - a charge the AU says is a direct result of inadequate resources. Said Djinnit, 
the African Union’s Commissioner for Peace and Security said that “beyond the serious shortfall 
in the financial resources of the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS), the ad hoc nature of a 
significant part of the funding had led to a lack of predictability. This had made it difficult to 
plan, launch and sustain peace support operations.”(Africa News 2007) The financial situation of 
AMIS was so difficult that in March 2006 it only had funds to last it to the end of that month.  
“The 7,000 AU peacekeepers in Darfur have often complained of unpaid wages” (Africa 
News 2007) and only when the UN threw its resources behind the African Union peacekeepers 
in Darfur, did the situation improve. AMIS spent around $200 million in its last year of existence 
before being incorporated within UNAMID. In its first year of deployment UNAMID spent more 
than $1.6 billion dollars on the peace operation. AMIS had only around 1,600 troops left in May 
2007 (from a peak of 7,000) as mentioned above by Said Djinnit, while UNAMID had close to 
16,000 troops. To add to these staggering differences we need to keep in mind that AU’s 
peacekeepers did not have the necessary equipment to efficiently conduct a peace operation 
(Africa News 2007). They relied on “un-armored pickup trucks for the bulk of their mobility 
needs, and had no tactical air support. Second, there was a significant lack of expertise regarding 
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strategic and operational military planning and command and control” (Ekengard 2009). This 
weakness arose because the skills and the human resources were lacking within the AU 
secretariat and at the AMIS Force Headquarters. The differences in financial and human 
resources created the need between the two organizations to cooperate in order to achieve peace 
and security in Darfur. It would have been difficult, if not impossible, for the United Nations to 
deploy its own peace operation to Darfur without working together with the African Union. Most 
likely, the government of Sudan, and most African countries, would not have accepted only a 
UN peace operation and secondly, African Union’s peacekeepers had the knowledge of more 
than 3 years of deployment in a very difficult conflict. Thus, the two organizations needed each 
other. Hypothesis 2 is strongly supported in the case of UNAMID.  
 
Hypothesis 3 - Complementarity 
Do the United Nations and the African Union complement each other’s efforts in 
Darfur’s operations (AMIS-UNMIS, and later UNAMID)? Technically all three peace operations 
(AMIS, UNMIS, and UNAMID) have been military peace enforcements. They were authorized 
under Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charta and were all active in enforcing ceasefire 
agreements. Thus, as with the previous case studies, if we look at the macro-level of the type of 
peace operations we do not notice complementarity. If we move below this macro-level and 
analyze the actual activities conducted by peace operations on the ground, we observe 
complementarity between the two organizations. While the African Union provided “the boots 
on the ground,” the United Nations initially through UNMIS, provided air-lift capability and 
training for the AMIS peacekeepers. The UN also provided its expertise on planning peace 
operations through its Assistance Cell at the African Union headquarters as well as setting up an 
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intelligence cell for the African Union Mission in Sudan (Ekengard, 2008). UNAMID is in itself 
a complementary project. The UN expertise is used more on the planning and training phases of 
the peace operation, while African Union’s expertise is used for effective interactions with the 
local communities. Thus, technically, Hypothesis 3 is not supported by this case study, but I 
would argue that if we take the level of analysis to the activities performed on the ground, we do 
observe complementarity.   
 
Hypothesis 4 - Complex and Difficult Conflicts 
Regarding Hypothesis 4 (complex and difficult conflict), the conflict in Darfur is both a 
civil war and an intra-state rivalry. The sporadic rebel attacks on governmental buildings in 
Darfur that occurred since 2001 developed into a fully-fledged civil war in 2003. In 2003, two 
major Darfur rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and 
Equality Movement (JEM) declared war on the Government in Khartoum. The conflict has many 
roots, but one of the most important ones is the persistent marginalization of the region of Darfur 
by the central government of Khartoum and its discrimination against Black Sudanese citizens 
(the majority of the population in Darfur) in favor of Arab Sudanese citizens. The results of the 
conflict are over 300,000 people killed and more than 2.8 million individuals as refugees and 
internally displaced people, according to the United Nations. (CNN 2008) That this is also an 
intra-state rivalry makes the whole conflict much more complex and difficult to address. Thus, 
inter-organizational cooperation is expected in the case of such a difficult conflict, and 
Hypothesis 4 is supported by evidence of this case study.  
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Hypothesis 5 – Learning  
Regarding Hypothesis 5, both the African Union and the United Nations were 
experienced at deploying peace operations well before their AMIS, UNMIS, and UNAMID 
operations. AMIS was African Union’s sixth multiple simultaneous peace operation, while 
UNAMID was its 9th such MSPO. These previous experiences though are not to say that there 
was no learning going on in-between the African Union and the United Nations. Concerning 
resources, as noted above, the African Union did not have the required expertise, both at AU 
headquarters and at the AMIS operational headquarters for deploying a peace operation in such a 
difficult conflict. But this lack of expertise is less a function of experience and more a function of 
lack of human resources. African militaries had the knowledge and expertise from decades of 
deployment with the United Nations peace operations. Their knowledge and expertise was not 
put to use, though. Thus Hypothesis 5 is not supported by the evidence of this case study. 
 
Hypothesis 6- Security Cultures  
The security cultures of the two organizations are mixed. Both the United Nations and the 
African Union have a mix of civilian and military personnel and activities. By not being strictly 
military or strictly civilian, the two organizations were therefore able to cooperate better across 
security cultures. The embedded UN Cell at the African Union headquarters as well as the 
staggering numbers of liaison officers, 360 military observers and liaison officers, (Stimson 
Center 2008) on the field also helped with the similarity of security cultures. Thus, it is no 
surprise that the two organizations cooperated well with each other. Hypothesis 6 is supported by 
the evidence of this case study.  
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Hypothesis 7- Personal Background  
Hypothesis 7 (personal background) is largely not supported by the evidence in this case 
study. AMIS and UNMIS had leaders from different countries. While UNMIS was led by Ashraf 
Jehangir Qazi (Pakistan) and Jan Pronk (Netherlands), AMIS was led by Rodolphe Adada 
(Congo), Festus Okokwo (Nigeria), and Luke Aprezi (Nigeria). There is no similarity of 
nationalities here. Nevertheless, there is an important aspect that may have played a role in the 
inter-organizational cooperation between the African Union and the United Nations. Rodolphe 
Adada, the Congolese diplomat that led AMIS was also appointed as the head of UNAMID in 
Sudan. This continuity may have played an important role in the smooth transition from AMIS to 
UNAMID and in the good cooperation between the African Union and the United Nations in 
Darfur. Several other top management figures of AMIS were “re-hatted” as the top management 
of UNAMID. The Deputy Joint AU-UN Representative for Operations and Management as of 
fall 2010, Mohamed Yonis, and the Police Commissioner as of fall 2010, James Oppong-Boanuh 
are two such people that had previous experiences in AU’s AMIS. Thus, overall Hypothesis 7 is 
not supported by the evidence of this case study, but there are indications that keeping the same 
people in place and re-hatting them helps the process of inter-organizational cooperation. These 
people can put to use their personal networks within the two organizations to work together in an 
effective and efficient manner.  
Therefore, we could conclude that for the case of African Union-United Nations 
cooperation in Darfur, be it during the AMIS-UNMIS period, or during the UNAMID period, 
inter-organizational cooperation between international organizations in peace operations could 
be explained by the fact that the member-states were acquiescent to their cooperation 
(Hypothesis 1), and by the disparity in financial and human resources (Hypothesis 2), the 
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difficulty and complexity of the conflict (Hypothesis 4), and the similarity in security cultures 
(Hypothesis 6). Hypothesis 3 (complementarity) also played an important role, but only once we 
move to analyzing the micro-level of activities. 
 
Case Studies Concluding Remarks 
If we put together the way the seven hypotheses perform in the three case studies chosen 
we obtain Table 7. 1. This table shows three hypotheses that seem to apply well to the cases 
under discussion (Hypothesis 1, 2 and 3). Hypothesis 1 holds across all cases. If there is no 
member-state acquiescence, as it happened for the case of ISAF and EUPOL in Afghanistan, 
there is no inter-organizational cooperation between the two peace operations. Nevertheless, if 
the member-states agree to cooperation, then the decision moves to the level of the international 
organizations.  
 The second hypothesis holds well in one of three cases. The disparity of resources 
between the African Union and the United Nations was one of the main reasons the United 
Nations decided to deploy a hybrid peace operation in Darfur. On the other hand the disparity of 
resources did not bring about cooperation for the case of Afghanistan, while in the case of 
Kosovo, the EU and the UN had relatively similar resources. There are two reasons for this 
result. One, inter-organizational cooperation got blocked at the level of the member-states with 
Cyprus and Turkey blocking cooperation for EU-NATO in Afghanistan. Two, NATO was not 
willing to cooperate with the European Union until the latter headed its call of doing more, and 
thus would send more troops and money to the peace operation in Afghanistan. The financial 
resources of NATO were five times more than those of the EU, but the human resources of 
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NATO were almost 200 times more than those of the European Union. NATO did not want free-
riding from the EU, but rather wanted the EU to pull its weight.  
On the other hand, in the case of Kosovo, the UN’s resources were only double those of 
the European Union, but still there was cooperation. But, as I have shown earlier, concerns about 
resources did play a role in the EULEX-UNMIK cooperation, especially as the European Union 
was trying to cut costs. Thus, I would argue that even though only one of the three case studies 
illustrates very well this hypothesis, thinking of these results in light of those from the statistical 
analyses and the interviews, hypothesis 2 is supported by the data.  
 Hypothesis three is partially illustrated by the three cases, too. In the case of ISAF-
EUPOL in Afghanistan there is complementarity of activities but with problems. NATO was not 
satisfied with EU’s activities and took over some of their responsibilities in training the Afghani 
police. In this case complementarity did not play a role because inter-organizational cooperation 
was blocked by the member-states. In the cases of Kosovo and Darfur, technically there is no 
complementarity of activities. UNMIK and EULEX are both doing civilian peacebuilding, while 
AMIS, UNMIS, and UNAMID are doing military peace enforcement. Nevertheless, these labels, 
as the EU and NATO officials interviewed in Brussels also pointed out, are too broad and they 
capture many different activities. If we move the level of analysis at the activities that take place 
on the ground, we observe that there is actually complementarity between UNMIK and EULEX 
in Kosovo and between the African Union’s activities and those of the United Nations in Darfur. 
Both the statistical analyses and the interviews point out that complementarity does play a role in 
determining inter-organizational cooperation. All the findings point to the fact that more specific 
categories of activities are better suited to explain the role of complementarity in inter-
organizational cooperation.  
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 As expected, the other hypotheses are not well illustrated by the three case studies. 
Hypothesis five does not apply to any of these three case studies. Hypothesis 4 (conflict 
complexity and difficulty) and 6 (security cultures) are well illustrated in the case of Darfur 
where we observe inter-organizational cooperation in a complex conflict and with the two 
international organizations having similar security cultures. However, there is inter-
organizational cooperation also in the case of Kosovo where the conflict is not so complex and 
difficult and the security cultures are only partially compatible. Hypothesis 7, the personal 
background of the heads of missions does not play a role in inter-organizational cooperation in 
any of these three case studies.  
 These case studies show similar patterns as the previous findings. First, member-states 
must be acquiescent with inter-organizational cooperation. Then, the financial and human 
resources as well as the complementarity of activities play a major role in determining 
cooperation. The personal background hypothesis, that received some limited support from the 
interviews, did not play a role in the results from the statistical analyses, and was neither well 
illustrated in the three case studies presented. The remaining hypotheses were not well illustrated 
in these case studies, as expected from the statistical findings and the interviews. 
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Tables 
Table 7. 1 Illustration of This Study’s Hypotheses Through the Case Studies 
Hypotheses ISAF-EUPOL 
Afghanistan 
 
NO COOPERATION 
EULEX-UNMIK 
Kosovo 
 
COOPERATION 
AMIS-
UNMIS/UNAMID 
Sudan 
COOPERATION 
H1: Member-States’  
Acquiescence 
NO YES YES 
H2: Resources YES NO YES 
H3: Complementarity YES NO, but… NO, but… 
H4: Complex and Difficult 
Conflict 
NO NO YES 
H5: Learning N/A N/A N/A 
H6: Security Cultures NO NO, but… YES 
H7: Personal Background 
Similarity 
NO NO NO 
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CHAPTER 8. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In this study I analyzed the motives for inter-organizational cooperation between 
international organizations when they deploy multiple simultaneous peace operations (MSPOs). 
Multiple simultaneous peace operations were defined as two or more peace operations deployed 
at the same time (simultaneous), in the same conflicts (multiple). The majority (60%) of all 
peace operations are deployed in conflicts in which the peace operations of other international 
organizations are already present. This has been an increasing trend over the last two decades, in 
the aftermath of the Cold War. This increase in peace operations’ inter-organizational 
cooperation since the mid-1990s has not been paralleled by an increase in scholarly analysis of 
this phenomenon. Improving the mechanisms of cooperation between international organizations 
is an issue of global concern, given the need to optimize the use of their financial and human 
resources. Thus, this study explored the factors that determine cooperation between international 
organizations in peace operations.   
There are two stages for the initiation of inter-organizational cooperation: the member-
states and the international organizations. At the first stage of cooperation, the member-states’ 
acquiescence is required. I consider the member-states to be the collective principals delegating 
responsibilities to their agents, international organizations. I use the principal-agent model 
merely as a framework for understanding the motivations for member-states to be acquiescent to 
cooperation between their agents. At the second stage of cooperation, I put forward three 
rational-interest hypotheses to explain international organizations’ motives for inter-
organizational cooperation: resources, complementarity, and conflict complexity. At this second 
stage, I also tested three social-constructivist paths to cooperation derived from the scholarly 
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literature: social learning, security cultures, and similarity in the personal background of the 
international organizations’ staff. Below, I shall briefly reiterate the arguments of each potential 
path to cooperation. 
I also tested three social-constructivist arguments for inter-organizational cooperation 
provided by the scholarly literature. Hypothesis 5 (social learning) states that international 
organizations cooperate because they want to learn from each other’s peace operations 
experiences. Hypothesis 6 argues that similarities in the security cultures of the international 
organizations could explain the initiation of inter-organizational cooperation. Hypothesis 7 states 
that there is a higher probability of enhanced inter-organizational cooperation if the heads of 
missions of different peace operations share the same nationality, know each other, have worked 
with each in different context, or even worked for the other IO previously. 
The research design of this study employs statistical analyses from three new datasets on 
multiple simultaneous peace operations and interviews with international organizations officials. 
In order to illustrate the findings from these two methods, I use three case studies: EU’s EUPOL-
NATO’s ISAF in Afghanistan, AU-UN’s UNAMID in Darfur, Sudan, and EU’s EULEX-UN’s 
UNMIK in Kosovo.  
 
Findings  
Hypothesis 1 argued that member-states are acquiescent to inter-organizational 
cooperation in peace operations because they stand to gain. The gains of the member-states come 
by increasing their control over their agents (international organizations), balancing the risks of 
failure between different agents, promoting their preferred IOs, promoting a national interest 
such as multilateralism, and blocking unwanted competition. Once the hurdle of the member-
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states’ acquiescence is passed, the decision to initiate inter-organizational cooperation moves to 
the level of the international organizations.  
The evidence for Hypothesis 1 suggests that the member-states of international 
organizations generally allow for inter-organizational cooperation to occur. The member-states 
of international organizations blocked inter-organizational cooperation in only six cases out of all 
99 dyads of multiple simultaneous peace operations. Thus, hypothesis 1 is supported by the 
evidence.  
At the second stage of inter-organizational cooperation, the argument made is that IOs 
cooperate with other IOs in peace operations because of rational, cost-benefit calculations. These 
calculations take into account the burden-sharing of the peace operations’ resources, division of 
labor, and conflict complexity. Hypothesis 2 states that international organizations cooperate 
with others because they do not have enough financial and human resources to meet the demand 
for peace operations by themselves. Hypothesis 3 argues that international organizations 
cooperate with each other in peace operations when they perform complimentary peacekeeping 
activities. In these situations they need each other’s expertise in order to be able to do their job. 
Hypothesis 4 states that inter-organizational cooperation is more likely in highly complex 
conflicts. In such conflicts, the probability of peacekeeping failure increases and organizations 
do not want to be singled out for being responsible for failure. Second, highly complex conflicts 
require different types of expertise and a response of more major actors of the international 
community, in order to be dealt with successfully.  
At this second stage, the strongest finding from the statistical analyses is that the IOs 
cooperate because they want to share the human resources burden of peace operations. Inter-
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organizational cooperation is also present when they use similar amounts of financial resources 
and deploy similar peacekeeping activities. Evidence to support Hypothesis 2 regarding the role 
of human and financial resources in inter-organizational cooperation comes from both the dyadic 
and the dyadic-year datasets. Thus, two of the three rational-interest explanations for inter-
organizational cooperation are supported by the evidence. The argument that conflict complexity 
influences the initiation of inter-organizational cooperation was not supported by the statistical 
analyses. No support from the statistical analyses was provided to the socio-constructivist 
hypotheses either.  
Why would international organizations cooperate with each other when there is 
symmetry of financial resources, but an asymmetry of human resources in peace operations? 
This is a surprising finding, given the initial expectation that inter-organizational cooperation 
occurs when there is an asymmetry of both financial and human resources between the two peace 
operations. One explanation for this phenomenon could be that some organizations cannot 
deploy as many peacekeepers as others, but given the general difficulty of finding peacekeepers 
at the international level, their small contingents are very much welcomed.  On the other hand, 
all international organizations should be able to collect and use financial resources for issues of 
peace and security. The wealthier IOs will not allow other international organizations to become 
“free-riders” in peace operations. When it comes down to protecting and helping each other on 
the ground, peacekeepers of various organizations are more willing to do that because they are in 
the “same boat” in Kabul or Sarajevo. Yet, when it comes down to paying the bills, the 
international organizations need to prove to their member-states that other IOs, involved in the 
same conflict, are also pulling their weight. That is why symmetry of financial resources, but 
asymmetry of human resources, is required for inter-organizational cooperation to occur. 
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The statistical analyses show that the complementarity of activities is a factor influencing 
the initiation of inter-organizational cooperation. Nevertheless, the results are in the opposite 
direction than predicted. Cooperation is more likely when the peace operations do similar types 
of activities rather than when they do different types of activities. For example, both the EU and 
the OSCE conduct civilian peacebuilding in Bosnia. Cooperation is more likely in these cases 
when both IOs conduct the same types of activities. One reason why the findings suggest this 
may be because the categories used are too inclusive. For example, in Bosnia, the EU deals with 
conflict transformation and economic development (important aspects for building peace in a 
conflict-torn region), while the OSCE deals with elections supervision and civil society training. 
There are many different activities occurring under the labels of military peace enforcement or 
civilian peacebuilding. This division of labor as illustrated in the EU-OSCE case in Bosnia, 
would avoid duplication and reduce the costs of the overall interventions. A more precise 
differentiation between the types of peacekeeping activities could have different results.  
The interviews with the international organizations’ officials provided evidence for three 
hypotheses: resources, complementarity of peacekeeping activities, and the personal background 
of the heads of missions. The other hypotheses regarding the role of conflict complexity, social 
learning, and security cultures were dismissed by both the statistical analyses and the 
international organizations officials. Sixty-eight percent of the officials interviewed argued that 
the desire to share the burden of peace operations explains inter-organizational cooperation: 
“everybody is resource strained. You have a single resource pool for military and civilian crisis 
management cooperation and you need to find ways, you absolutely need to find ways, to use 
those resources in the most efficient ways and to use the right forums for channeling those and 
cooperation with other international and regional organizations is one of the ways, that can be 
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achieved.” (interview with EU official, Brussels, 2009). Even organizations that have substantial 
amounts of resources, both human and financial resources, such as the United Nations and the 
European Union, want to cooperate with other IOs to keep their costs down. The United Nations 
is often over-stretched, having too many peace operations in too many conflicts. The EU’s 
financial resources depend on the member-states’ willingness to pay for peace operations in 
remote parts of the world.  
Seventy-five percent of the officials interviewed said that complementarity is a factor 
influencing the initiation of inter-organizational cooperation: “It is a question of tools that other 
international organizations have at their disposal that drives inter-organizational cooperation.” 
(interview with EU official, Brussels, 2009). The officials interviewed made it clear that the 
European and NATO want to create synergetic relationships will all the international 
organizations that deploy peace operations. Most of these officials think that the peace operations 
market is large enough for everyone. Otherwise, if the peacekeeping market was too small, 
international organizations would have the ability and willingness to deploy peacekeepers in all 
the conflicts requiring such interventions, as of right now.  
The officials of the international organizations suggested that the personalities of the 
heads of missions play a major role in promoting or blocking inter-organizational cooperation. 
“Personality is very important. Sometimes people have to be withdrawn from the peace operation 
because of personality incompatibility.” (interview with EU official, Brussels, 2009). The 
evidence from the statistical analyses does not provide support for this finding. Nevertheless, for 
the purposes of the statistical analyses, I only looked at similarities in the nationality of the heads 
of missions. There is a good possibility that the officials of the international organizations were 
right, if one would also look at previous work relationships, education ties, and the re-hatting of 
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heads of missions. Paying attention to the role of the personality of heads of missions in the 
initiation of inter-organizational cooperation is a recommendation of this study.   
Finally, I illustrated the findings from the statistical analyses and the interviews through 
three case studies: EU’s EUPOL-NATO’s ISAF in Afghanistan, AU-UN’s UNAMID in Darfur, 
Sudan, and EU’s EULEX-UN’s UNMIK in Kosovo. These case studies illustrated that the 
member-states must be acquiescent with inter-organizational cooperation. Second, the financial / 
human resources as well as the complementarity of activities play a major role in determining 
cooperation. The personal background hypothesis, that received some limited support from the 
interviews, was not significant in the statistical analyses and was not well illustrated in the three 
case studies either. Below I outline the theoretical and empirical contributions of this study, its 
policy implications, and future research ideas that could develop this study further.  
 
Theoretical and Empirical Ccontributions  
There are three major contributions for the study of international organizations and peace 
operations: collective principals-multiple agents model, multiple simultaneous peace operations 
(MSPOs), and a typology of MSPOs. First, this dissertation introduced a new collective 
principals-multiple agents model. This could be formally modeled to provide more evidence for 
the rationale of collective principals (states) to employ multiple agents (international 
organizations) to achieve the same goals. Applying this model would allow us to answer 
questions such as: Why does the United Kingdom delegate similar responsibilities to four 
different agents (international organizations) involved in Kosovo (the EU, the UN, NATO, and 
the OSCE)? Thinking of principal-agent relationships in international organizations through the 
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lenses of this model could be a fruitful way to analyze international organizations, and especially 
their tasks.   
Second, it introduced the concept of multiple simultaneous peace operations (MSPOs). I 
define two or more peace operations deployed by international organizations at the same time, in 
the same conflicts, as multiple simultaneous peace operations (MSPOs). Most peace operations 
(60%), deployed from 1978 to 2009 by international organizations (IOs), were deployed in 
conflicts in which other international organizations’ peace operations were active at the same 
time. Multiple simultaneous peace operations increased from around 10% of all peace operations 
in 1992 to more than 70% of all peace operations in 2007. There is a clear increasing trend in 
inter-institutional cooperation in the context of peace operations since the early 1990s. All IOs 
want to be multilateral and they want to have a comprehensive security approach. Multiple 
simultaneous peace operations are the peacekeeping of the 21st century. In order to properly 
analyze peace operations, we need to understand that peace operations do not operate in a 
vacuum but are often interdependent with each other. In this context the concept of multiple 
simultaneous peace operations becomes essential for analyzing peace operations.   
The third theoretical contribution of this study is the introduction of a typology of 
multiple simultaneous peace operations. There are three types of multiple simultaneous peace 
operations: 1) sequential peace operations (either bridging or hand-overs), 2) parallel 
deployments, and 3) hybrid peace operations. Sequential peace operations refer to those cases in 
which one IO’s peace operation immediately follows (or is followed) by another IO’s peace 
operation. Parallel peace operations refer to those cases in which two or more peace operations 
are deployed independent of each other during an overlapping time period in the same conflict. I 
define hybrid peace operations as those in which there is a joint mission between international 
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organizations. There should also be a unified, joint chain of command involving personnel from 
several international organizations. Out of 99 dyads for multiple simultaneous peace operations, 
76% are parallel deployments (75 peace operations), 19% are sequential (19) and 5% are hybrids 
(5). This typology of MSPOs is useful to highlight that the more complex and bloody conflicts of 
Africa are left to inexperienced regional organizations until enough political support is gathered 
within the U.N. to send a peace operation there. This approach could also represent a way to gain 
experience for such IOs as the African Union and ECOWAS regarding peace operations 
deployments, by allowing them some action before the experienced IOs step in. On the other 
hand, violent conflicts in Europe receive the best expertise first from UN, and only latter, when 
the conflicts have been stabilized, they are left to the more inexperienced European IOs. 
 
Policy Implications and Recommendations  
This study has several policy implications regarding the effectiveness of inter-
organizational cooperation between international organizations. First, the evidence suggests that 
a flexible institutionalization of inter-organizational cooperation is required in order to avoid the 
problems caused by ad-hoc cooperation and personnel turnover. Currently cooperation occurs on 
an ad-hoc basis. Most of the time cooperation occurs only in the field, between the various peace 
operations commanders. A good headquarters-to-headquarters (HQ-to-HQ) cooperation is also 
required to ensure the sustainability of these projects. However, the HQ-to-HQ cooperation 
should allow for cooperation flexibility on the ground, especially on issues of complementarity 
of activities and sharing of resources. For example, if both organizations were mandated by their 
HQ to implement the same activities, a flexible cooperation in the field would allow for an 
efficient division of labor. Second, because peacekeepers are all striving for the same goals, 
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sharing human resources with each other is very important for cooperation. For example, if 
NATO military peacekeepers would provide security to EU’s civilian peacekeepers in 
Afghanistan, there would be increased levels of cooperation between the two organizations. On 
the other hand, the EU, and all other organizations, must use their financial weight and not free 
ride on UN or NATO financing peace operations.  
Second, the cooperation path of EU and NATO with the establishment of an EU Cell 
within NATO structures (even though mostly unused since 2004) is a good method to be 
followed by other IOs. Thus, NATO could have, besides the EU cell, an UN cell, an AU cell or 
OSCE cell within its structures. The United Nations could have similar cells of organizations at 
its headquarters, and so could all the other IOs. These embedded and double-hatted cells would 
ensure not only cooperation between their organization and NATO, but they would also help 
socialize peace workers with each other and in an environment of global governance. In order 
not to burden the bureaucracies of these international organizations, the suggested Cells should 
be small and have primarily a liaison function.  
 The types of relationships mentioned above should become institutionalized through 
Memorandums of Understanding with guidelines for what to do when the IOs find themselves in 
the situation of multiple simultaneous peace operations. In certain cases the politics of the 
organizations may interfere with IO-IO cooperation. But as one interviewee said, “we are all 
[often] working for the same goals”, so at the staff level, where politics play less of a role, this 
cooperation could be encouraged. In these cases they would all be striving for peace and conflict 
resolution, regardless of whom they represent. Information about the peace operations could be 
shared on a daily basis. Planning new peace operations could involve all the relevant actors from 
the very beginning of the process, instead of trying to figure out how to work together on an ad-
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hoc basis. Starting the cooperation process from the planning phase could allow the development 
of joint goals, objectives, and activities without any incompatibilities to hinder them. 
Third, cooperation is currently only in a bilateral format between IOs. There are UN-EU 
or EU-AU meetings twice a year of which peace operations are brought up for discussion. 
Nevertheless, given that there are just around ten IOs who have (or had) peace operations 
responsibilities, it would be beneficial to institutionalize yearly summits on the status of peace 
operations. Officials from all the IOs that deploy peacekeepers could gather twice a year at these 
summits and discuss the global problems they face and the common global solutions they should 
implement.  
If we are to see more IO-IO cooperation in the future, all major IOs in the field of peace 
operations must have liaison officers deployed at the headquarters of the other organizations. For 
example, even though the UN-EU relationship is the one with most multiple simultaneous peace 
operations, UN does not have a specific liaison officer which deals with peace operations in 
Brussels (the interviews unraveled that the UN is currently seriously considering to send one but 
no such thing has happened since 2009). Secondly, staff to staff meetings should be increased, 
because at the end of the day it is individuals who cooperate. This could be done through joint 
trainings and exercises of the international civil servants from the various international 
organizations. Observers from other IOs should be encouraged to see how IO-IO cooperation 
works between other organizations either at the headquarters or in the field. Lessons learned 
from inter-institutional cooperation or lack of it should also be studied and analyzed by the 
respective departments in the IOs. 
In order to ensure good cooperation in the field, IOs should pay attention at the 
personalities of their heads of missions, police and military - their previous work experience, 
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nationality or education - in order to ensure the closest similarities possible. Even though 
nationality did not play a role in determining the initiation of cooperation, other factors such as 
previous work experience in the other IO or having graduated from the same university as the 
other head of mission could play a role. Second, these characteristics may be very important for 
the depth of inter-organizational cooperation.  
Finally, one of the findings of the interviews was that the staff of international 
organizations do not think that more inter-organizational cooperation is better. Inter-
organizational cooperation could also be a problem and a burden on the IOs because it takes 
away too much time, resources, and staff from the actual peacekeeping activities of the IOs. 
Having the peace operations’ staff spending all their time in cooperation meetings with other 
IOs, instead of implementing their peacekeeping activities is not an effective option. A good 
balance has to be struck regarding the best level of cooperation for specific peace operations. A 
flexible institutionalization of inter-organizational cooperation would allow for the organizations 
to identify through multiple trial and errors, the levels of such a good balance. 
 
Future Research  
This research project is the first in a series of studies analyzing multiple simultaneous 
peace operations and cooperation between and within international organizations. Next, a 
potential research project would be to analyze the impact of inter-organizational cooperation on 
a) the overall success of peace operations, b) the depth of inter-organizational cooperation, c) the 
role of informal channels of cooperation in peace operations, d) inter-organizational cooperation 
between IOs and other international actors such as non-governmental organizations and 
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multinational peace operations active in the peace operations environment, and finally, e)intra-
organizational cooperation between IOs’ units responsible for peace operations. 
The immediate spin-off research asks the question: Does the success of peace operations 
increase if there is inter-organizational cooperation between the multiple simultaneous peace 
operations of the international organizations? What inter-organizational cooperation factors 
increase/decrease the probability of success? I argue that this is an important question that has 
theoretical contributions for the global governance and international organizations literature, as 
well as policy contributions especially for the European Union. One theoretical contribution 
made by such a study is that it would show how this type of international cooperation is a 
mechanism of global governance. Second, this study will provide explanations for the conditions 
that determine inter-organizational cooperation to lead to a successful peace operation and also 
what should be learned from the lessons of inter-organizational cooperation that led to 
unsuccessful peace operations. From a policy perspective, as inter-organizational cooperation is 
presented as a panacea for keeping track of the myriad of third parties active in a post-conflict 
environment, this research would allow us to test the largely-held belief among policy-makers 
that the probability of peace operations’ success increases if there is inter-organizational 
cooperation. 
A second spin-off study from this project would go beyond the initiation of inter-
organizational cooperation to analyze the depth of inter-organizational cooperation in peace 
operations. Are the levels of cooperation deeper between some dyads of international 
organizations than between others? Why? What determines the depth of inter-organizational 
cooperation? How does the depth of inter-organizational cooperation impact the overall success 
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of the intervention? These are some of the research questions on the depth of inter-organizational 
cooperation that could be tackled in future studies.  
The European Union and NATO officials interviewed for this study mentioned that a 
large amount of cooperation occurs informally, below the radar of the formal relationships 
between organizations. Peace operations officials know each other and they share information 
with each other. In the field, far away from the politics of the headquarters, peacekeepers 
establish informal channels of cooperation. I would be interested in understanding how these 
channels of cooperation are initiated and maintained. A potential project would be to compare 
the impact of these informal channels of cooperation with the impact of the formal channels of 
cooperation, on the overall success of the intervention.  
For the purposes of this study I focused only on inter-organizational cooperation between 
international organizations. Nevertheless, there are also multinational peace operations deployed 
in conflicts in which the international organizations also deployed their own peacekeepers. 
Second, peace operations environments have a myriad of non-governmental organizations that 
work on issues of peacebuilding and conflict management. Mapping all the actors within peace 
operation environments and the links between these actors could be a potential research project. 
This map would allow policy-makers to create a more effective division of labor between all 
these actors, to observe blockages and challenges in the relationships between the actors, and to 
take appropriate measures to deal with these challenges. 
   During the interviews with EU and NATO officials, I was told numerous times about 
the rivalries and the cooperation difficulties that occur within international organizations. For 
example, within the European Union, there are multiple institutions and units responsible for 
peace operations: Council of the European Union, European Union Military Staff, Civilian 
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Planning and Conduct Capability Unit, European Commission, EU Cell at NATO SHAPE. 
These units have different goals, different agendas, different methods and these rarely coincide 
with each other. Thus, understanding how intra-organizational cooperation occurs in order to 
have a peace operation deployed and to make sure that the peacekeepers have all the necessary 
resources to be successful is a research topic that has not received much scholarly attention. For 
example, in the case of the United Nations, the need for better integration and cooperation 
between the multiple UN agencies and units present in a peace operation environment has been 
reiterated by policy-makers. But in order to have better cooperation between multiple agencies 
and units we need to understand what are the challenges to this cooperation and how this 
cooperation could occur. The scholarly community on peace operations has not yet heeded the 
call for research on intra-organizational cooperation.  
These spin-off research projects are proof that the study of inter and intra organizational 
cooperation is an area that holds a lot of potential in the field of international cooperation. The 
world of international organizations is not a black-box but it is rather much more complex. 
Mapping these complexities would help scholarly research to be more policy-relevant for these 
international organizations.   
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APPENDIX A. ALL PEACE OPERATIONS, 1947-2009 
 
 Conflict IO Peace Operation 
Afghanistan NATO ISAF 
Afghanistan EU EUPOL 
Afghanistan UN UNGOMAP, OSGAP 
Afghanistan UN UNAMA 
Albania Multinational MPF-Operation Alba 
Albania OSCE OSCE  Albania 
Albania NATO AFOR 
Angola UN UNAVEM I 
Angola UN UNAVEM II 
Angola UN UNAVEM III 
Angola UN MONUA 
Bosnia NATO IFOR 
Bosnia NATO RRF 
Bosnia OSCE OSCE - Bosnia 
Bosnia NATO SFOR 
Bosnia EU EUPM 
Bosnia EU EUFOR 
Bosnia UN UNPROFOR-BH 
Bosnia UN UNMIBH 
Burundi OAU OMIB 
Burundi AU AMIB 
Burundi AU AU STF 
Burundi UN ONUB 
Burundi UN BINUB 
Cambodia UN UNAMIC 
Cambodia UN UNTAC 
CAR UN  MISAB 
CAR CEMAC FOMUC 
CAR ECCAS MICOPAX I 
CAR EU EUFOR Tchad-CAR 
CAR UN MINURCAT 
CAR (Centr. 
African Rep) 
UN MINURCA 
Central America UN ONUCA 
Chad Multinational Chad I 
Chad OAU Chad II 
Chad OAU Chad III 
Chad/Libya UN UNASOG 
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Columbia OAS OAS 
Comoros OAU OMIC 
Congo, DR SADC Sovereign Legitimacy 
Congo, DR OAU OAU Observer Mission 
Congo, DR EU EUPOL Kinshasa 
Congo, DR EU EUSEC 
Congo, DR EU EUFOR Congo 
Congo, DR EU EUPOL Congo 
Congo, DR EU Operation Artemis 
Congo, DR UN ONUC 
Congo, DR UN MONUC  
Costa Rica, 
Nicaragua 
OAS OAS Mil Experts Comm 
Croatia OSCE OSCE Croatia 
Croatia UN UNPROFOR-C, UNCRO 
Croatia UN UNPF 
Croatia UN UNMOP 
Croatia UN UNTAES 
Cyprus UN UNFICYP 
Dominican Rep OAS OAS IAPF 
Egypt (Sinai) Multinational MFO 
El Salvador UN ONUSAL 
Estonia OSCE OSCE - Estonia  
Ethiopia, Eritrea AU OLMEE 
Ethiopia, Eritrea UN UNMEE 
Georgia Multinational So. Ossetia Jnt Force 
Georgia Multinational Russian Abkhazia Peacekeeping Operation 
Georgia CIS CPKF/CPFOR 
Georgia OSCE OSCE Georgia 
Georgia EU EUJUST THEMIS 
Georgia EU EUMM 
Georgia UN UNOMIG 
Guatemala UN MINUGUA 
Guinea Bissau ECOWAS ECOMOG 
Guinea Bissau EU  EU SSR 
Guinea Bissau UN UNIOGBIS 
Haiti Multinational Operation Uphold Democracy 
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Haiti Multinational MIFH 
Haiti OAS/UN MICIVIH 
Haiti UN UNMIH 
Haiti UN UNSMIH 
Haiti UN  UNTMIH 
Haiti UN MIPONUH 
Haiti UN MINUSTAH 
Honduras, El 
Salvador 
OAS OAS Mil Obsvrs II 
Honduras, 
Nicaragua 
OAS OAS 
India, Pakistan UN UNMOGIP 
India, Pakistan UN UNIPOM 
Indonesia (Aceh) EU Aceh Monitoring 
Iran, Iraq UN UNIIMOG 
Iraq Multinational OIF, res 1483 
Iraq UN UNAMI 
Iraq NATO NATO's Training Iraq 
Iraq EU EUJUST LEX 
Israel, Egypt UN UNEF I 
Israel, Egypt UN UNEF II 
Israel/Arab UN UNTSO 
Israel, Syria UN UNDOF 
Israel/ Palestine EU EUBAM Rafah 
Israel/ Palestine EU EUPOL Palestine 
Ivory Coast Multinational Operation Licorne 
Ivory Coast ECOWAS ECOMICI 
Ivory Coast UN MINUCI 
Ivory Coast UN ONUCI 
Kosovo OSCE OSCE Kosovo, Sandjak, Vojvodina 
Kosovo OSCE OSCE Verification Kosovo 
Kosovo NATO KFOR 
Kosovo OSCE OSCE Mission in Kosovo 
Kosovo EU EULEX Kosovo 
Kosovo UN UNMIK 
Kuwait LAS LAS 
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Kuwait, Iraq UN UNIKOM  
Latvia OSCE OSCE-Latvia 
Lebanon Multinational MNF I 
Lebanon Multinational MNF II 
Lebanon LAS ADF 
Lebanon UN UNOGIL 
Lebanon UN UNIFIL 
Lesotho SADC SADC 
Liberia ECOWAS ECOMOG 
Liberia ECOWAS ECOMIL 
Liberia UN UNOMIL 
Liberia UN UNMIL 
Macedonia OSCE OSCE Skopje Spill-Over 
Macedonia NATO KFOR 
Macedonia NATO Essential Harvest 
Macedonia NATO Amber Fox 
Macedonia NATO Allied Harmony 
Macedonia EU Concordia 
Macedonia EU Proxima 
Macedonia EU EUPAT 
Macedonia UN UNPREDEP 
Moldova CIS Moldova Joint Force 
Moldova OSCE OSCE-Moldova  
Moldova EU EU-Ukraine/Moldova 
Mozambique UN ONUMOZ 
Namibia UN UNTAG 
Nepal UN UNMIN 
Nicaragua OAS CIAV-OAS 
Papua New 
Guinea 
Bougainville 
Multinational TMG (Truce Monitoring Group) 
Papua New 
Guinea 
Bougainville 
Multinational PMG (Peace Monitoring Group) 
Peru, Ecuador Multinational MOMEP 
Russia 
(Chechnya) 
OSCE OSCE Chechnya 
Rwanda Multinational Operation Turquoise 
Rwanda OAU OAU NMOG I 
Rwanda OAU OAU NMOG II 
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Rwanda UN UNOMUR 
Rwanda UN UNAMIR I 
Rwanda UN UNAMIR II 
Sierra Leone ECOWAS ECOMOG 
Sierra Leone UN UNOMSIL 
Sierra Leone UN UNAMSIL 
Sierra Leone UN UNIOSIL 
Sierra Leone UN UNIPSIL 
Solomon Islands Multinational IPMT 
Solomon Islands Multinational RAMSI 
Solomon Islands Commonwealth CMPAG 
Somalia Multinational UNITAF 
Somalia AU AMISOM 
Somalia NATO NATO 
Somalia EU EU NAVFOR 
Somalia UN UNOSOM I 
Somalia UN UNOSOM II 
Sri Lanka Multinational IPKF 
Sudan AU AMIS 
Sudan EU EU-AMIS 
Sudan AU/UN UNAMID 
Sudan UN UNMIS 
Suriname OAS OAS 
Tajikistan CIS CPKF 
Tajikistan OSCE OSCE-Tajikistan 
Tajikistan UN UNMOT 
Timor Leste Multinational INTERFET 
Timor Leste UN UNTAET 
Timor Leste UN UNMISET 
Timor Leste UN UNOTIL 
Timor Leste UN UNMIT 
Ukraine OSCE OSCE - Ukraine 
W. New Guinea UN UNTEA/UNSF 
W. Sahara UN MINURSO 
Yemen LAS LAS 
Yemen UN UNYOM 
Zimbabwe Commonwealth CMF 
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APPENDIX B. LIST OF ALL MSPOs, 1978-2009 
Conflict IO Peace Operation 
Afghanistan  EU EUPOL 
Afghanistan  NATO ISAF 
Afghanistan  UN UNAMA 
Bosnia EU EUPM 
Bosnia EU EUFOR Althea 
Bosnia NATO RRF 
Bosnia NATO IFOR 
Bosnia NATO SFOR 
Bosnia OSCE OSCE-BH 
Bosnia UN UNPROFOR 
Bosnia UN UNMIBH 
Burundi AU AMIB 
Burundi AU AU STF 
Burundi UN ONUB 
Burundi UN BINUB 
CAR AU MISAB 
CAR CEMAC FOMUC 
CAR ECCAS MICOPAX I 
CAR EU EUFOR Tchad-CAR 
CAR UN MINURCA 
CAR UN MINURCAT 
Congo, DR AU OAU Observer 
Mission  
Congo, DR EU Artemis 
Congo, DR EU EUPOL Kinshasa 
Congo, DR EU EUSEC 
Congo, DR EU EUFOR Congo 
Congo, DR EU EUPOL Congo 
Congo, DR SADC Operation Sovereign 
Legitimacy  
Congo, DR UN  MONUC 
Croatia OSCE OSCE Croatia 
Croatia UN UNPF 
Croatia UN UNMOP 
Croatia UN  UNTAES 
Ethiopia/Eritreea AU OLMEE 
Ethiopia/Eritreea UN UNMEE 
Georgia CIS CPKF/CPFOR 
Georgia EU EUJUST THEMIS 
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Georgia EU EUMM 
Georgia OSCE OSCE Georgia 
Georgia UN UNOMIG 
Guinea-Bissau EU SSR 
Guinea-Bissau UN UNIOGBIS 
Haiti OAS/UN MICIVIH 
Haiti UN UNMIH 
Haiti UN UNSMIH 
Haiti UN UNTMIH 
Haiti UN MIPONUH 
Iraq EU EUJUST LEX 
Iraq NATO NATO Iraq 
Iraq UN UNAMI 
Ivory Coast ECOWAS ECOMICI 
Ivory Coast UN MINUCI 
Ivory Coast UN ONUCI 
Lebanon LAS Arab Deterrent Force 
Lebanon UN  UNIFIL 
Liberia ECOWAS ECOMOG 
Liberia ECOWAS ECOMIL 
Liberia UN UNOMIL 
Liberia UN  UNMIL 
Macedonia EU Concordia 
Macedonia EU Proxima 
Macedonia EU EUPAT 
Macedonia NATO KFOR 
Macedonia NATO Essential Harvest 
Macedonia NATO Amber Fox 
Macedonia NATO Allied Harmony 
Macedonia OSCE Skopje Spill-over  
Macedonia UN UNPREDEP 
Middle East EU EUBAM Rafah 
Middle East EU EUPOL Palestine 
Middle East UN UNTSO 
Moldova CIS CIS Moldova 
Moldova EU EU Moldova/Ukraine  
Moldova OSCE OSCE Moldova 
Nicaragua OAS CIAV-OAS 
Nicaragua UN ONUCA 
Rwanda  AU OAU NMOG II 
Rwanda  UN UNAMIR I 
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Rwanda  UN UNOMUR 
Serbia(Kosovo) EU EULEX 
Serbia(Kosovo) NATO KFOR 
Serbia(Kosovo) OSCE OSCE Mission in 
Kosovo 
Serbia(Kosovo) UN  UNMIK 
Sierra Leone ECOWAS ECOMOG 
Sierra Leone UN  UNOMSIL 
Sierra Leone UN  UNAMSIL 
Somalia AU AMISOM 
Somalia EU EU NAVFOR 
Somalia NATO ALLIED 
PROTECTOR 
Sudan AU AMIS 
Sudan EU EU-AMIS 
Sudan UN UNMIS 
Sudan UN/AU UNAMID 
Tajikistan CIS CPKF 
Tajikistan OSCE OSCE Tajikistan 
Tajikistan UN UNMOT 
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APPENDIX C. DYADIC MULTIPLE SIMULTANEOUS PEACE OPERATIONS 
DATASET v1.00 
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APPENDIX D. DYADIC MULTIPLE SIMULTANEOUS PEACE OPERATIONS 
DATASET V1.00 CODEBOOK 
 
Below you will find an explanation of the variables included in the Dyadic Multiple 
Simultaneous Peace Operations Dataset v1.00. Please contact the author if you have any 
questions.  
VARIABLES  
conflict  
The country or region in which the peace operation was deployed. 
startmon  
The month in which the peace operation started.  
startyear  
The year in which the peace operation started. 
endmon  
The month in which the peace operation ended. 
endyear  
The year in which the peace operation ended. 
io1  
Name of international organization 1. 
missionname1  
Name of the peace operation deployed by international organization 1. 
io2  
Name of international organization 2 
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missionname2  
Name of the peace operation deployed by international organization 2 
seccultio1  
Security culture of international organization 1. There are three types of security cultures coded 
depending on the majority of activities of an IO:   
1= military; 2= mixed; 3= civilian.  
Thus, NATO is a military IO, UN, AU, and ECOWAS are mixed IOs, EU and OSCE are civilian 
IOs. 
seccultio2  
Security culture of international organization 1. There are three types of security cultures coded 
depending on the majority of activities of an IO:  1= military; 2= mixed; 3= civilian.  
Thus, NATO is a military IO, UN, AU, and ECOWAS are mixed IOs, EU and OSCE are civilian 
IOs. 
financial resource IO1  
The average cost of peace operation 1 in million $USD.  
financial resource IO2  
The average cost of peace operation 2 in million $USD. 
human resource IO1 
The average number of troops, police, and civilians deployed by peace operation 1.  
human resource IO2  
The average number of troops, police, and civilians deployed by peace operation 2.  
mission1 type 
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Type of intervention by peace operation 1. There are three types of intervention coded: 
1=traditional peacekeeping; 2= military peace enforcement; 3= civilian peace-building 
mission2 type 
Type of intervention by peace operation 2. There are three types of intervention coded: 
1=traditional peacekeeping; 2= military peace enforcement; 3= civilian peace-building 
conftype 
The type of conflict in which the peace operations deployed. There are four types of conflicts 
coded using the PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset 4-2009: extra-state, internationalized intra-state, 
intra-state, and inter-state conflicts.  
Internationalize intra-state conflicts were coded as 3. Intra-state conflicts were coded as 2. Inter-
state conflicts were coded as 1. Exta-state conflicts were coded as 0. There were no peace 
operations deployed in extra-state conflicts.  
riv  
If the conflict was coded as inter-state rivalry by either Klein, Goertz, and Diehl40 or as intra-
state rivalry by Bercovitch and DeRouen 41than it was recorded as a rivalry and it got a 1 in the 
dataset. If not, it received a 0.  
mspo type 
There are three types of deployments coded: 1= sequential, 2= parallel, and 3= hybrid. 
-999  = missing data  
xxxx = peace operation unfinished as of December 21, 2008 
 
                                                           
40 Klein, James P., Gary Goertz, and Paul F. Diehl. 2006. “The New Rivalry Dataset: Procedures and Patterns.” 
Journal of Peace Research 43(3): 331 - 348 
41 Derouen, Karl, and Jacob Bercovitch. 2008. “Enduring Internal Rivalries: A New Framework for the Study of 
Civil War.” Journal of Peace Research 54(1):.55-74 
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APPENDIX E. INTERVIEW PROTOCOL QUESTIONS 
1) What is your position within the inter-institutional organization (IGO)? 
 
2) Could you please describe your job profile? What are your regular duties?  
 
3) How are these duties relevant for peace operations?  
 
4) What is your experience with peace operations?  
 
5) For what other inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) have you worked before? For 
what periods of time? What was the job profile for that position? 
 
6) What is your personal experience in working with officials from other inter-institutional 
organizations(IGOs) on a regular basis? Please describe the type of cooperation, duration 
as well as an assessment of its effectiveness. 
 
7) Do you think that there is a trend towards inter-institutional cooperation in the context of 
peace operations? Why?  
 
8) If yes, do you think this is a trend that will increase in the future?  
 
9) In the existing cases of inter-institutional cooperation between your organization and 
other organizations (IGOs) why do you think your organization sought cooperation in the  
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context of peace operations? Why do you think the other organization sought 
cooperation? Do you think that the rationale for cooperation is different depending with 
whom your IGO cooperates with?  
 
10) How does this cooperation occur? Could you describe exactly how your organization and 
the other IGO cooperate, both at the headquarters level but also in the deployment field of 
the peace operation?  
 
11)  Do you have specific liaison officers to the other IGOs headquarters? Are there regular 
meetings between officials of the two IGOs? Please describe. 
 
12)  How does cooperation in the field, at the operational level occur?  
 
13) Is this cooperation different depending on the identity of the other IGO with whom your 
organization cooperates? How?  
 
14) How does your organization cooperate with United Nations? European Union? African 
Union? NATO? OSCE? Other IGOs on peace operations issues? How effective is this 
cooperation?  
 
15) How in depth is cooperation with other IGOs?  
 
16) Why do you think the other IGOs cooperate with your IGO in peace operations?  
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17) In your opinion which is the most institutionalized form of cooperation between your 
IGO and another IGO? Why?  
 
18) In your opinion which is the least important form of cooperation between your IGO and 
another IGO? Why?  
 
19) How important is cooperation with other IGOs for your IGO? Why?  
 
20) Do you think that sharing the high costs of peace operations between different IGOs is an 
important factor in explaining IGO-IGO cooperation? 
 
21) Do you think that IGOs cooperate because in case of failure they do not want to be 
singled out for blame?  
 
22) Do you think that IGOs who are in their early years of peace operations cooperate more? 
Why?  
 
23) What role do you think compatibility of norms of peaceful conflict resolution play in 
determining IGO-IGO cooperation?  
 
24) What common norms bring certain IGOs to cooperate while cooperation with other IGOs 
is not considered?  
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25) Do you think that similar security cultures between IGOs increase the probability of 
cooperation between them? Why? 
 
26) Do you think that IGOs that lack resources (human or financial) are more likely to seek 
cooperation with other IGOs? Why?  
 
27) Do you think that IGOs that have expertise in a specific type of conflict resolution or in a 
specific region will cooperate more? Why?   
 
28) Do you think that we should see more IGO-IGO peace operations cooperation in the 
context of complex conflicts? Why?  
 
29) If you had to choose the single most important factor which would explain why your IGO 
cooperates with other IGOs what would it be? 
 
30) If you had to choose the single most important factor which would explain why IGOs in 
general cooperate with each other what would it be?  
 
31) Would you like to add anything to these answers and to the general topic?  
 
Thank you for your time! 
 
